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INTRODUCTION 
The amnesty of 1846, the first political act of Pope Pius IX, created a 
sensation in its age. Today, however, it receives only perfunctory men-
tion in most histories, and very little attention beyond that. What 
originally looked like the new beginning of a "Liberal" Pope is now seen 
as just a false start for a famous conservative. 
This sudden change of opinion is no doubt strongly conditioned by 
the events of th~ Roman Revolution of 1848. It is fairly well known 
that some of the most visible leaders of that revolt had also received 
pardon for their previous offenses a mere 2 years before. It is even 
better known that the Pope himself, following his restoration, retreated 
from enlightened political reforms into religious conservatism and bit-
terness for the rest of his days. His subsequent unwillingness to con-
tinue political programs which had only recently made him the toast of 
the Italian nation appear to be rooted in suspicion and hurt - he acted 
on the belief that his own subjects had violated his kindness and trust. 
There were, to be sure, several recipients of the amnesty who had 
turned against their erstwhile benefactor. Among the best known were 
Pietro Sterbini, sincere democrat and arch-promoter of the Roman Repub-
lic, Giuseppe Galletti, a gentle Mazzinian, and the young firebrand Fel-
ice Orsini, who would later die for his attempt to assassinate Napoleon 
III. We can identify other names of high-profile plotters who came home 
in 1846 to continue their former activities: Pietro Beltrami, Raffaele 
vii 
Pasi, Livio Zambeccari, and several members of the Caldesi and Muratori 
families. Whatever each of these men intended in his inmost self, loyal 
or not, Pius certainly could not know. We can easily forgive him for 
concluding that they had been "poor risks" - that reconciliation for 
them was probably a bad idea. Thus we are left with the impression that 
the amnesty was an act of folly and political naivitee'. 
State of the Question 
Until now, those authors who mention the amnesty at all usually do so in 
some larger context; either of the Revolution of 1848, or of the person 
and reign of Pius IX. Hence the amnesty is typically treated as an iso-
lated event, and often a mistake at that. What I propose to do in this 
investigation is to focus on the valuable data generated by the amnesty 
itself. Two distinct archival fonts contain a rich lode of information 
on the individuals who first applied for it in 1846, as well as those 
who were later indicted for violating its conditions. This neglected 
information will clearly show that the amnesty was not only a just and 
generous political action, but that it was an act of mutual trust which 
was generally respected and honored by those who benefited from it. 
Even in the context of 1848, the amnesty and the Revolution which came 
after it are unique. Those who led and those who followed were cer-
tainly not cast in the mold of 1830. 
Those writers tend to follow several variations of a single theme. 
Pius IX represents an important element of the Old Regime, as he fights 
frantically to hold back the tide of the modern world, which is vari-
ously interpreted in terms of nationalism, liberalism or social justice. 
viii 
Writing within 20 years.of the event, authors like Alphonse Balla-
dier and Giuseppe Spada promoted the rather conservative image of a 
legitimate and moral government overthrown by mindless democrats, or by 
anarchists who threatened the very foundations of civilization. Luigi 
Carlo Farini moderated this vision somewhat: he saw Pius' regime as 
anachronistic, yet holding the middle ground between clerical reaction-
aries and qoctrinaire nationalists, and still fighting the same lost 
cause. At the opposite end of the spectrum are authors like Raffaele 
DeCesare, Gius~ppe Leti, and George M~ Trevelyan. Writing during the 
early decades of this century, they interpreted the revolution in terms 
of heroic patriots fighting to overthrow an outdated rule of supersti-
tion, clericalism, and medieval relics so that the New Italy could 
emerge. Still more recently, works of George F-H. Berkeley (1932-40), 
E. E. Y. Hales (1954-60), and Frank J. Coppa (1974-85) have presented a 
less stereotypical portrait of the Pope. Like Farini, they have shown 
Pius and his advisors as attempting to steer a middle course between 
extremists. They are drawn as well-meaning individuals who were eventu-
ally overcome by forces beyond their understanding and control. In each 
of these several interpretations, 1848 in Rome is essentially the same 
as other revolutions since the Restoration. 
Three works of Domenico Demarco from the 1940 1 s present another 
sort of interpretation. He pointed out in great detail that the 3-month 
Provisional Government of 1848 gained very broad support among nearly 
all Roman citizens by responding to bread-and-butter issues more effec-
tively than any papal government ever had. Although doomed from the 
ix 
start by the international situation and by financial chaos, the interim 
government had established a spirit of sympathy and good will which was 
passed on to Mazzini. This legacy, in part, helped to explain why so 
many people made heroic sacrifices during the siege. For Demarco, the 
Roman Revolution is a new thing in Italy because of its social basis and 
broad support. 
This study will fall somewhere between these interpretations. 
Some of the leaders of the revolt against Pius were veterans of the for-
mer troubles: 1831, 1843 and 1845 - traditional "carbonari against man-
archy" conflicts. But the vast majority of the amnesty recipients did 
NOT support the new rebellion. Indeed some of them actively opposed it 
and died in the process. The obvious conclusion, with data to back it 
up, is that the 1848 revolt resulted from new leadership and issues; 
those who supported the Provisional Government and Mazzini's Republic 
were not the same as the old veterans pardoned in 1846. 
In one of the most recent works on the Risorgimento, the author 
states that "something like 2000 (sic) potential revolutionaries were 
thus once again walking the streets of Rome, Bologna and the rest of the 
state". 1 The implication is all too clear that the former exiles and 
prisoners anxiously returned to their former plotting. The same theme 
resumes only a few pages later: "The coming revolution thus had paten-
tial leaders as a result of the amnesty of 1846. 112 This - author is typi-
cal of most; a handful of leaders are allowed to represent the entire 
1 Harry Hearder, Italy in the Age of the Risorgimento, 1790-1870 
(London: Longman, 1983), p. 109. 
2 Hearder, Italy p. 112. 
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group. If this proves to be true, then 1848 is merely a larger 
of the previous revolutions. But if not, then we must conclude that 
l848 attracted new people, motivated by newer issues, concerns and cir-
cumstances. 
So what about all of those others? Over 1000 prisoners and exiles 
applied for the amnesty, and most of them received it. But apart from 
the best known among them - those already mentioned - there has never 
been any systematic attempt to study the entire group. It seems strange 
for the remaining prisoners and exiles have been neglected for so long. 
After all, most of them had been courageous enough (at least once) to 
put their lives and fortunes at risk. Then, as now, overt opposition to 
one 1 s government is dangerous. Pius 1 amnesty them a chance to 
return home and attempt a fresh start; most of them were only too happy 
to accept the opportunity. But did the allure of politics during the 
exciting 1848 period grow too strong for them? Did the passion for 
reform and change re-ignite the old fire to sweep away the venerable 
Papal States in favor of a modern, united Italy? Let us find out. 
Objectives 
The objective of this study is to complete that investigation. There 
are three fundamental questions: Exactly who took part in the subse-
quent Revolution, and who did not? What significant patterns are there, 
if any, in the background of those individuals (place of origin, social 
class, and places of exile or imprisonment), and what do the patterns 
mean? What connection is there, if any, between this background and the 
type of participation (political or criminal) in the revolution'? 
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Instead of using one statistical sample, the entire group of such 
oners and exiles who benefitted from the of 1846 will provide 
the raw material for the study. In this way, the somewhat vague argu-
"l 1 fl • lt f t 1 b . ment over oya ty mig1 assume a more ac ua as1s. 
Method 
The investigation consists of a comparison between two lists of names: 
a "Long List" of all exiles and prisoners who profited from the amnesty 
II h L' I! f h h h , 1 d b of 1846, and a S ort 1st o t ose w o may ave v10 ate its terms y 
what they did in the next three years. 
Principal sources for the Long List are the records of the Secre-
tariat of State, preserved today in the Vatican Archives. There were 
contemporary printed lists of the amnistiati, but they are full of 
errors and omissions. The 11 Long List" used here was composed from 
scratch, using the original correspondance which applied the global 
amnesty to individual prisoners and exiles. 
The Short List will then be drawn from "sample of the whole" 
by determining which individuals allegedly violated the promise to 
behave themselves after 1846. The best sources for this material are 
found in the State Archives in Rome among the court, police and mil 
records for the restoration years. There is a great abundance of mater-
ial in these fonts, most of it badly neglected by scholars. 
Even allowing for inevitable gaps and deficiencies, the results of 
this study are truly startling. This unified profile of large numbers 
of former revolutionaries has an obvious interest for scholar and dile-
tante alike. The result insights not only puncture several myths 
xii 
about the amnesty itself, but cast a whole new light on Pius IX and his 
government. 
xiii 
CHAPTER I 
THE PAPAL STATES TO 1846 
When Pius IX was elected Pope in 1846, his Temporal Dominions, the Papal 
States, extended from Venetia in the north to Naples in the south. In 
total area, the state was about 41,400 square kilometers. Its greatest 
length was about 435 kilometers, and its average width was about 130. 1 
Its population·numbered almost three million inhabitants, of whom a mere 
14 to 17 percent lived in towns of a thousand or more. 2 The remainder 
(at least 2,400,000 people) lived in isolated houses or tiny rural com-
munities, whether they were farmers or not. Rome, the capital, was the 
largest city with about 150,000 inhabitants at the time. The second 
city, Bologna, lay at the far northern end of the country with a popula-
tion less than half the size of Rome's. 3 
Even though it occupied an important slice of central Italy, the 
domains of the Pope had the reputation of being one of the worst gov-
erned and most backward of all European states. The root causes of this 
1 George Fitz-Hardinge Berkeley, Italy -in the 
Cambridge University Press, 1932-40), I, 47. 
2 Italia: Ragioneria generale dello Stato, 
Contabili e di Controllo Stato Pontificio 
(Roma: Istituto Poligrafico del Stato, 1961), table 
3 Gabriello Rossi, Sulla Economica e dello Stato 
Pontificio (Bologna: Societa Tipografica Bolognese, )~table 
"R". Rossi gives the total population for 1844 as 2, 929, 807. Berkeley 
(I, 37) gives the 1848 population as 2,898,115, with Rome at 170,199 and 
Bologna at 80,000. Rossi's more specialized work appears to be more 
reliable. 
1 
condition lie deep in history and local customs. But bad policy alone 
does not explain· how an individual might become a political exile or 
prisoner. In order to fill in necessary background, this chapter will 
briefly discuss social and economic conditions, then local government 
2 
structures and the court system, and finally, a history of revolutionary 
activity, as it applied to the Roman state. 
in the Papal ~~~ 
The Papal States exhibited one unique characteristic among European mon-
archies: the dominant class was not the nobility, but the clergy. In 
other states, the church was one social element among many; but in Rome, 
the church was considered to be the very reason for the state. Practi-
cally speaking, the existence of a papal state was supposed to enable 
the Pope to govern the church freely - without owing any special loyalty 
or favor to another prince. This singular rationale also meant that the 
Papal States would not conform to neighboring states in several ways. 
Most states of the time accepted constitutional limits on the sovereign, 
civic officials drawn from the nobility or educated classes, tax revenue 
for public good, etc. The government in Rome assumed no such things. 
The nature of traditional church government made the state, as well as 
the church, a virtually absolute monarchy. Revenue was not considered 
pu,lilic wealth, but benefice: income to be used for char.itable purposes 
or to support clerics engaged in church-related work. By reason of both 
law and custom, the church often held the best lands, prelatures, pre-
bends, abbeys and monastic property, all of which were also considered 
benefices. During the middle ages, donations had flowed to Rome freely; 
3 
local taxes remained very low, and sometimes were not even collected. 
But the experience of centuries had taught Rome that free will offerings 
and donations could be unreliable, especially when other European states 
restricted money sent abroad. Even before the French Revolution, unin-
terrupted support of schools, seminaries, hospitals and missions was 
possible only because benefices in central Italy were able to defray the 
cost with local money. Churchmen were also assured of the top positions 
in state government and directed the disbursement of the lion's share of 
state revenue. Clerics made laws, passed judgement, directed education 
and controlled the police, always with an eye to the establishment of 
the Kingdom of God on earth. They saw themselves, not as civil servants 
or public trustees, but as lords who exercised sovbreignty in the name 
of the church. In other words, the state did not exist for any reason 
of its own, but to provide a steady base for the operation of the 
church. 4 Except for its dominant clerical caste, the society of the 
Papal States was similar to that of most Italian states in nearly every 
way. Agriculture was the most important occupation, but there were many 
other goods and services as well. A simple division of the population 
by profession would look something like the table on the following page. 
4 Domenico Demarco, !l dello Stato 
lio Einaudi editore, 1949), pp. 25f. 
4 
Clergy (all levels) 2.0% 
Nobility and untitled landowners 10.2 
Professionals (doctors, magistrates, teachers) 1.8 
Commercial people 4.5 
Artisans, tradesmen and skilled workers 13.0 
Servants, unskilled workers and unemployed 16.2 
Peasant-owners, sharecroppers and tenants so.a 
Soldiers 1.0 
Students 1.3 
total 100.0% 
Each of these major categories corresponds to those used in the present 
study. 5 
The whole concept of a church-state seemed anachronistic to many 
nineteenth century people. But to most of the clergy of that time, the 
Papal States promised a freedom of action which they considered both 
necessary and good. In the person of Pius VII, the Papacy itself was 
seen as one of the principal conquerors of Napoleon's tyranny. It was 
living proof that God had not allowed his church to fall under the domi-
nation of any one secular prince. The church which emerged after the 
trials of the French Revolution had certainly lost much of its social 
influence and privileged position, together with immense property hold-
ings which would never be recovered. But in the process, many of the 
5 This table is the author's own creation, based on statistics quoted 
by Demarco (Tramonto, pp. 22~4), and intentionally regrouped and simpli-
fied to match the statistical tables used later in the paper. 
5 
old evils had also been purged. Great wealth had never been wholesome 
for those who preached such virtues as temperance and justice. Nearly 
everywhere in Europe, there was a flowering of vocations and a great 
expansion of religious orders. The church they served was more unified, 
disciplined, and worthy of gospel values than it had been in centuries. 
Clerics, frequently poor, were now more ascetic and virtuous. Bishops 
were now better educated and better motivated than the worldly prelates 
of a century before. It was generally accepted that they were to be 
pastors first, and princes ·afterward. 
But what was true of the church at large came more slowly in Rome 
itself. It is genuinely unfortunate that this newly purified clergy was 
not as well represented in the Roman government as it was in the coun-
tryside. Administrative offices were often filled by so-called ''politi-
cal clerics." These sought advancement through their personal connec-
tions and talents, but otherwise showed few of the virtues expected of 
churchmen. 6 Although not necessarily evil men, they tended to be short 
sighted and opportunistic, like bureaucrats found elsewhere. Other 
highly motivated prelates kept themselves close to the seat of papal 
power, but honestly feared the modern world and were unable to compro-
mise with such ideas as constitutional monarchy and liberty of con-
science. For most of the clerics found in the curial offices, scienti-
fic progress, economic success and modernity were not the controlling 
norms. Quite the contrary, they represented everything that had to be 
opposed. 
6 Demarco, Tramonto, p. 28. 
6 
The nobles of the Papal States found themselves in a somewhat 
equivocal position. On one hand, their landholdings and overall wealth 
steadily increased, and their prestige and social position remained 
unchallenged. On the other hand, there were few opportunities for them 
to enter government service because of the clerical monopoly. In Rome 
and Lazio, noble families were one of three types: feudal (ancient clans 
such as the Orsini, Colonna and Savelli), financial (self-made dynasties 
like the Torlonia or Grazioli) and nepotistic (beneficiaries of previous 
popes, such as the Doria, Corsini, Borghese and Chigi). Most Roman fam-
ilies remained :fairly loyal to the Papacy in principle, since any 
changes in the papal monarchy could threaten their own social standing 
as well. Yet they had little sense of duty or purpose. Those who might 
wish to serve the state as urban or provincial governors had to begin by 
becoming clerics themselves. Some were willing to receive tonsure and 
promise celibacy, but most were not. Younger sons, especially, had a 
difficult time, since primogeniture favored the eldest as heirs to both 
lands and title. Unless they managed to carve out careers for them-
selves in the army, the church, or the bureaucracy, they frequently 
withdrew to their villas, mistresses and art collections to pass their 
time as petty princes within a narrow social circle. Although they con-
tinued to exert some influence on government by what they said and did, 
they were always able to claim that they were not responsible for its 
mistakes. 7 
7 Demarco, Tramonte, pp. 29-34. 
Elsewhere, the provincial nobility found themselves in a similar 
quandary, al though their psychological ties to Rome were relatively 
weak. Especially in the Romagna and the Marches, hard working nobles 
7 
found themselves frustrated at every turn. Families like the Manfredi, 
Bentivoglio, Malatesta and Della Rovere possessed education, landed 
wealth, and a tradition of leadership, but few practical opportunities 
to lead or contribute to their society. The provincial nobles, even 
those with feudal roots, had also retained an interest in commerce and 
local politics which the more ornamental Romans would have scorned. 
Those who had estates in the Po valley often busied themselves with 
intensive agriculture, like their Lombard cousins. Others invested 
their wealth in commercial or manufacturing enterprises, sumetimes with 
disappointing results because of the general commercial stagnation. In 
desperation, many resorted to political writing or debate, sometimes 
through secret societies. Such a profile fits many individuals in 
this study. 8 
For the commercial and professional classes, life in the Pope's 
dominions could be especially frustrating, though certainly not because 
of any lack of talent or creativity on their part. Especially in the 
north, life in the towns depended very much on .agricultural conditions. 
The most important exports were hemp, wool and silk, although meat and 
leather products were also significant. Grain was largely produced for 
domestic consumption, and was not considered an export. Since most man-
ufacturing and commerce focused on the processing of food and fibers, a 
8 Giuseppe Spada, Storia del Rivoluzione di Roma, (Firenze: Stabil-
imento di G. Pellas, 1869), I, 45ff. 
8 
bad growing season could have a disastrous impact on the availability of 
work and trade. But even under the best conditions, foreign trade was 
not encouraged. The principal interest of the central government seemed 
to be taxing what was produced, rather than stimulating production. 
Those who planned to trade or to invest found their efforts blocked by 
tariffs, monopolies, privileges and a bewildering variety of other regu-
lations designed to prohibit and to protect. Use of modern machinery 
was actively discouraged (or forbidden outright in state-owned facto-
ries) because workers would be displaced. There were no railroads at 
all, and almost no merchant fleet. Even the roads were in poor repair 
except near the customs posts. 9 Some merchants did prosper because of 
hard work and a bit of luck. But most felt their efforts would produce 
much better results under a more friendly regime. 
For those engaged in any form of agriculture, life could be much 
worse. Throughout Italy, the population growth (about 60% from 1700 to 
1840) was mainly rural. Farmer~ met the greater demand for food by 
bringing more land under cultivation, rather than increasing their yield 
with better methods. The various systems of cultivation depended not so 
much on the crops or the size of the farms, but on the type of labor 
contract in use. In addition to direct farming by a peasant-owner, sev-
eral systems of rent and sharecropping were used in central Italy. 
Smallholders were able to survive if their farms were big enough, but 
they faced falling prices as the century progressed, due largely to com-
petition from cheap Russian grain. Increasing debt often reduced owners 
and renters to the level of tenants. The mixed farming used most often 
9 Demarco, Tramonto, pp. 113-38. 
9 
by sharecroppers produced wheat, maize and other grains, olives, vines 
and fruit trees. , But while this system took care of the needs of a fam-
ily, it rarely produced enough of any cash crop for a genuine profit. 
Creeping debt and close supervision by the landowners with constant 
demands to produce more were also unpleasant realities of a tenant's 
life. In far too many cases, agriculture alone could not assure a fami-
ly's survival. The difference had to be made up by cottage industry or 
seasonal migration by family members with other skills, like blacksmith-
ing or carpentry. 10 
Immediately outside the gates of Rome, was an intensively culti-
vated belt of small farms where the peasants did relatively well, due 
largely to their specialization and their clos~ness to the Roman mar-
kets. Most of the sharecroppers in Lazio also shared in this good for-
tune, unless their contracts were for only a year at a time, as they 
commonly were in the Romagna. Beyond this fertile belt was the Agro 
Romano,. a huge and very productive region. At that time, about 1/3 of 
the land was owned by only four families (Sforza-Cesarini, Borghese, 
Fabrizi and Chigi), another 1/3 by other nobles, usually in vast unbro-
ken tracts, and the final 1/3 by religious corporations, chief among 
whom were the chapters of St. Peter and St. J.ohn Lateran, the Santo 
Spirito Hospital, the Holy Office and the Bishopric of Ostia. Although 
ideally suited for grain production, 85% of the Agro was devoted to pas-
ture for domestic animals. Grazing was not heavily regulated by the 
courts, as cereal farming was, making it attractive to those whose main 
10 Stuart Joseph Woolf, A History of Italy 1700-1860, (London: 
Methuen, 1979), pp. 275-81. 
10 
interest was a steady income. Grazing was also relatively easy work, as 
it required neither efficient management nor extensive J.abor costs. As 
a result, the grain produced in the Agro could only feed 90,000 people -
half of what Rome required. Even the meat production fell short, 
because of the easy going methods of the landowners. Over 6000 cattle 
per year had to be transported from other provinces to feed the capi-
tal. 11 Thousands of land-hungry peasants looked on this inefficiency 
with disgust. 
Although the farms outside of Lazio were usually small and com-
pact, there remained one other group of very landholdings. These 
were found along the low-lying coastal plains of Ferrara, Ravenna and 
the Marches, as well as the district known as the Maremme, west of Rome. 
Life there was dangerous because of malaria, and whatever farming and 
herding took place was done with hired labor from nearby hill towns. 
Hired hands there and elsewhere on the largest estates were among the 
poorest of the farm workers, not so much because they were badly paid, 
but simply because they had no claim on more than one day's work at a 
time. The ones who had other skills or jobs were usually able to make 
ends meet - those who had no other income could starve, especially in a 
famine year. Despite all their troubles, most peasants remained solidly 
loyal to the government, al though most would complain that they "paid 
too much" for their rents or contracts. 12 
11 Demarco, Tramonto, pp. 43-66. 
12 Demarco, Tramonto, pp. 35-45. 
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But far from being concerned with helping peasants, increasing 
food production br encouraging trade, the Roman administration had a 
very different agenda of its own. Understanding this extremely unique 
philosophy of government helps to explain why the Papal States was 
nearly impossible to govern by the mid-nineteenth century. 
Local Administration 
Unlike the systems of government found in textbooks which are simple, 
rational and unified, the papal administration retained the marks of 
several different (and sometimes contradictory) attempts to change or 
reform it. Its most serious flaw was that institutions tended to 
reflect several different and competing concepts of what the state ought 
to be or do. Much like the Bourbon state in France before 1789, the 
eighteenth century concept of the Papal States envisioned a union of 
several organic communities or entities. These were the Comarca (a 
40-mile capital district), together with a duchy (Urbino), and five 
other historic provinces: the Romagna, the Marches, Umbria, the Patri-
mony, and the Roman Campagna. 13 Each of these provinces had a network of 
centuries-old customs and practices which made it a unique social and 
political 'organ unlike anything else. 
Napoleon's conquest of Italy quickly swept away these institu-
tions. His occupation government was based on systems used in Imperial 
France, rather than on any precedent in Italian history. Each province 
was governed by a prefect responsible directly to Paris. In theory, the 
prefect was a representative of the French Revolution to oppressed pea-
13 Elio Lodolini, "L' amministrazione periferica e locale nello Stato 
Pontificio dopa la Restaurazione, 11 Ferrara Viva, (1959) I/1, 7f. 
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ple, who were being prepared for self-government; in practice, he was 
largely concerned with efficiency in collecting taxes and conscripting 
troops for Napoleon's war effort against other European monarchs. Yet 
the prefects often found the need to maintain an image of popularity, 
and did so by promoting economic development and quick, honest enforce-
ment of justice. For many citizens, especially in the Legations, this 
was a type of good government they had never known or expected from the 
former clerical-dominated regime. 
Following the defeat of Napoleon in 1815, the restored government 
of Pius VII adop~ed some of these features. His Secretary of State, 
Cardinal Ercole Consalvi, had already assured restoration of the entire 
state to its pre-revolutionary boundries. Now in the hopes of preserv-
ing that state from revolutionary instability and popular discontent, he 
issued an edict in 1816 which retained a relatively modern administra-
tion. Consalvi had to endure a great deal of criticism from those who 
wanted to restore all aspects of the old regime, but he was encouraged 
to persist by the Austrian chancellor Metternich. Although Consalvi 
believed strongly that the Pope had to remain free of any political or 
institutional limits, he also felt that the best guarantor of this free-
dom was efficient and humane government. A Pope could never exercise 
his spiritual missicn in true freedom if he found himself simultaneously 
at war with his own subjects because the institutions of his state 
worked so badly. 
According to Consalvi's program, most offices would now be open to 
laymen, although the highest were still reserved for clerics. Consul-
tive advice to local administrators was supposed to moderate the rigid-
13 
ity of absolutism. But in practice, many of the potential benefits of 
this structure were never realized, due largely to opposition and delay-
ing by a faction of ultra-conservative prelates known as the Rigorists 
(zelanti) to their political contemporaries. 14 Since Consalvi's plans 
provoked more hostility than support within the college of cardinals, 
his only hope was to convince Pius VII to decree reforms from the 
throne, and gently push his critics aside. He knew, of course, that his 
reforms might end when the Pope died. Thus he felt driven by a sense of 
urgency, and attempted to enact sweeping changes in a relatively short 
time. The very speed of his work provoked a sharp reaction on the part 
would outlast him, and each successive reform, in their minds, was ear-
marked for revision or elimination at the earliest possible opportunity. 
Ironically, the plan of Metternich and Consalvi to reform the Papal 
States would eventually fail, not because it was too conservative, but 
because it was too advanced. 15 After the death of Pius VII in 1823, 
these ~~~-' succeeded in electing one of their leaders, Cardinal Ser-
mattei della Genga, who took the name Leo XII (1823-9). He promptly 
dismissed Consalvi and spent much of his reign undoing the effects of 
his laws. Leo, in turn, was succeeded by the moderate Cardinal Casti-
glioni who, as Pius VIII, hoped to return to a more enlightened policy. 
Sadly, he died without doing so after only a year. Before they elected 
the very conservative Gregory XVI (1831-46), the cardinals were dead-
14 Alan J. Reinerman, "Metternich and Reform: The Case of the Papal 
State, 1814-1848, 11 Journal of History (1970) XLII, 535-7. 
15 Reinerman, "Reform," p.547. 
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locked for two months. The resulting power vacuum was one of several 
factors which helped precipitate the revolt of 1831. 16 
According to Consalvi's reform edict of 1816, the state was re-di-
vided into a capital district and 17 "delegations," similar to the 
" t " French departemen s. For administrative purposes, each delegation was 
d d • "d • t • t II th II t II d II II sub-divi e into is ric s, en governmen s an communes. Except 
for their uniform name, delegations were unequal in nearly every way. 
Some were poor and barren, with barely 15,000 inhabitants; others were 
quite prosperous, with well over 300,000 people engaged in a great vari-
ety of economic activity. 17 Each was administered by a governor known as 
an "apostolic delegate, 11 similar to a French prefect in function. Five 
of these delegations were classified as "first cl.ass": Urbino & Pesaro, 
together with Bologna, Ferrara, Ravenna and Forli', the four traditional 
"Legations 11 of the Romagna region. Seven others were rated usecond 
class": Ancona, Macerata, Fermo, Perugia, Spoleto, Viterbo and Frosi-
none, and five were "third class 11 : Camerino, As coli, Rieti, Civitavec-
chia and Benevento. Because of their commercial significance, a first 
class delegation was always administered by a cardinal known as a 
"legate. 11 All other delegates had to be bishops. 18 
A delegate, in his capacity as provincial governor, was the chief 
politiGal, administrative and judicial official in his delegation. 
Despite the image of a delegate a local representative of the central 
government, he was often considered (and sometimes saw himself) as more 
16 Reinerman, "Reform," p.541. 
17 Demarco, Tramonte p.17. 
18 E.Lodolini, "Amministrazione," pp.9f. 
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of a feudal lord, who acted very much on his own. In theory, a bad 
administrator could always be removed from his duties; but in practice, 
few ever were, since they formed an important part of the shifting web 
of political factions. All too frequently, a Pope might not live long 
enough to discover who his worst administrators were. And even if he 
knew, he might need today's foe as tomorrow's ally against a newer foe. 
Pellegrino Rossi, a future prime minister of Pius IX, was quoted as say-
ing that a cardinal is "a prince in Rome, a pasha in his province." 19 
Especially in the administration of justice, a delegate retained a 
semi-feudal function as judge. His charity or integrity might enable 
him to judge well and fairly, but professional training almost never 
did; few lawyers or jurists ever reached this rank. 
In an effort to broaden a delegate's ability, he was assisted by 
two judicial aides (' 1assessori 11 ), one for civil affairs, the other for 
criminal cases. He also received the consultive advice of a "governor's 
council," which met three times per week. This counci 1 had a delibera-
tive vote on all budgetary matters, and a consultive vote on everything 
else. 20 At first, the council consisted of a secretary general, with 
two, three or four members, depending on the class of the delegation. 
After 1824, membership was simplified to include only a mayor and two 
aldermen (''gonfaloniere" and "anziani11 ). In his capacity as sovereign, 
the Pope named all these officials from lists periodically drawn up by 
his ministers. 21 To further simplify administration, the same directive 
19 Demarco, Tramonto, p. 26f. 
20 Demarco, Tramonto, p. 18. 
21 E.Lodolini, "Amministrazione, 11 pp.10-12. 
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of 1824 reduced the number of delegations from 17 to 13 by combining 
Macerata-Camerino, Fermo-Ascoli, Spoleto-Rieti and Viterbo-Civitavec-
chia. 22 A less fortunate result of this directive was the revival of the 
ecclesiastical monopoly among top level administrators, with a simulta-
neous increase in inefficiancy and corruption. 23 
Following the revolution of 1831, a Memorandum (May 21, 1831) from 
the five major powers had proposed a much more dramatic reform. This 
document provides a sharply contrasting view of what should have been 
happening in Rome, at least in the opinion of some of Europe's leading 
statesmen. Although never implemented, it became somewhat of a focal 
point whenever reform was discussed. Because it had its origins in the 
international forum, Roman liberals were able to point to it as a sort 
of "charter" for the changes they wanted to see. The chief elements of 
this Memorandum of 1831 are: 
1. an administration based on elected municipal and provincial 
councils which would control local affairs, and send members 
to a fiscal giunta in Rome to set financial policy, together 
with an appointed Council of State. 
2. opening all civil posts to laymen. 
3. reform of the legal system according to Consalvi's 1816 direc-
tive, and 
4. an organic law to protect these reforms against tampering by 
subsequent governments. 
22 E.Lodolini, "Amministrazione, 11 p.13. 
23 Woolf, p. 244. 
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Cardinal Bernetti, the new Secretary of State, accepted the Memorandum 
politely, but still resented what he considered interference by outsid-
ers in the affairs of his unique state. Bernetti was a clear headed 
organizer and a competent administrator, at least according to the Roman 
understanding of that skill. He was passionately dedicated to the cler-
ical regime and its need to remain free of entanglements with any for-
eign power, including Austria. He was prepared to accept help from any-
one, but made it clear that he owed them no favors in return. 
Metternich often found Bernetti to be a difficult partner, but admitted 
a certain grudging admiration. 24 After the Memorandum, Bernetti submit-
ted his own reform proposal on July 5, 1831. Most recommendations of 
the Memorandum were quietly pushed aside. Perhaps the only signif~cant 
exception was a weak attempt to broaden the local administration. Each 
legation (=first class de ion) had its council expanded to four mem-
hers, one of whom acted as president and pro- Any or all of 
these members could be laymen, although clerics continued to function in 
many cases, simply because they were the administrators with more expe-
rience. 25 When Bernetti was succeeded by Cardinal Lambruschini in 1836, 
the papal government became more tactful, but remained essentially the 
same. Metternich gave up his serious hopes of .reform in Rome. 2 6 
24 Luigi Carlo Farini, The 
John Murray, 1851-4) I, 28.~ 
State from 1815 to 1850, (London: 
25 E.Lodolini, nAmministrazione," p. 15. 
26 Reinerman, "Reform," pp.542-4. 
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Administration of 
The Napoleonic regime had granted the first modern codification of lar_,s 
in the Papal States. Even after the suppression of the French legal 
codes, Pius VII named three commissions to revise civil, criminal, and 
commercial codes so that they were no longer founded on just canon or 
Roman legal principles. 27 Cardinal Giuseppe Antonio Sala had told Pius 
VII in 1814 that the greatest weakness of the judiciary was a combina-
tion of too many tribunals with too much overlapping or doubtful juris-
diction. He proposed that legal forums be limited to two (clerical and 
lay), that uniform procedures and a single code be used everywhere, that 
judges replace governors in all courts, and that court officials be 
fewer, but better educated. Courts of first instance, appeal, and revi-
sion should hear all cases except those dealing with agriculture or com-
merce. 28 
Nevertheless, after the Restoration, each legate or delegate 
retained his function as president of the penal (criminal) tribunal. 29 
The reform edict of 1816 began the rational simplification of the judi-
cial system by revising the existing codes and tribunals. Ecclesiasti-
cal tribunals survived, but without any jurisdiction in civil affairs. 
The edict introduced the principle of equality before the law, and pro-
hibited torture, as well as arbitrary arrest and punishment. 30 It also 
2 7 Elio Lodolini, 111' ordinamento giudiziario civile e penale nello 
Stato Pontificio (sec.XIX)" Viva (1959) I/2, 43-73. 
28 Ottorino Montenovesi, "L'amministrazione della giustizia a Roma e 
nello Stato pontificio (sec.XIV-1870)," Archivi, (1960) s.II, XXVII, 
287. 
29 E.Lodolini, "Ordinamento," p.65. 
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abolished the special jurisdictions of the barons and the municipali-
ties, and restricted the jurisdiction of the delegates to only minor 
offenses (those punishable by fines, or by one year of labor). Each 
province was to have a criminal tribunal with five judges in addition to 
the delegate. These provincial tribunals would hear appeals from the 
local courts (the Governo) they in turn could have cases reviewed by the 
superior courts at Bologna, Macerata, or two in Rome (Governo ~ Con-
~). Trained defenders and procurators were to be nominated by the 
Pope. As modest as these measures may seem today, and notwithstanding 
those still to be implemented, this 1816 directive gave the Papal States 
the best administration and judicial system it had ever had. But wel-
comed as they were by some, these procedural reforms were frequently 
watered down or ignored by those closest to the heart of power: the 
judges and prelates of the zelante faction. 31 
The special tribunals still continued to hamper the efficiency of 
the court system, even after several of them were abolished in the 1816 
reform. Most of those which survived did so because of special needs, 
such as Rome's food supply. From an economic standpoint, the capital was 
almost exclusively a governmental center and a place of pilgrimage. It 
had little manufacturing and no industry at all, but still had a huge 
appetite. Since Rome required a steady and substantial flow of food-
stuffs, the ordinary market forces were not considered reliable enough 
to meet the demand. Tight regulation was considered the only way to be 
sure farmers would sell their products, even at prices below market 
30 Reinerman, 11Reform, 11 pp.535f. 
31 Montenovesi, p. 289. 
20 
value. According to the spirit of the times, special courts and judges 
seemed to be the best manner to safeguard a stable food supply. 
Those institutions which retained special judicial powers 
included: 
1. The Congregazione di Buon Governo, the result of a much ear-
lier reform, was an attempt to provide the communes near Rome 
with officials who were concerned more with efficient govern-
ment than with political appointments. 
2. The Uditore del Camerlengo, specializing in commercial law, 
helped fi~ prices and regulate markets in the Piazza Navona 
neighborhood. 
3. The Presidenza di Grascia existed to ensure the supply of oil 
and cooking fats by supervising the merchants who sold them. 
4. The Prefettura di Annona, concerned with the supply of bread 
and pasta, held regulatory powers over mills, ovens and some 
grain stores. 
5. The Tribunal for Agriculture settled disputes between consum-
ers and merchants dealing in meats and vegetables. 
6. The Tribunal of the Cardinal Vicar, among many other func-
tions, helped regulate supplies of other foodstuffs and their 
prices. 
7. The Giudice del Mercede was charged with supervising salaries 
for all workers engaged in agriculture. 
Needless to say, many people saw the need to consolidate and streamline 
the judicial system further. But for the time being, these institutions 
survived because of the degree of upset that might take place if too 
21 
t hings were reformed at once. In the meanwhile, uncertainty as to many 
who had jurisdiction continued to cripple the efficiency of the court 
t em to the surprise of no one.
32 
sys ' 
The administrative reform of 1824 attempted to do two things: 
streamline the efficiency of the courts, and eliminate the need for 
administrators to function also as magistrates. As a result, Leo XII 
suppressed or transferred several tribunals: Urbino to Pesaro, Camerino 
to Macerata, Ascoli to Fermo, Rieti to Spoleto and Civitavecchia to 
Viterbo. 33 By allowing fewer courts to exist, all attempts to make them 
more efficient could hopefully be implemented more quickly. In the same 
reform, first steps were taken to remove provincial governors from the 
courts. The four cardinal legates of the Romagna retained both civil 
and criminal jurisdiction, but the delegates for the other thirteen 
provinces lost their authority in criminal cases. Tribunals were 
reduced to include only four professional judges (not including the 
legate or delegate), and henceforth there would be only two Courts of 
Appeal: Bologna and Rome. All local laws or statutes not in harmony 
with the general code were abolished. 34 By the time the reform of 1831 
was decreed, sufficient judges had been trained to allow a complete sep-
aration of political and administrative powers .from the judicial. For 
all practical purposes, the delegate had now lost his function as even a 
civil judge. 35 
32 E. Lodolini, "Ordinamento," pp.52£. 
3 3 E. Loda lini, "Ordinamento, II p.66. 
34 
nontenovesi, 290. p. 
35 E. Lodolini, "Ordinamento, 11 p.68. 
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Each ordinary tribunal had one or more processing judges, a public 
defender, and a public procurator. In addition, the much larger courts 
in Rome had a Public Procurator General, a Prosecutor Advocate, and an 
Advocate of the Poor. 36 At the top of the scale was the Tribunal of the 
Holy Consulta, which served as criminal court of appeal. The entire 
Consult a was composed of a Cardinal Prefect, several "presiding prel-
ates" and a prelate secretary, but very rarely functioned as a whole. 
It was commonly divided into two shifts or sections, known as "turni, 11 
which functioned separately and heard different cases, sometimes in dif-
ferent cities. The eldest of the judges (called the dean) presided over 
the first turno, the secretary over the second. Each turno judged capi-
tal cases appealed from the various Roman courts (Governo, Senatorial, 
Auditor Camerale and Apostolic Palace), as well as all provincial 
courts, except those in the Marches or the Legations. Each turno could 
also review sentences imposed by other courts (including the opposite 
turno), and quite significantly, ALL POLITICAL CASES which came to 
trial. 37 For the purposes of the present study, it is important to keep 
this judicial monopoly in mind. In essence, it means that a study of 
the Consulta records will yield a relatively complete list of political 
cases, except those which were so weak that they could be dismissed by 
even a local tribunal. 
36 E.Lodolini, "Ordinamento," p.68. 
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The Political Opposition 
Although relative peace returned to Europe after the Congress of Vienna, 
partisans of reform or political change continued to press, sometimes 
violently, for the acceptance of their ideas and the destruction of 
their rivals. There are two chief forms which liberal 38 political oppo-
sition followed. One was open, legal criticism of government ministers 
and policy by members of the opposition. The other was plotting against 
a government by members of secret societies. Among the members of this 
second group, there were two main tendencies, both of which had their 
roots in the French Revolution and before. The first tendency is best 
represented by the Marquis de Lafayette and the Philosophes of the 
Enlight.enment. They preached a cosmopolitan ideology of progressive 
economic development, with an increase in production, markets and jobs, 
all led by an educated elite. Political reform was emphasized; there 
was a general assumption that social conditions would improve as a natu-
ral result, and need not be considered separately. Organizations formed 
by people of this mind-set were both hierarchical and secret. They 
looked on nationalist movements as divisive, and ultimately self-defeat-
ing. Though widely different in most other ways, members of this group 
were collectively known as "moderate liberals" to .their contemporaries. 
38 For the purposes of this study, the term "liberal" will be used in 
the "classic" nineteenth century political sense. It denotes one who 
favors individual freedom of thought, religion, speech, and activity, 
and the removal of any controls not required for the protection of the 
most basic human rights. Liberals in the Papal States, therefore, would 
tend to favor elimination of clerical influence in education and in the 
courts, an end to feudal or clerical privileges, and public control of 
tax revenues. They should not be confused with "economic liberals, 11 
although this latter group may still share some common principles. 
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By contrast, followers of the other tendency are frequently called 
11 d. al or democratic liberals. 
11 This other group is best represented 
ra 1c 
by Filippo Buonarroti, still active and incorruptible in his old age. 
As 8 living symbol of the Jacobin movement, he retained his faith in the 
ultimate victory of an egalitarian society, which would flow from a fun-
damental social, as well as political realignment. Although his follow-
ers also constituted a de facto elite, Buonarroti favored incorporation 
of the lower classes into the revolutionary movement as soon as they 
could be won over and properly motivated. These Jacobin-democrats cer-
tainly intended to act in favor of the working masses, but did not nee-
essarily trust them to know the best path to their own salvation. Until 
they were enlightened, emotional issues such as nationalism and radical 
social reform might be useful tools to gain and hold the loyalty of this 
popolo minuto, the ordinary working people. 39 
Some of the earliest sects, most of them following the 11Lafayette 11 
pattern, had strong links to freemasonry. One of these, the Adelphia, 
gained a substantial following among officers in the pre-1815 army. 
Similar and better known was the somewhat shadowy organization known as 
the Carbonari, who also retained masonic trappings. Their demands 
focused more on political, rather than social.change, but were fre-
quently difficult to pin down. They included such standard liberal 
reforms as the opening of offices to laymen, laicization of the courts, 
a written constitution, and possibly the separation of the Marches and 
the Romagna from Rome. 40 Although not well organized, they existed in 
39 Woolf, pp. 303f. 
40 w oolf, pp. 246-54. 
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nearly every corner of pre-unification Italy. The Carbonari never had a 
single political program, but several at once. Their vagueness and 
respect for freedom of thought meant that all good liberals could join. 
A typical local cluster might include plenty of opportunists, such as 
those looking for employment or useful connections, or those who simply 
joined because of peer pressure. But the very broadness of their pro-
gram ensured that any specific proposal might be met with indifference. 
Even so, there was general agreement on a basic minimal platform: the 
broad ideals of "Italian unity, independence, liberty, and expulsion of 
foreigners" (wid~ly understood to be the Austrians). As to the most 
desirable form of constitutional government, they were less unanimous; 
opinions ranged all the way from constitutional monarchy, through a fed-
eral state, to a unitary state, such as a radical republic. Evidence 
presented in this study proves that each of these sub-factions was 
active before 1846. 41 
Although Giuseppe Mazzini'~ plans for Italy were still largely 
unknown and untried in 1830, the revolutions of that year drove him to 
refine his ideas with increasing urgency. Mazzini saw the work of the 
Carbonari as halfhearted and hopeless. He tended to favor Buonarroti 
over Lafayette insofar as he saw a need to involve all classes in the 
movement. But he still felt the entire movement was fatally crippled by 
timid leadership, complex ritual, and the cult of secrecy. The events 
of 1831 helped Mazzini develop his own program to achieve 11 liberty, 
independence and union. 11 He envisioned an Italian society of the future 
41 R. John Rath, "The Carbonari: Their Origins, Initiation Rites and 
Aims," American Historical Review (1964) LXIX, 366f. 
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based on natural laws and rights, in which all aristocracy and 
privileges would.be abolished in favor of a simple "organic" state based 
on association between classes, and human progress attained through 
cooperation. In practice, this demanded good leadership, largely from 
the middle class, supported by the masses, the poorest and most numerous 
working classes. He favored the eighteenth century proposals to place 
limitations on all wills, mortmain and other institutions which removed 
land from free circulation. He also wanted to see very broad ownership 
of farmland, a progressive ·tax on profits, wage control to protect work-
ers, and many public works to provide jobs. The material benefits of 
this cooperation were to benefit everyone without exception. 42 
ro promote his vision and bring it about more effectively, Mazzini 
founded a new society which he called "Young Italy" (Giovine Italia). 
His followers were to avoid any hint of conflict between classes, since 
he felt that converting a revolution to a class war would ruin it with a 
new tyranny. He certainly favored leadership remaining with the law-
yers, proprietors and officers, but recruited heavily among the city 
poor as well. He directed that all propaganda favoring Young Italy be 
restricted to literate members, but insisted that anyone should recruit 
new members, and that no formality be required. beyond an oath of loy-
alty. 43 
In the years that followed, both the earlier sects and Mazzini's 
Young Italy would exist side by side, sometimes at odds with one 
another, sometimes combining their efforts. But judged both by numbers 
42 Woolf, pp. 305-8. 
43 Woolf, pp. 306-9. 
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and by influence exerted, time and circumstances seemed to favor the 
latter. 
The Revolution of 1831 
The thirty years following the Congress of Vienna were characterized in 
all Italian states by an underlying struggle between political oppo-
sites. A marriage of strange bedfellows labored to change the institu-
tions of Metternich's Europe: Moderate Liberals, the Carbonari, Young 
Italy and others. The Papal States remained relatively quiet during the 
early years of Consalvi's reform, although an Austrian army crossed the 
frontier in 1821 to defeat Neapolitan rebels near Rieti. 44 
Most potent::_a1 rebels recognized that the major powers of Europe 
supported the Austrian domination of the Italian states. But in 1830, 
the new French government of Louis Philippe declared that France would 
no longer tolerate Austrian intervention in Italian affairs. The Carbo-
naro rising of 1831 could never have occurred without this manifesto. 
Revolutionary leaders in Lyons, as well as in the Legations, hoped that 
now they might not have to contend with Austrian troops. 45 
The slowing of reform, and the two-month long conclave following 
the death of Pius VIII on November 30, 1830 did contribute to the revolt 
of 1831, but were certainly not its causes. There was no food shortage, 
and little popular unrest to speak of. The genuine causes were the lin-
gering ones: economic stagnation, governmental inertia, and loss of hope 
44 Berkeley, Italy, I, xvii. 
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among upper-class leaders. The successful July Revolution in France in 
1830 may well have served as an encouragement. But the only immediate 
occasion for activity at this time may have been the revolt in neighbor-
ing Modena, and consequet fear of possible crime and disorder in the 
Romagna. Local leaders appear to have decided to take matters into 
their own hands. 
The earliest leaders were a relatively conservative combination of 
"old liberals" together with students and young professionals. The 11old 11 
faction were landowners and merchants who hoped to restore the historic 
liberties of Bologna and free themselves from the hopeless misgovernment 
of Rome. They remembered the old Jacobin and Italic governments as mod-
els for imitation, but were largely anti-democratic. The newer leaders 
(who are the only ones of real interest here) drew their support almost 
entirely from provincial nobility, property owners, and leading families 
in the major cities. Although this second group was almost as conserva-
tive as the first, there were two important differences: they were more 
open to considering a newer society of a "Buonarrotian" type, and they 
were more strongly nationalistic than their fathers had been. Thinking 
of themselves as "Italians" rather than mere French clients, they were 
more willing to experiment with political reforms? as long as no explo-
sive social changes threatened their foundations. It is also signifi-
cant that they had enough idealism or optimism to risk prison or exile 
for their cause. These conspirators were able to use the network 
already built by the carbonari, as well as their plans and foreign con-
nections. 46 
46 Woolf, pp. 270-3. 
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Among these new leaders were several who were to figure promi-
nently in subsequent events. Count Terenzio Mamiani della Rovere of 
Pesaro would be prime minister for Pius IX, and later for Victor Emman-
uel II. 47 Colonel Pier Damiano Armandi had helped lead rebel military 
forces. Physics professor Francesco Orioli, Count Carlo Pepoli and Mar-
quis Daniele Zappi were significant leaders of the expatriate community 
irt France. Tiberio Borgia of Perugia, Filippo Canuti, Sebastiano Fus-
coni and Federico Pescantini of Lugo would emerge as strong moderate 
leaders even after years of exile. 48 Each of these was excluded by name 
from the amnesty, of 1831, which allowed most other exiled rebels to 
return home. 
By timing their revolt to take place during the conclave, the reb-
els assured that the Cardinal Legates wo~ld all be in Rome, and not 
residing in their provincial capitals. Well planned agitation and 
threats by respected families successfully convinced the temporary 
administrators that a general insurrection was about to take place. 
Most of this pressure focused on Monsignor Nicola Parsciani-Clarelli, 
substituting for Bernetti as the pro-legate of Bologna. On February 4, 
he authorized a committee of local leaders to maintain order, and 
departed the following day. This action ensured both a peaceful tran-
sition and a strong semi-legal appearance for the new committee, which 
47 Mario Natalucci, Il contributo delle Marche al Risorgimento nazio-
nale, (Citta' di Castello: Unione arti grafiche, 1962), p. 87. 
48 ASR, Periodo Costituzionale (1846-8), Busta 1, fascicolo 2. This 
file i-;-a mixed collection of documents providing background on those 
named to the Council of Ministers (December 29, 1847). It includes 
printed sheets listing the 33 men excluded from the amnesty of 1831, as 
well as the 929 who petitioned for the amnesty of 1846. 
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quickly became a Provisional Government. These leaders appealed to 
other communes for support, raised the tricolor flag, and declared their 
independence as the United Provinces of Italy. 49 The 1831 Provisional 
Government quickly and peacefully changed the controlling hand of the 
government without loosening its grip. Their only dramatic act came on 
February 8, when they declared that the Temporal Power of the Popes was 
abolished forever in the northern provinces. In spite of their rela-
tively conservative position, most contemporaries saw few differences 
between these rebels and any others. In Metternich's Europe, even a 
change in theory or principle could be considered an intolerable 
threat. 50 The same leaders showed enough tactical skill to control the 
mob, call a constitutent assembly, change the government and decree the 
fall of the Temporal Power, all without spilling a single drop of 
blood. 51 
The pre-arranged movement was so successful that it spread as far 
south as Senigallia by February 9, always by legal and peaceful means, 
except at Forli' where a minor clash took place. There was no sanfedist 
resistance. Troops and administrators either ran away or joined the 
rebels, apparently because they felt only a weak attachment to Rome, or 
because they saw more promise and talent in the Provisional Government. 
The very weakness of any sentiment in favor of the central government 
was a potent weapon which the rebels used to their advantage. The 
49 Giorgio Candeloro, Storia 
nelli Editore, 1960) II, 175-8. 
moderna, (Milano: Feltri-
50 Emilia Morelli, Lo Stato Pontificio .£!'Europa nel 1831-2, (Roma: 
Edizioni Ricerche scientifiche, 1966), pp. 1 & 4. 
51 Morelli, Stato pp. 128f. 
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Ancona garrison joined the rebels to a man, even though they had been 
offered an honorable withdrawl to Rome. It appeared that nearly every-
where, the governors, judges, officers and magistrates were supporting 
the rebellion, or leading it. 52 But this was not in any sense a univer-
sal rising of the population; it was a very good example of how well a 
handful of skillful leaders could organize and communicate among them-
selves and their towns. 53 
Though artisans and peasants were not active in this initial 
stage, they tended to go along with the new government in the hopes that 
a more efficient. local administration might stimulate the economy and 
bring them more and better jobs. The rest of the Marches and the region 
of Umbria joined the revolt within 15 days. In addition to good coordi-
nation among municipal governments, a key factor in spreading the revolt 
was the advance of a military column under General Sercognani, who led a 
mixed force of some 3000 rebel troops and volunteers from Ancona toward 
Rome. They reached Rieti, on the edge of Lazio, where for the first 
time a local force fired back at them. Sercognani halted to wait for 
support before continuing his march on Rome. As none was forthcoming, 
this advance through Umbria marks the high-water mark of this first 
stage of the revolt. Sercognani eventually decided to surrender to 
Archbishop Mastai-Ferretti of Spoleto, the future Pius IX. 54 
52 Farini, I, 38-40. 
53 Tivaroni, Austriaco, II, 185-9. 
54 Candeloro, II, 176-9. 
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The Austrians finally intervened when Gregory XVI asked for help. 
Their army entered Bologna on March 21, and forced Ancona to surrender a 
week later, despite a delaying action by rebel troops under the leader-
ship of General Zucchi. Resistance was generally light and almost per-
functory. 55 Once the rebellion seemed to be contained, the ambassadors 
of the major powers issued their Memorandum of 1831. Cardinal Bernetti 
sensed the fundamental rivalry between French and Austrian policy, and 
set out to play off one against the other. He promised reform in good 
time, but insisted that the powers "did not understand" the Church 
interests which were his own priority. In the meantime, he used French 
support to help get Austrian troops withdrawn by mid-July. 56 Once the 
Austrians were gone, the Legations promptly rebelled again. 
This second revolt was not as peaceful as the first had been, but 
the influence of the moderate leaders remained strong. The Austrian 
intervention and the belated activities of some sanfedist groups sup-
ported by Cardinal Albani had radicalized supporters of the Provisional 
Government. The result was scattered, if savage, factional fighting in 
the Legations and elsewhere. It is worth noting that nearly all cases 
of political murders and other crimes, and warfare over social issues, 
like land seizure, were confined to this second ~hase of the revolt. 
Bernetti was now determined to use force, but waited six months before 
doing so. He made minor adjustments in the command structure of the 
army, as well as enough administrative and judicial reforms to placate 
foreign opinion. When the papal army finally advanced in January of 
55 Berkeley, I, 93-8. 
56 Farini, I, 58-63. 
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lB32, their march northward was so undisciplined that atrocities and 
civilian casualties were very high. It required six hours to crush the 
rebels near Cesena, despite a three-to-one superiority. On January 28, 
the Austrians again returned to Bologna to restore order; this time they 
d 57 were welcome as protectors. 
The second Austrian intervention proved to be too provocative for 
the new French government, which styled itself as defender of the Rights 
of Man. A month later, the French navy landed troops at Ancona to 
counter what they considered Austrian encroachment. (Both foreign con-
tingents would remain until 1838, when they were withdrawn by mutual 
consent.) The earliest French commanders, Combes and Galloy, were 
republican in sentiment. They won over local leaders by proclaiming 
liberty for all and hostility to the papal government. Since their own 
forces were small and largely symbolic, they decided to enlist local 
help to keep order. They organized and armed a so-called "mobile col-
umn" of former soldiers and others who had fled the Austrians. 5 8 This 
11colonna mobile" was a secret organization composed largely of lower 
class (sometimes criminal) types, who had little organization or disci-
pline, but a great deal of hatred. They took advantage of the temporary 
power vacuum to set themselves up as a sort of special revolutionary 
police force. The result was five months of disorder and terror in 
Ancona, until the French officers themselves were replaced. 59 Although 
it was eventually disbanded, the mobile column destroyed the hitherto 
57 Berkeley, I, 119-21. 
58 Farini, I, 69-74 & 134. 
59 Natalucci, Marche, pp. 106f. 
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peaceful image of the revolutionary government, and associated revolu-
tion with terror-in the minds of many conservatives. Among those asso-
ciated with this violence were Camillo Melani and Adamo Mancini, as well 
as Matteo Costantini, who would figure in several murder trials after 
the restoration of 1849. 60 The same period saw the first organization of 
Young Italy in the Marches, among whose leaders was Lorenzo Lesti, a key 
· thi's study. 61 person in 
Behind his shield of foreign troops, Bernetti worked to improve 
the notoriously poor quality of the papal armed forces. He hired two 
splendid Swiss regiments, recently in the service of Charles X of 
France. He also enlisted large numbers of native troops, until the ~eg-
ular army numbered 13,500. In an effort to bolster these expensive pro-
fessionals, Bernetti authorized the formation of a body of auxiliary 
troops called Pontifical Volunteers. A closer look at the Volunteers is 
in order, since they became an important counter-revolutionary force. 
At the time of the Restoration, there had been several reactionary 
bodies known collectively as "sanfedists" or 11 centurions. 11 They quickly 
made their presence felt by clandestine violence against liberal lead-
ers, and people they considered to be pro-French. Although dangerous to 
real or perceived enemies immediately after 1815,. these groups rapidly 
lost strength because of their weak organizational structure, the super-
ficiality of their doctrine, and their reliance on spontaneous anger as 
motivation. Their descendents, the Volunteers, were more disciplined, 
and far more formidable for that reason. Bernetti knew he was taking a 
60 Natalucci, Marche, pp. 113-5. 
61 Natalucci, Marche, p.106. 
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political gamble, but allowed Giovanni Battista Bartolazzi to organize 
government sympathizers into paramilitary militia units. Large numbers 
eventually enlisted to help put down the rebellion and prevent further 
outbreaks. 62 The first unit of Volunteers was raised in the province of 
Fermo toward the end of 1831 to assist Cardinal Albani's troops in sup-
pressing the second revolt. By some accounts, there were presently 
about 50, 000 of them under 30 distinct commands. 6 3 Most recruits were 
men from peasant stock or villages known for their loyalty to the Pope. 
Some of these tended to blame the slightly more prosperous townsmen for 
their own poverty and unemployment, and took out their hostilities on 
them accordingly. Volunteers received no pay, but were exempt from cer-
tain municipal taxes and allowed to bear arms. Many of these militiamen 
were badly disciplined and widely hated for the murders and other crimes 
which took place once they began to view their political opponents as 
criminals with no rights. Pitched battles were recorded in places where 
most townsmen were liberals and many peasants living nearby were Volun-
teers. Faenza, for example, was strongly liberal, while the Borgo, or 
sub-town, of Urbecco was a Volunteer stronghold. There alone, those 
killed and wounded in sectarian violence numbered several hundred within 
just a few years. 64 The danger of setting one.part of the population 
against another was obvious to the better administrators. As early as 
July of 1832, provincial authorities in the Marches expressed serious 
62 Fabrizio Marinelli, Le sette reazionari nello Stato Pontificio 
Restaurazione. Strut~ra ~ basi dottrina~(Napoli: Guida Edi-
tori, 1978), p.51. 
63 Natalucci, Marche, p. 113. 
64 Berkeley, I, 131-3. 
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doubts about the value or desirability of such units. The stern Cardi-
nal Spinola saw value in their use as a sort of rural guard for the 
Legations, but only if there was no expense to the central government. 
Sebregondi, the Austrian advisor, did not like the idea of leaving law 
enforcement in the hands of non-professionals. He eventually prevailed 
on Bernetti to increase their accountability by forcing them to wear 
black uniforms and demanding a visible command structure. 65 
So bitter were feelings against the militia, that Mazzini's direc-
tives make special mention of them. In the series of revolts planned 
for 1833-4, Society members were told to "attack and kill all known cen-
turians and enemies of the Federation, 11 to burn their houses, take gov-
ernment representatives into custody, and disarm military posts. 66 
Before Bernetti tightened their discipline, the Volunteers exhib-
ited characteristics of both secret societies and auxiliaries. Although 
genuinely secret, they took an oath and had a paramilitary structure. 
From 1833 until their disbanding in 1847, they were a true auxiliary 
force, with their uniforms and recognized duties. By the time they were 
disbanded, they had reached a strength of 75,000 in the Legations and 
the Marches. In spite of their numbers, the Volunteers received very 
little help from Rome ... and very little control. Both Consalvi and Met-
ternich had opposed the formation of such groups as costly, dangerous, 
and largely useless. More importantly, they both recognized that to 
65 Emilia Morelli, La politica estera di Tommaso Bernetti, Segretario 
di Stato di Gregorio XVI. (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 
1953)' pp. 149-51. 
66 Hales, Mazzini, pp. 98f. 
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link force to policy was to admit the failure of that same policy. 67 For 
the purposes of the present study, Pontifical Volunteers were especially 
significant because of the large amount of violence which was directed 
against them, or provoked by them. 
Plots of early 1840's 
After more than a decade of Gregory XVI's inert regime, there were sev-
eral attempted revolts in short succession. Most of these seemed to be 
motivated by the same combination of factors seen in 1831, but now with 
greater participation of Mazzinians. Since these revolts were not 
broadly based or even widely known among the population at large, the 
police were somewhat justified in their assumption that the plotters and 
revolutionary societies themselves were the reasons for the continued 
unrest. Yet there seemed to be no end to the willingness to challange 
the government on the part of citizens, especially in the Legations. 
One such plot had been uncovered in the planning stages in 1836; 
Tomasso Galletti and Camillo Melani were exiled to Brazil with several 
other leaders. 68 Of much greater importance, in the Papal States and 
elsewhere, were the better planned revolts organized by Mazzini's fol-
lowers: Calabria (1839), Aquila (1841), Savigno (1843), the Bandiera 
expedition (1844), and Rimini (1845). Mazzini had added the feature of 
using a sort of "foreign legion" of exiles to support iocal revolution-
ary leadership. 69 Thus the papal police often arrested conspirators from 
67 Marinelli, Sette, pp.52f. 
68 Natalucci, Marche, p.117. 
69 Bianca Montale, I democrat 
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other states during local rebellions, and revolts in the Kingdom of the 
Two Sicilies were followed by charges against papal subjects like 
Achille Paggi, Nicola Marchetti and Antonio Gianelli (1843), and Carlo 
Osmani (Bandiera group, 1844). 70 Mazzini also made efforts to maintain a 
liaison with respected moderate leaders, such as Mamiani and Farini, as 
well as with organizations not under his control, like that of Galletti 
and Biancoli in Bologna. 71 
The Muratori revolt at Savigno near the Modenese frontier (1843) 
was only one example of this sort of combined effort. Several uprisings 
were to take pla~e simultaneously to confuse the police and the Austri-
ans. But efficient work by Cardinal Spinola and the police identified 
many of the planners before they were ready tu act. Spies and agents 
had little trouble learning the general plan, especially since many con-
spirators assumed that everyone favored their cause, and talked freely 
of their plans. Police raids forced the few surviving leaders to commit 
themselves when their chances of success had dropped to nearly zero. As 
early as July 31, the humane Legate of Ravenna, Cardinal Amat, contacted 
three local suspects, Count Francesco Lovatelli, Count Tullo Rasponi, 
and Luigi Carlo Farini, in an attempt to head off trouble. He offered 
them passports and protection if they would simply leave the country and 
forget the coming revolution. Subsequent events would demonstrate that 
his trust had been well placed. 72 The rebellion which finally took place 
70 Natalucci, Marche, pp.122f. 
71 Montale, p. 27. 
72 Piero Zama, Rivolta in Romagna fra 1831 ~ il 1845. I giud-
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at savigno, in the Samoggia valley, was led by Pasquale and Saverio 
Muratori. Their attempt of August 14 was a disaster because their prom-
ised support had either been defeated, or exposed and scattered. Within 
a week's time, the police were circulating notices which promised 
rewards of 300 scudi to whoever arrested the Muratori brothers or any of 
their fellow leaders: Gaetano Turri, Pietro Pietramellara, Oreste Bian-
coli, Sebastiano Tanara or several others, all of whom were young 
nobles, landowners and professionals. 73 
A larger but even more hopeless attempt was made on September 8-9. 
Vincenzo Caldesi and other local leaders assembled a body of 200 armed 
rebels at Bologna. They were reviewed in broad daylight by Colonel 
Ignazio Ribotti and a cadre of officers irom the Spanish army who had 
arrived by way of Livorno. Their objective was to march toward Imola 
and capture three popular cardinals meeting at a villa at Tarrano 
nearby, and hold them as hostages until their demands were met. But the 
movement of so many armed men was·too big to keep secret. The cardinals 
(including Amat and Mastai-Feretti) heard of the attempt and escaped 
easily. When the rebels learned that they no longer had a reason to 
march, they broke up and melted back into the countryside. Only 30 were 
ever captured. 74 
These events gave the most reactionary elements in the government 
an excuse to crack down hard. They resorted to using special commis-
sions of inquiry, with powers to try and condemn political suspects by 
completely bypassing the regular court system. Whatever rebels could be 
73 Zama, Rivolta pp. 40f. 
74 Piero Zama, Rivolta pp. 42ff. 
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identified were tried by an Extraordinary Military Commission which had 
been given these special powers in May to deal with the rebellion. They 
handed down three distinct judgements in 1844: one against the Imola 
group (January 22), another against the Muratori band (March 11) and one 
as a follow-up to both (June 26). Draconian sentences followed, includ-
ing 20 condemnations to death. Most of these sentences were commuted to 
prison terms, but 7 rebels were actually executed. 75 The Military Com-
mission1s judgements were always harsh, summary, and not subject to 
appeal, except to the Pope himself. Even within governmental circles, 
many administrators felt these special commissions were much too severe, 
insofar as they were turning otherwise harmless people into implacable 
foes. Cardinal Amat had already helped some of the accused escape; 
Cardinal Gizzi, Legate of Forli', refused to accept the jurisdiction of 
the Commission at all in his province. Still others protested to Rome 
over unfairly harsh treatment. But very little good seemed to come from 
any of it. At Easter, 1844, two Volunteers were killed in Rimini. The 
Commission arrested seventy men for the crime, executed two of them, and 
sentenced all but one of the others to long terms in prison. Fifty-two 
of these condemned were artisans, probably just bystanders to the actual 
murders. 76 
Since it was at Rimini that local passions were inflamed, it was 
also there that a much larger attempt at revolution followed in short 
order. Simultaneous risings were planned for Cesena, Faenza and Forli', 
as well as Rimini. Large numbers of armed citizens would seize the pub-
75 Zama, Rivolta p. 46. 
76 Tivaroni, II, 242-8. 
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lie buildings, as well as police and military posts. Great care was 
taken to co-ordinate the movements at least as well as in 1831. The 
chief local planner was Pietro Renzi. He had been in contact with the 
exile community in France, specifically Livia Zambeccari, and such other 
1843 veterans as Oreste Biancoli and Gaetano Bottrigari. Renzi was 
informed that three groups were ready to march to support him once the 
signal was given: one between Poretta and Vergatto, another at Bagnaca-
vallo, led by Pietro Beltrami, and the third at le Balze, near Faenza, 
commanded by Count Raffaele Pasi. Each of these columns would advance 
in the direction of Rimini, gathering strength and disrupting the local 
police forces along their way. 77 
At the same time, a carefully worded appeal to the major powers of 
Europe would be published. This so-called Manifesto of Rimini was 
largely Farini's work, although he had collaboration from several oth-
ers, like Giuseppe Montanelli. Farini eloquently listed a program of 
twelve .reforms, largely political, which the rebels considered essential 
to the good government of their state. Many of these had already been 
proposed in Consalvi's time (but never implemented), or listed in the 
Memorandum of 1831: modern legal codes, municipal and provincial coun-
cils, opening offices to laymen, a free press, a civic guard, and a gen-
eral amnesty for all political offenders. The demands and the tone of 
the Manifesto were extremely moderate, intended to attract broad support 
both inside and outside the Papal States. 78 It was similar in many ways 
to a supporting proposal issued by the Piedmontese noble Massimo D'Azeg-
77 Zama, Rivolta, pp.119-22. 
78 Montale, p. 28. 
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1 . He suggested a uniform military system throughout Italy, reformed 10. 
legal codes, liberalized press laws, railroads, a customs league, a com-
mon organization of studies, and government based on elected communal 
. . 1 . 1 7 9 and prov1nc1a counc1 s. 
Although it had been carefully planned beforehand, the Rimini 
incident began prematurely. Once again, the police were aware of the 
plot because of the large numbers involved. The police jailed two 
suspected leaders, Giuseppe Galletti in Bologna and Mattia Montecchi in 
Rome. The Military Commission then deployed large numbers of agents and 
Volunteers to raid the houses of suspects, in order to provoke an upris-
ing before it had a chance to succeed. 80 The actual rebellion grew out 
of what may have been a spontaneous clasi1 between young people and cara-
binieri at a football game. It is still uncertain how many people 
anticipated a fight, but quite a few had brought weapons with them. One 
reason that feelings were especially strong was that the condemnations 
of the Military Commission had just been handed down on September 10; 
most of the 67 men sentenced were from the Rimini area. 81 
On September 23, an armed band attacked carabinieri and volunteers 
at the entrance to the football field in Rimini. Several officers 
received gunshot or stab wounds, but held their positions. In another 
clash, a volunteer received a chest wound from which he died the next 
day. Two Swiss were attacked by a mob which killed one and wounded the 
other. A force of about eighty rebels, led by Renzi and Celli, attacked 
79 Montale, p. 33. 
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the San Francisco barracks, where they captured a substantial number of 
weapons. A large number of the troops joined their ranks - those who 
did not were locked in the Rocca after the other prisoners were 
released. Renzi declared himself head of a reform government, but was 
unable to actually rule the city. His regime collapsed after two 
days. 8 2 The other supporting forces were even less successful. The 
bands at Bagnacavallo and le Balze gained control of local government 
installations, but were easily disbanded before most ordinary citizens 
knew there had even been a·revolt. For all the high sounding rhetoric 
of the Manifesto, the actual rebels seemed unable to gain the slightest 
success against Gregory XVI's government. 83 
Although it seemed that both the Memorandum oi 1831 and the Mani-
festo of Rimini had gone largely unheeded by the government, both would 
eventually provide the basis for the reforms later attempted by Pius IX. 
What was quite certain, on the other hand, was that hundreds of men now 
found themselves exiled from their state or imprisoned within it. Many 
of these were natural leaders who might profit from another opportunity, 
but Gregory XVI and his government had to pass from the scene before any 
such thing would be possible. 
82 Zama, Rivolta, pp.123-32. 
83 Zama, Rivolta, pp.138ff. 
CHAPTER II 
THE AMNESTY OF 1846 
The election of Pius IX (Giovanni Mastai-Ferretti) signalled a dramatic 
change of political course. Unfortunately, the sharpness of the con-
trast between Gregory and Pius led some contemporaries to assume that 
the change was even more dramatic than it actually was. Pius began· as a 
humane conservative, and remained such. But he was no "liberal pope," 
and never had any intention of becoming one. Although his charm, good 
will, and genuine charity toward his political foes might have obscured 
this basic truth, they could not change it. It may be impossible to pin 
down the "political philosophy" of the new Pope. He probably never 
developed one, except for a few vague ideas or plans prior to 1846. 
Once elected, he had to learn a hard lesson: that a head of state, 
engaged in governmental politics and day-to-day decisions, must often 
put aside his 11philosophy11 and watch it turn into something else. For 
Pius IX, perhaps the best description of his political journey would be 
a series of "attitudes, 11 rather than objectives or goals. He evolved 
from an attitude of paternal charity, through one of self-doubt and con-
fusion, and into one of discouragement and bitterness. 
Our most specific insight to his early ideas and hopes for papal 
government can be found in a short treatise which he wrote nearly a year 
before his election. This work, entitled Thoughts on the Public Admin-
istration of the State, is a rather disjointed essay written in Septem-
44 
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ber of 1845. It probably was not written for publication, and may or 
may not have been inspired by the Manifesto of Rimini, although it 
clearly had much in common with that document. 1 It was simply a list of 
58 items, in random order, each of which leads into a brief discussion 
of what the author would like to change about the administration. He 
spoke of what means might be used to encourage education, industry, jobs 
for young people, better officials and policemen, rooting out corrup-
tion, and making better use of the nobility in high positions. Through-
out the work, he frequently appealed to virtue and good will. Essen-
tially, it is not a true political program or philosophy, but rather a 
charitable and humane discussion of how to make the existing institu-
tions work better. The changes he envisioned in the mechanism of gov-
ernment were largely cosmetic. He took it for granted that clerical 
government would continue, that lay participation in the administration 
would never be allowed to influence church policy, and that the clergy 
should retain their elite status' in both social and political sectors. 
Far from being the revolutionary leader he would later be considered by 
some, he was fully committed to keeping the Papal States stable and har-
monious. · Although he liked the idea of making his state a showcase of 
good government, he never seriously accepted the thought that his sub-
jects might challenge his sovereign rights. In effect, his entire 
11political philosophy," as reflected in this essay, boils down to no 
more than maintaining the status quo, but doing so with a sense of 
decency. 2 
1 Giovanni Soranzo, "'Pensieri relativi all'Amministrazione Pubblica 
dello Stato, 1845' del futuro Pio IX," Aevum (1953), XXVII, 23. 
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Genesis of the Amnesty 
One pivotal suggestion in the future Pope's essay was the need for some 
dramatic act of clemency. In the Papal States, as elsewhere in Italy, 
granting an amnesty was solidly embedded in tradition. A new sovereign 
frequently granted pardons or paroles to the rivals of his predecessor 
to give a fresh and benevolent look to his own regime. In his Thoughts 
of. September 1845, Pius specifically pointed out the need for 11 ••• a 
generous pardon for political offenders, since the multiplication of 
exiles also multiplies those who are plotting revolutions. n With this 
objective in view, the new pope appointed a transitional committee of 
six cardinals to study several issues. Their agenda included railroad 
construction, the reorganization of the Secretariat of State, and how 
best to reconcile an amnesty with public order. The six nominees were 
two former Secretaries of State, Bernetti and Lambruschini, together 
with Macchi, Mattei, Gizzi and Amat, these last two being popularly con-
sidered the leading "liberals" among the sacred college. For the pro-
ceedings of this committee, we are indebted to its secretary, the young 
monsignor Giovanni Gorboli-Bussi, a close friend and confidant of the 
Pope, and one of the few genuine liberal thinkers. in the new government 
circle. A study of Gorboli-Bussi's transcript gives us a detailed look 
at the way in which the amnesty was organized and implemented. More 
importantly, it explodes some of the myths about the same amnesty. 3 
2 Soranzo, Aevum pp.40-6. 
3 Giacomo Martina, S.J., IX (1846-1850), (Roma: Editrice Pontifi-
cia Universita' Gregoriana, 1974), pp. 95-7. It is curious that Cande-
loro (II, 419) makes Gorboli-Bussi and the police chief, Monsignor Mar~ 
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The committee held three sessions before the amnesty was pub-
lished. Each member was encouraged to state his views freely and defend 
his recommendations, which would then be used by Pius in reaching his 
final decision. Although no cardinal is identified by name in the tran-
script, it is relatively simple to trace the advice favoring a rather 
"minimal" pardon to Lambruschini, occasionally seconded by Bernetti, but 
opposed by everyone else in most cases. Nevertheless, the exchange of 
views was surprisingly frank and open. The cardinals took their task 
seriously and largely succeeded in reaching a balanced consensus. 4 
During the.first session (July 1), everyone agreed that some act 
of clemency was in order, especially to reduce the hatred which many 
people felt toward their government. Huge numbers of citizens had 
signed petitions to the Pope requesting mercy for condemned prisoners, 
especially those from the provinces of Ancona and the Romagna. The car-
dinals found it easy to agree that this might be the ideal moment for a 
conciliatory gesture. 5 
There was, however, considerable disagreement about how it might 
best be done. Lambruschini observed that there was an inherent danger 
in publishing any sweeping amnesty which might appear to be an official 
condemnation of the previous government. In addition, he pointed out 
the disruptive effects of releasing genuinely dangerous people under any 
ini, members of the commission, and ignores Cardinals Macchi and Mattei. 
If this had been the actual membership, the meetings would probably have 
been sharply polarized and reached agreement only with great difficulty. 
4 Pietro Pirri, "L'Amnistia di Pio IX nei documenti ufficiali," Rivi-
~ di Storia lla Chiesa in (1954), VIII, 214f. 
5 Pirri, "Amnistia," pp. 207-10. 
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circumstances, but especially if the release left the impression that 
there was really nothing morally wrong with political machinations. He 
suggested that the pardon should not be sudden but gradual, that it be 
granted on a strictly case-by-case basis, and then only after consul ta-
tion with other Italian states. It is easy to understand why Lambrus-
chini felt that those in prison should stay locked up, since most of 
them had been put there during his tenure as secretary of state. In 
short, he believed that a general pardon would be counterproductive, 
since it would do more to undermine public order than to preserve it. 6 
Another matter raised at this first session was the future behav-
ior of those pardoned. There was general consensus that good conduct in 
the future was a legitimate condition of the amnesty. A variety of sug-
gestions followed. For example, the former offenders could have their 
political rights restricted, or local governments might accept responsi-
bility for them, or they could be placed under close supervision by the 
police, or they should be forced to post cash bonds or mortgages on 
their property to assure their loyalty. But these conditions were ruled 
out as too severe. The cardinals came to see that such measures 
appeared petty rather than generous, while still providing no concrete 
guarantees in return. They were also realistic enough to know that the 
inefficient police force could never monitor so many people. The only 
suggestion left was that prisoners and exiles be required to give their 
word of honor to be loyal citizens from now on. All of the cardinals 
appreciated the very large risk they were taking: the security of such 
an arrangement was minimal since it depended heavily on good will and 
6 Reinerman, "Reform," p.545. 
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vague hopes. Yet this alternative had the one great advantage of seem-
ing far more generous and trusting than any of the other conditions. 7 
Several cardinals agreed that distinctions were in order. It was 
appropriate, for example, that ordinary political offenders not be dealt 
with in the same way as violent criminals. And since greater loyalty 
was expected of clerics, soldiers and government employees, these might 
not be automatically treated as generously as the others. 8 Cardinal Mac-
chi spoke in favor of a more generous amnesty than Lambruschini wanted, 
excluding only policemen and military. Two others, probably Gizzi and 
Mattei, also in~isted that the pardon should be a general one, and 
granted all at once, if Pius were to begin his reign with a strongly 
conciliatory gesture. Lambruschini realized that he had not convinced 
anyone to favor a gradual amnesty, but was well supported in his conten-
tion that the broadness of the act of clemency might be difficult to 
reconcile with public order. 9 This issue of distinctions was left unde-
cided, however, pending more specific information on individual cases. 
Finally, it was suggested as an afterthought that more severe pen-
alties would be in order for any relapses which might occur. But again, 
nothing was decided. By now, most of the cardinals felt that they were 
discussing a subject which required more specific information before 
they could proceed. As a preparation for the next session, they agreed 
to ask Monsignor Marini, director general of police, to provide them 
with lists of political offenders already condemned, those still on 
1 Pirri, "Amnistia," pp. 216f. 
8 Martina, I, 98. 
9 Pirri, "Amnistia," p. 215. 
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trial, and those in exile both by their own will and by reason of a 
judicial decree. Each of these listings should also provide enough 
information to distinguish real criminals from the rest and to identify 
which were ecclesiastics, military and employees of the state. With all 
these considerations in mind, and nothing firmly decided, the first ses-
sion came to an end. 10 
Corboli-Bussi 1 s transcript of this meeting effectively kills the 
appealing fable of Pius and the black beans, which has even been perpet-
uated by some of the better historians, like Farini, Spellanzon and Sal-
vatorelli. When asked wh~ther or not an amnesty was prudent - so the 
story goes - the cardinals voted by placing black or white beans in a 
dish. Five out of six supposedly voted "no," with only Gizzi in favor. 
Already knowing what he wanted, Pius then covered the dish with his 
white skull cap, saying "Brothers, aren't they all white?" Despite its 
cuteness, the story has no basis in fact. The transcript shows clearly 
that Pius asked for advice not on "whether" to grant an amnesty, but 
only "how." Furthermore, each of the cardinals favored some form of 
mercy, and their advice was distilled from prolonged discussions, with 
each of them able to speak and react to others. Finally, the device of 
voting secretly with colored beans was not even used by the curia at 
that time. 11 
The cardinals' preparatory commission held its second meeting on 
July 8. The agenda had been drawn up assuming that the information 
already requested from the police would be on hand. But instead of com-
10 Pirri, 11Amnistia, 11 pp. 210-7. 
11 Pirri, 11Amnistia, 11 pp. 213f. 
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plete lists of prisoners, exiles and those still on trial, Monsignor 
Marini sent a letter. He regretted that he was unable to supply such a 
list, due to insoluble bureaucratic difficulties and confusion over 
authority. In particular, he had no information whatever about trials 
in progress, since the courts had never shared this data with him. Of 
the four processes then under way, the Consulta could supply information 
on two, but the other two were still in the local courts at Ancona and 
Farro. The rest of the names were available to the police, but would 
simply take a while longer to assemble in a format useful to the commis-
sion. 12 In the m~anwhile, he proposed a simpler solution to the problem 
of distinctions, based on suggestions which Metternich had sent to Rome. 
Austria had granted amnesties in 1838 and 1845, and the proposals were 
the results of their experience: dismiss all political trials in pro-
cess, commute life sentences to ten years, free all other prisoners, and 
examine the conditions of the exiles on an individual basis. The cardi-
nals decided, however, that thes'e criteria were too vague and general; 
they also recalled that the Austrian pardon had not worked very well. 
They repeated the request that Marini provided the essential information 
as soon as possible, and returned to their deliberations as best they 
could without it. 13 
They agreed to exclude officers, clerics and government employees, 
as well as common criminals, and to require a declaration of loyalty 
instead of an oath. They also decided that the announcement would take 
the form of an address of the Pope to his subjects, according to a for-
12 Pirri, "Amnistia," p. 217. 
13 Martina, I, 99. 
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mula to be composed by Corboli-Bussi. In an effort to maintain morale 
within the ranks of the police and the army, the cardinals accepted Lam-
bruschini 1 s suggestion to announce the amnesty only after rewards were 
given to those soldiers who put down the revolt of 1845, and the members 
of the political commissions had received official thanks from the gov-
ernment. Following this disappointingly short discussion, the commis-
sion listed a number of items for future sessions, including measures to 
reform the court system, the bureaucracy, the police and the military. 
All voiced their agreement· that the matter of the amnesty had to be 
dealt with first, and on that note they adjourned their meeting. 14 
The third and final session of the cardinals' commission took 
place on July 15. Most issues relating to the amnesty had already been 
decided. Only two items remained on the agenda: consideration of Mari-
ni' s information, and the final approval of the text, which had been 
fairly well decided without the police file after all. 15 Whatever its 
potential flaws, the amnesty had to be published without further delay 
if it were to have any value as a good will gesture. And so it was. 
The final version of the amnesty was dated July 16 and actually 
appeared on the evening of July 17. The reaction on the part of ordi-
nary citizens was explosive and immediate. Crowds. converged on the Qui-
rinal within hours to cheer the Pope, and hail what many hoped would be 
the beginning of a new age. Both the conditions set down by the cardi-
nals' commission and Corboli-Bussi's careful phrasing had their effect; 
the acts of clemency were generous and obviously conciliatory. And far 
14 Pirri, "Amnistia," pp. 220f. 
15 Pirri, "Arnnistia," p. 221. 
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beyond the mere words of the proclamation were the overtones and the 
symbolic value that accompanied it. That very image of lavish generos-
ity and the joyous reaction to it had the effect of making the new pope 
into a hero larger than life. Simply stated, Pius appeared to turn 
overnight into a 11 liberal pope" and savior of Italy merely because so 
many of his subjects had a need to believe that he was those things. 16 
The text of the proclamation includes not only the conditions of 
the amnesty, but the motives for it. This version was translated by 
William E. Gladstone. 
Pius IX - To his most faithful subjects, Health and Apostolic ben-
ediction. 
During the days when the public rejoicing on our exaltation to 
the Pontificate touched Us to the depth of our heart, We could not 
restrain an emotion of grief, while reflecting that not a few fami-
lies among our subjects were kept back from sharing the general joy, 
because, in the loss of their domestic consolations, they were made 
to bear a great portion of the judgement, which only some one member 
of the family had deserved, by offences against the order of soci-
ety, or the lawful rights of the Sovereign. We furthermore turn a 
pitying eye upon the numbers of inexperienced youths, who, although 
drawn by alluring flatteries into the vortex of political disorders, 
yet appeared to us less as seducers than seduced. On which account, 
from that time forward, We have been considering whether to stretch 
out our hand, and to tender peace of mind, to those of our erring 
children who might be disposed to give evidence of their sincere 
repentance. The affection that our good subjects have shown toward 
Us, and the incessant tokens of veneration that the Holy See has, in 
our Person, received from them, have now pursuaded Us, that We may 
pardori them without danger to the public at large. We accordingly 
determine and command, that the opening of.our Pontificate be sig-
nalised by the following acts of sovereign clemency: 
I. To all our subjects now actually in a place of punishment 
for political offences, We remit the remainder of their sentences, 
provided they make in writing a solemn declaration that they will 
never, in any manner, abuse this favor, but that they desire faith-
fully to fulfill all the duties of good subjects. 
II. Upon the same condition, all our subjects who have quit-
ted our dominions for political reasons may return to them, provided 
that they shall make known in a proper decree, and through the 
16 Alberto M. Ghisalberti, Nuove Ricerche sugli inizi del pontificate 
di Pio IX, ~ sulla Consulta di Stato, (Roma: Vittoriano, 1939), p. 23. · 
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Apostolic Nuncios, their desire to avail themselves of this act of 
our clemency. 
III. We, in like manner, discharge those who, on account of 
having taken part in any machination against the state, are either 
bound by precetti , or declared incapable of municipal 
office. 
IV. It is our intention that all criminal proceedings for 
offences purely political, which have not yet been completed by a 
formal judgement, shall abate and determine; and that the parties 
under charge be set free, unless any among them should ask for the 
continuation of the trial, in the hope of making his innocence 
clear, and recovering his rights accordingly 
V. It is not, however, our intention to comprise within the 
provisions of the foregoing articles that very small number of 
ecclesiastics, military officers, and civil servants who have been 
sentenced, or have fled, or are under process, for political 
offences. In regard to these, We reserve it to ourselves to take 
other measures, as the examination of their respective cases may 
show it to be advisable. 
VI. Neither, in like manner, is it our will that in this 
indulgence should be included ordinary crimes, with which political 
culprits, refugees, or prisoners on trial may be further charged; 
as, in regard to these, We intend that the existing laws shall have 
full effect. 
We would willingly trust that those, who shall avail them-
selves of our mercy, will know at all times how to respect both our 
rights and their own honor. We moreover hope that, with minds sof-
tened by our pardon, they will be ready to lay down those intestine 
resentments, which are always related, either as cause or as effect, 
to political passions; so that all the children of a common Father 
may be truly reunited in that bond of peace, in which it is the will 
of God that they should be mutually joined. But should our hopes in 
any degree be frustrated, We shall then, with whatever bitterness of 
pain to ourselves, constantly recollect, that if mercy be the most 
pleasurable attribute of sovereignty, justice is its first duty. 
Given in Rome, at S. Maria Maggiore, on the 16th of July, 
1846, in the first year of our Pontificate. Pius PP IX. 17 
The conditions were presented simply and.directly. First of all, 
the amnesty applied only to political offenses; no one could receive it 
if he were in prison or exile for some civil crime. For example, if a 
person had been condemned by a Special Commission for taking up arms 
against the police, he could benefit from the amnesty. But if a police-
man had been shot at the time, and there was a possibility that he might 
17 Farini, I, 179-81. 
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have done it, then he could be excluded until the matter was cleared up. 
A second condition denied the amnesty to clerics, soldiers and govern-
ment employees, since greater loyalty had been expected of them. But 
even in this severe circumstance, the door was left ajar for a possible 
review of individual cases. A third condition demanded that each appli-
cant had to sign a printed declaration of loyalty, promising to abide by 
the conditions of good citizenship in the future. This formality was a 
small enough price to pay for a·second chance, yet it was considered 
legally binding by the courts. Later on, it would be used as the basis 
for more severe charges and sentences against those who violated their 
word. 
Even at the start, a few exiles resented this declaration as a 
sign of bad faith on the part of Pius, and an indicator of his lack of 
real trust in them. This question of the declaration provoked concern 
in some exiles. Luigi Carlo Farini wrote to Bertini (August 2, 1846): 
.... it seems to me that the condition is honorable enough, since by 
requiring one to carry out the duties of a good subject, it does not 
mean that he must renounce his own principles. The good subject of 
a prince is one who tells him the truth, who advises him to do what 
is good, and who wants him free of foreign dependence. One of two 
conditions exists: either the Government intends it this way, and 
everyone can sign in good conscience; or the Government is making 
mental restrictions, and thus breaks the agreement and absolves the 
individual from his word of honor. 18 
Farini followed his own advice and signed the declaration on the next 
day. 19 Most others signed the declaration without much thought, espe-
cially the prisoners. Some exiles reflected on whether or not they 
really wanted to sign such a document. A few, like Count Carlo Pepoli, 
18 Ghisalberti Nuove 
19 ASV, SdS (1846), rubrica 86, fascicolo 99, p. 100. 
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Terenzio Mamiani and Filippo Canuti insisted in composing personal for-
mulas of their own, and were relieved to have them accepted. These 
three returned home only after some delay. Most other exiles either 
signed in good faith, or evaded the matter altogether. 20 
The thought that former rebels against the state were now being 
asked for their word of honor helped to make an otherwise routine meas-
ure look radical and dramatic. 21 Furthermore, the conciliatory message 
which accompanied the amnesty implied that those who would benefit from 
it were "victims" of youth and inexperience. Henceforth, they would be 
considered as partners of the new government, and not foes. But the 
conditions and the objectives of that partnership were never spelled 
out, leaving a great deal to chance, or worse, to conflicting interpre-
tations. 22 
Even at this early stage, significant numbers of conservatives 
viewed the amnesty as an affront to justice and a dangerous sign of 
weakness. 23 Some said that Pius hoped to disarm potential revolutionar-
ies with kindness because he preferred not to confront them. Such an 
allegation is difficult to demonstrate. But as things actually turned 
out, the dealings between Pope and Revolution were never very successful 
for either party. 24 
2
° Candeloro, II, 420f. 
21 Ghisalberti, Nuove 
2 2 Mario Battaglini, "Ai tempi di Pio IX: 1 1 edit to de 1 perdono, 11 Cap-
itol ium, (1958) XXXIII/1, 24. 
23 Giulio Andreotti, Ore 13: il Ministro deve morire, (Milano: Riz-
zoli, 1974), p. 135. 
24 Michele Monaco, "I precedenti e il significato dell' allocuzione 
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One conservative with an obvious interest in Roman stability was 
Klemens van Metternich. In a letter to the new Pope, he advised him to 
remember that an amnesty was not, and should not be, a statement of 
innocence, but a pardon for an actual crime. He also advised Pius to 
maintain a clear distinction in his own mind between acts of "govern-
ment 11 (policy originating with him as sovereign) and acts of 11 adminis-
tration" (more routine matters which could be delegated to ministers). 
Finally, the Austrian chancellor added a caution against dangerous "con-
cessions, 11 which gave up essential sovereign rights; these should not 
be confused with. exercising justice and prudence, which were a ruler's 
duties, and could not in any way be considered options. 25 
One contemporary author estimated that at the moment of the 
amnesty, there were about 1250 individuals who might benefit, including 
247 political prisoners already condemned, 303 others whose cases were 
in process, and about 700 exiles. 224 prisoners were released immedi-
ately, including 19 from the Castel Sant' Angelo, 7 from the Carceri 
Nuovi, 129 from Civita Castellana, 5 from San Leo, and 30 from Civita-
vecchia. 26 According to a list printed by the government in 1849, 894 
persons eventually received the amnesty, but only 564 of these signed 
the declaration. 27 A much more recent work goes so far as to say that 
perhaps 2000 revolutionary leaders were allowed to live freely in the 
del 29 aprile 1848, 11 Studi Romani, (1955) III, 175. 
25 Reinerman, "Reform," p. 545. 
26 Ghisalberti, Nuove, p. 24n. 
27 Raffaele Ballerini, S.J., prime pagine del pontificato di 
IX, (Roma: Civilta' Cattolica, 1909), p. 6ln. 
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Papal States. 28 This number looks ·absurdly large, unless he intends to 
include huge numbers of people never arrested or charged with anything, 
and thus never pardoned. 
One immediate result of the amnesty was increased optimism among 
liberals, who became bolder in suggesting improvements for state and 
society. Throughout the remainder of 1846, a seemingly endless series 
of rallies, torchlight processions and banquets honored Pius IX as the 
harbinger of a new age. Former prisoners and exiles were feted as the 
heroes of the day, and lauded for their sufferings for the cause of lib-
erty and steadfastness against the "Gregorian" regime. 2 9 On the other 
hand, those who.had been partisans of the former regime became discour-
aged and increasingly pessimistic about the future. The names of Greg-
ory and Pius became symbols for the two factions, something which dis-
turbed the Pope greatly. He had announced the amnesty and the more 
progressive policy because he wanted an era of reconciliation and har-
mony, not merely another round of fratricide. But in spite of his best 
efforts, Lambruschini and the 11Gregorians 11 seemed to be utterly discred-
ited and quite bitter against Pius for upsetting the society which they 
had so carefully crafted. 3 0 
28 Harry Hearder, "The Making of the Roman Republic, 1848-1849 11 His-
tory (1975) LX, 173. 
29 Martina, I, 102. 
30 Ballerini, pp. 61f. 
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The Process Amnesty 
While the festivities continued in Rome and elsewhere, the cumbersome 
machinery of Roman government began to process the actual beneficiaries 
of the amnesty. For obvious reasons, putting the prisoners at liberty 
was much easier than clearing the exiles to return home. According to 
the custom of the time, prison officials had most of the significant 
records for prisoners under their care. Whenever a prisoner was moved, 
his records went with along with him. So in many cases, a prison warden 
had not only the authority, but also the information to decide who qual-
ified for release under the terms of the July 16 document. Since no 
further consultation or permission was required, many wardens released 
prisoners the same day on their own authority. While this was obviously 
a great boon to the prisoners in question, it has made documentation of 
their release more difficult. Little or no paperwork was required for 
ordinary cases, so little has survived. About a hundred cases were 
doubtful enough to make some official send an inquiry to the Secretariat 
of State, asking whether or not the terms applied to specific persons. 
These special cases, together with their replies, are well documented 
and present no problems whatever to a researcher. The rest, including 
some actual mistakes in releasing the wrong people, continue to make 
study in this area difficult. 
For those in exile, there were two different ways to initiate the 
process. The applicant could write directly to Rome, where the Secre-
tariat of State was charged with overall supervision of the amnesty. Or 
wherever it was more convenient, he could contact a Papal Nuncio through 
an embassy or consulate of the Papal States in the country where he 
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found himself. There were many of these consulates in major cities, 
especially in the Catholic countries of Europe. Most of the day-to-day 
paperwork of the amnesty process was done by Nuncios and their secretar-
ies as they wrote back and forth in their regular packets of correspon-
dence with Rome. If an exile found himself in a country with no consu-
late, he could also contact the consulate of another state friendly to 
Rome, such as France or Tuscany. These delegations were accustomed to 
handle papal affairs in states like Great Britain or the Ottoman Empire. 
Once the application itself was received by the Secretariat of 
State, a clerk wpuld contact the central office of police in Rome, or 
the local police in the applicant's province or home town. This check 
was made to be certain that the exile was not charged with other crimes 
which would make him ineligible for the amnesty. As soon as the police 
had cleared the applicant for readmission (or found prohibitive crimes, 
if such was the case) the results were communicated to him directly, or 
to the consulate representing him. Finally, the Secretariat authorized 
the release of a passport and travel visa to him, and alerted the fron-
tier guards to let him pass. Although most cases were handled quite 
routinely through normal channels, a few presented special problems 
which might require a legal judgement. There cases were referred for a 
final decision to the Consulta, as highest court of appeal in political 
matters. If the applicant signed the written declaration of loyalty as 
a part of this process, it was also returned to the Secretariat of State 
and filed. 
Ideally, a complete ·file on one individual would include four ele-
ments: the letter of request, the printed declaration, the police 
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report, and the final permission to return. Not surprisingly, most 
files are incomplete. Missing elements may simply have been lost, or 
never existed in the first place. A large number of printed declare-
tions are missing, not necessarily because someone refused to sign. In 
some cases, the consul probably never had the chance to place the paper 
before the applicant for his signature. Sometimes, an overeager exile 
could complicate things by beginning to travel homeward while his case 
was still being processed. In ~ few cases, applicants are traced from 
one consulate to another; one individual applied in Paris, for example, 
then moved to Marseilles, Livorno and Florence before finally arriving 
at Bologna. Long after he was home, secretaries in these various consu-
lates continued writing frantic notes to one another, wondering why he 
had disappeared. Such confusion could wreak havoc with a bureaucracy 
which was already inefficient and overworked. There are also more than 
a few cases of applicants simply turning up at home without benefit of 
passport or valid authorization; the police and the customs guards were 
no more efficient than the diplomats. 
Profile of the Returnees 
This study is based on a list of 989 specific names. Each one of them 
applied for the amnesty, and most received it. Even among those who 
were refused at first, many were later granted release from prison .or 
permission to return from exile as a result of a change or clarification 
of policy. Still others simply returned home without permission, or 
were released from prison against the wishes of the central government. 
Most of these cases were processed and completed within a year of the 
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proclamation of the amnesty, the stated deadline. 31 In each case, there 
is reason to believe that the individual did have the opportunity to 
return to his home and live a normal life. What is more important is 
that he also had the opportunity to return to political activity for or 
against the government, if he chose to do so. 
The master list includes 550 exiles, 433 prisoners, and 6 others 
who are special cases. These 6 are people who were physically at lib-
erty within the Papal States, but who had some curtailment of their 
civil or political rights as a result of earlier political activity on 
their part. On the occasion of the amnesty, they applied for restora-
tion of their former condition, which usually included a government job 
or pension. In these cases, lost jobs were not regained automatically, 
but all other civil and political rights were restored. Although the 6 
cases are numerically insignificant, they are still included here for 
accuracy and honesty, and because they remind us that there were cases 
which do not automatically fit irito larger categories. 32 
31 A few cases were allowed to continue into early 1848, by way of 
exception, since they had special features which required legal judge-
ments, or in a few instances because of distance and slow communications 
from such places as Brazil and Ceylon. 
32 In the statistical lists which follow, as well as those in the 
appendices, consistent abbreviations are used. The letter "x" always 
refers to an exile, "p" to a prisoner, and 110" to one of the 6 special 
cases. In the appendices, where parallel columns are used, the first 
group of columns always refers to those included in the original amnesty 
of 1846, the second group always indicates the sub-group of those who 
were considered to have violated their pledge of loyalty and good con-
duct. 
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Division by Place of Origin 
Recipients of the amnesty include men from each of the four regions of 
the Papal States, but very unevenly distributed. Fortunately for this 
project, nearly every name mentioned in the archival documents includes 
a place of origin. It was a common practice of the time to list both 
the place of birth and the father's first name as a means of more accu-
rate identification. 
Division by Place of Origin 
g_rouping - -x/- -p/--o 
Lazio 29 52 
Umbria 11 17 1 
Marches 73 107 
Legations 423 232 5 
-unspecified 1 
Ferrara 89 40 2 
Bologna 54 103 
Ravenna 131 22 
Forli' 148 67 3 
"Others" (= unspecified, unknown or foreign) 14 25 
TOTALS (989) 550 433 6 
Please refer to Appendix A for a more complete breakdown by province or 
town. 33 
33 In several cases, there are multiple places of residence. As a 
typical example, a man could be born in one area (usually in the coun-
tryside), but then move to another (usually a town) to live and work,· 
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To those who read Italian history, it comes as no surprise that a 
large number of revolutionaries in the Papal States originated in the 
Legations of the northeast. What may be surprising, however, is just 
how large the percentage actually is: fully two-thirds of the total. 
Over half of the remaining third come from those two provinces in the 
Marches (Urbino-Pesaro and Ancona) which were closest to the Legation of 
Forli', indicating an unmistakable geographical pattern. Ancona was the 
more important of the Papal States' two major commercial ports, and was 
always strongly influenced by whatever happened in the areas to the 
north. This compined zone represents 85% of all names in this study 
with a specified place of origin. The differences between the commer-
cial northeast and the lethargic, cleric-dominated capital are obvious. 
By way of sharp contrast, mountainous Umbria accounts for only 29 
names (3%). While it is true that poverty sometimes stimulates revolu-
tion, there is no support here for economic want as a single and deter-
mining factor. If poverty alone could explain people's disenchantment 
with the government, them Umbria might have been the leading region, and 
not the prosperous Legations. 
The relatively low number for Lazio (81) reflected its obvious 
economic link to Rome's food supply, the proximity of the principal 
administrative offices, and sentimental ties to the Papacy. Added to 
these factors was a long standing and systematic policy of favoratism 
for the capital. Food prices were closely regulated, in most cases 
even though he may have continued to refer to himself as coming from his 
old patria. In this sort of situation, the place of residence at the 
time of the alledged political offense is used for one simple~reason: 
political influences on a potential revolutionary are more likely to 
come from his immediate environment than his place of birth. 
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keeping them artifially low. 34 Charitable organizations and institu-
tional help for the poor were always stronger in Rome than in the prov-
inces. It is worth remembering that Gregory XVI was cheered even in the 
poor Trastevere quarter of Rome at the same time in 1831 that revolt was 
flaming in the north. 
Another distinction should also be made. The typical revolution-
ary from Lazio was likely to be an intellectual, not an artisan. Within 
Lazio, over half (49 out of 81) are from the city of Rome itself. Rome 
accounted for a large perecentage of the educated people in Lazio, if 
not the entire state. A further breakdown of the Roman names shows 
that, at least in this sample, many came from noble or other prosperous 
families, rather than artisans or working class people. Thus whatever 
impetus to revolution there may have been in Lazio, it probably origi-
nated as a result of political discussion or study, rather than demo-
graphics. It is no surprise that the country areas here, and indeed 
everywhere except the Adriatic coast, were relatively peaceful. 
Within the Legations region, it appears at first glance that the 
statistics show a fairly even distribution of names among the four lega-
tions. But a map of the contemporary boundaries (see Appendix E) shows 
that the legations interlock at precisely the places where some of the 
largest concentrations of names are found (e.g. Lugo, Russi, Faenza and 
Forli 1 ). The more detailed breakdown in Appendix A shows that some of 
these provinces contributed far more than others. If one looks care-
fully at the map, an interesting pattern emerges: provinces along the 
Via Emilia were quite significant. This ancient Roman road was still 
34 See the reference to the special courts in Chapter I, pp. 19f. 
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the principal commercial artery of the area. It ran northwestward from 
Rimini on the coast through Bologna and beyond, In all, it crossed 10 
of the 45 provinces in the Legations: Rimini, Savignano, Cesena, Berti-
noro, Forli 1 , Faenza, Castel Bolognese, Imola, Castel S. Pietro, and 
Bologna itself. Collectively, these provinces contributed 66% of the 
revolutionaries in the Legations. 
A similar pattern, also comprising ten provinces, can be drawn 
within a 30 kilometer radius of the town of Mangari in the province of 
Faenza. Although Mangari itself produced none of the exiles and prison-
ers in this study, it provides a convenient geographical center for the 
diagram. In common with the 11Via Emilia11 pattern, this circle also 
includes the provinces of Cesena, Bertinoro, Forl~', Faenza, and Castel 
Bolognese, then adds the provinces of Fusignano, Lugo, Bagnacavallo, 
Russi and Ravenna. This 11Faenza circle" pattern, also representing 10. 
provinces out of 45, claimed about 47% of the Legations' names. 
Most interesting of all is the combination of both patterns, 15 
provinces, looking somewhat like a sausage with a bulge in the middle. 
This relatively small zone produced 584 names, 88.5% of all those from 
the Legations, and over 60% of those from the entire state. While it 
would be foolish to attribute such a complex thing as revolutionary 
motivation solely to geography, the geographical pattern is hard to 
ignore. The 11clustering11 effect in these specific areas may very well 
be due to such things as local leadership, peer pressure, cultural tra-
ditions of opposition to Rome, regional economic grievances, or the 
organizational infrastructure of the Carbonari or Young Italy. Whatever 
factors were present in these provinces, they must have been local 
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indeed. Another third of the Legations' provinces, (15 out of 45) pro-
duced no names at all in this study. 
One final observation is in order. The statistics of this table 
show that prisoners outnumber exiles in every region except the Lega-
tions, and specifically the coastal Legations of Ferrara, Ravenna and 
Forli'. In these three areas, exiles outnumber prisoners by more than 
double. 35 In times of revolutionary turmoil, the question of who is cap-
tured by the police and who escapes to fight another day may very well 
be decided by one's access to boats, or to some other means of escape. 
There is probably a "maritime" factor at work here, which would explain 
this lopsided statistic. A glance at Appendix A also reveals that the 
city of Ancona (a port) shows a similar imbalance of exiles over prison-
ers, whereas the rest of the Marches region does not. A closer look at 
these factors in a future study could shed more light on how exiles from 
the northwest differed from all others. 
3 5 The term "exile" in this study not only describes ex-prisoners 
released to serve double time outside the country, but voluntary exiles 
and those who have fled to escape prosecution as well. 
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Division by Profession or Social Class 
The categories already used (see page 4) reflect social divisions as 
they were conceived at the time: six major socio-economic groupings, and 
several minor ones. 
Division by Profession 
grouping --x/--p/--o 
Nobility 28 1 1 
Gentry 36 16 
Clergy 3 5 
Urban Commoners 342 123 5 
Bourgeois 69 19 2 
Petty Bourgeois 87 19 3 
Artisans 157 58 
Unskilled 29 27 
Peasantry 8 3 
Military 37 7 
Others 9 6 
-unspecified 87 272 
TOTALS (989) 550 433 6 
Please refer to Appendix B for a more detailed breakdown of each 
class. 3 6 These statistics, unlike those for the previous group, are 
36 Lest there be any doubt, the term "gentry" refers to any individ-
ual who listed himself a "possidente," but had no noble title, and gave 
no other profession. The very large number of untitled town-dwellers 
(called "Urban Commoners" here) covers a vast spectrum of professions 
and levels of wealth. This category has been subdivided according to· 
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obviously incomplete. The large number of uunspecified11 professions 
(over 1/3 of the total) leaves us with a much smaller base total with 
which to work: 630. The lion's share of those doubts are the fault of 
the poor prison records, which will continue to leave many questions 
unanswered. 
To return briefly to a discussion in the previous section, please 
note the imbalance between exiles and prisoners on this table as well. 
Prisoners predominate only in the "unspecified" group. 17 However the 
of exiles to prisoners is highest among the nobility, gentry and 
uppermost profes~ional circles, while it is almost even among the uns-
killed workers. We return to the question of who escaped and who was 
captured after a failed revolt. Among those who were able to flee, the 
factors of wealth and influence may also be as important as access to 
boats. 
In comparison to their total share of the population, the numbers 
of titled nobility and untitled gentry are quite high (30 and 52). One 
possible reason for it is the lack of opportunity in the predominantly 
clerical administration for these otherwise talented and potentially 
well-motivated people. Another topic for a future study would be a com-
parison of the level of disillusionment among aristocrats in the Papal 
States with those of Piedmont or Tuscany, for example. 
the author's own system, which may hopefully reflect a more accurate 
clustering by attitude. Any policemen or carabinieri who came to light 
are listed as "military," according to their ranks. 
37 There is one exception; the clergy, whose total is so small that 
any statistical discussion would be foolish. 
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Similar in proportion is the total of 44 for members of the mili-
tary, usually trusted to remain loyal, even in times of trouble. It is 
interesting that officers outnumber enlisted ranks 27 to 17. The Papal 
states of the time, as everywhere else, drew its officers largely from 
the upper classes of society. Whatever motivation was operative among 
the nobility, gentry and professional classes would probably be signifi-
cant to the military officers as well. 
By way of contrast, the numbers of clergy and peasants are so 
small as to appear almost non-existent. True, the percentage of clergy 
is proportional to their numbers of society, but absolute loyalty was 
expected of them in a clerical regime. Even 8 might seem high. On the 
other hand, the peasants were the largest single class. Most of them 
had no easy life, but very few had attempted to redress their grievances 
by revolutionary means. Whatever else these figures might suggest, they 
show that the sort of revolts which had taken place before 1846 had lit-
tle appeal for people in the countryside. 
The umbrella category of Urban Commoners provides 470 names, 
three-quarters of the total known professions. It is therefore easy to 
demonstrate that the revolts of the 1830 1 s and 1840's were essentially 
urban phenomena; a concentrated populus certainly facilitates political 
mobilization. The fairly broad range of professions also provides a 
highly diversified spectrum of those who put down their tools to take up 
arms against their sovereign. Although the artisans as a group provide 
nearly half the names in this subdivision, there does not appear to be 
any one group which stands out. We might assume that many of the tai-
lors, shoemakers or building tradesmen who are listed may have been 
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unemployed or underemployed, but there is no reason to point to a crisis 
in any one sector of the economy. If, indeed, there is an economic rea-
son for their discontent at all, it might be best found in the overall 
stagnation of trade and production, and nowhere else. 
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Division by Place of Exile or Imprisonment 
once a former rebel had fled the country, he had to select a place to 
live. After a captured revolutionary was sentenced, he was assigned to 
a prison. The places where these men found themselves in mid 1846 pro-
vide an interesting mosaic. 
Division by Place of Exile 
grouping 
--x/--p/--o 
France 358 
Italian States 75 
Elsewhere in Europe 81 
Asia 2 
The Americas 13 
-unspecified 21 
Division by Place of Imprisonment 
Lazio 125 
Umbria 11 
Marches 148 
Legations 47 
-unspecified 102 
TOTALS (983) 550 433 
Please consult Appendix C for a detailed subdivision of both catego-
ries. 38 
3 8 Data for this table was relatively easy to obtain, especially for 
the exiles ... the letters of request had to come from somewhere. On the 
other hand, most of the data does not tell us much about revolutionary 
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The most striking feature of the exiles' table is the 68% of all 
exiles who fled to France. Even if one discounts those who went to Cor-
sica or to Algeria (which may arguably be written off as "non-French" 
areas) the total remains astoundingly high. Part of the reason for the 
attraction of France was probably the availability of employment in a 
thriving country. Some of the exiles were reluctant to leave these jobs 
after 1846, although most still applied for the amnesty in the hopes of 
visiting family and friends again. Another practical consideration was 
the small pension provided by the French government for any and all 
political refugees. This token help to expatriots was one way in which 
King Louis Philippe and Francois Guizot gave lip service to the idea 
that their government was "revolutionary, 11 with a possible eye toward 
keeping their own potential troublemakers in line. Whatever the rea-
sons, the tolerant attitude which the exiles found in France made large 
numbers of them comfortable enough to stay. 
Other places of exile tend to support the wish of most expatriots 
to remain close to home. Southern Europe and the Mediterranean were 
clearly preferred to northern Europe, in spite of the possible lure of 
jobs in these industrializing zones. There is decent representation 
among quite a large range of Mediterranean countries. If one takes the 
statistics for Malta and the other islands, the Italian and Iberian 
states, the surprisingly high number for Greece and the Ottoman Empire, 
and adds these to the totals for Algeria, Corsica and the French costal 
motivation, since those exiled or jailed had already done their deeds. 
The one exception is what may come to light as a result of the next rev-
olution (i.e. 1848-9), if those who participate tend to follow leaders 
or fellows met in their jails or places of exile. 
the result is a pan-Mediterranean total of 275, or half the 
cities, 
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entire exile contingent. Those living under the French crown had the 
dual advantage of being close to home, and still collecting their pen-
. ns the best of both worlds, so to speak. 510 ... 
One might suppose that other Italian states would receive most of 
the exiles, but this does not take place. Easy-going Tuscany is well 
represented with about half the total for all of Italy, but compared to 
the French groups, this is tiny.· All the Italian states together gave 
shelter to only 75 refugee&. 
Brief note might be made of the very small numbers of overseas 
exiles. Many of the police and prison records make mention of prisoners 
who were released from jail to serve double their remaining sentences in 
exile. The most commonly stated country of exile is Brazil, and the 
Papal government would frequently buy a ticket and escort the prisoner 
to the ship to make sure he arrived there. But apparently many of those 
banished to the Americas found their way back; several of those who 
repatriated themselves from France are cases in point. Of course there 
is the possibility that some of those who were deported to North or 
South America did stay and adapt to their new surroundings, with no 
thought of returning to Italy. Obviously, these people would not appear 
in this survey. There really is no practical way of finding out who and 
how many there were. 
Returning once again to the large numbers of exiles in France, we 
find an interesting pattern of clustering. One more obvious place of 
settlement would be Marseilles and the south coast, where many refugees 
Would first have entered France. If we add the total for the large port 
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to those of Toulon, Avignon, Nimes, Montpellier, Cette and Narbonne, we 
find that there were 93 exiles in the coastal strip. Paris, too, would 
have held some hope for housing and employment, as well as proximity to 
the local Italian community in the French capital. Paris, with the 
nearby towns of Versailles and Charenton, provides another 75 names. 
A third settlement area is more mysterious. A crescent-shaped 
pattern of towns in western France, facing the Bay of Biscay, accounts 
for more than a few names. The towns in question are Angers, Saumur, 
Tours, Loches, Chateauroux, Limoges, Perigueux and Bordeaux. In this 
crescent, 104 exjles had been settled (possibly at the behest of the 
French government), making it the largest of the three clusterings in 
Fratlce. Chateauroux (30) and Saumur (22) are particularly large concen-
trations. There is some evidence that Mazzini and other revolutionary 
leaders were actively communicating with men in these cities. 
CHAPTER III 
THE REVOLUTIONARY AND REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENTS OF 1848-9 
After the joyous beginning of his reign, Pius continued to enjoy a 
period of great popularity. For a while, even the most conservative 
cardinals felt it difficult to oppose the reforms of a man who was idol-
ized by so many. Yet the wild enthusiasm shown for Pius in his early 
years tells us perhaps more about the needs and hopes of the citizenry 
than it does about the man's own policy. His willingness to discuss 
change and the reform of institutions was, in itself, a near revolution. 
Such flexibility was unknown since the days of Pius VII and Consalvi, 
despite the speed of change in European society. Yet the new Pope's 
genuine humanity and decency did not itself constitute a policy. Had he 
been a stronger person, these virtues might have developed into a suc-
cessful long-ranged program of development. But such was not the case. 
IX as Reformer 
Much of his popularity was based on a misunderstanding. People tended 
to see a liberal political leader first of all, and a priest only after-
ward. Yet the opposite ranking of priorities was. the true one. For 
those few people who cared to observe him, there was ample evidence of 
the Pope's timidity and fear of dramatic action. Especially in the 
early spring of 1848, he complained of excessive pressure to anyone who 
would listen: close advisers, Civic Guard officers, diplomats, visiting 
76 
77 
bishops. He lamented his lack of freedom to act as leader of the 
Church, and declared that he could only see one way to solve a conflict 
in his roles of priest and prince - to throw himself on God's providence 
and accept whatever troubles might follow. 1 
In spite of all appearances, the Pope never passed through a "lib-
eral phase," because true liberals embrace certain optimistic assump-
tions 2 which Pius found totally alien. For him, human beings were weak 
and helpless creatures, flawed by original sin, and incapable of good 
and virtuous conduct without the help of God and the controls of soci-
ety. The duty ot an enlightened ruler was to protect and guide his sub-
jects, like a stern parent, but never allow them so much freedom that 
they might hurt themselves or destroy those institutions which kept them 
safe. Pius could never bring himself to believe that human beings are 
perfectable creatures, or that they are able to make wise and prudent 
judgements with nothing but natural reason to guide them. Pessimism and 
religious traditionalism were far more important factors in Piust think-
ing than liberalism ever was. He lived largely for the next life, and 
assumed that most of his subjects did too. Whenever he was faced with 
hard decisions, for example, he would consult theologians before cabinet 
ministers. This tendency, while admirable in any religious leader, 
causes untold complications when it is applied to statecraft. It is 
interesting to note that both Mazzini and Metternich saw this element of 
1 Alberto M. Ghisalberti, "Intorno alla fuga di Pio IX," Archivio 
Storico Italiano (1969), CXXVII, 110-2. 
2 For example, humans are naturally perfectible beings, with an 
innate attraction to good and virtuous activity; the individual will 
advance toward a more perfect state, as long as he is free to act 
rationally. 
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pessimism in Pius much earlier than most others. The author of the 
labus 
--
Errors (1864) was obviously someone who saw little hope for the 
modern world. 3 
In his earliest political reforms, Pius IX was strongly motivated 
by the need to reduce suffering among his subjects, and a hope to remove 
the widespread hatred for the Papal States as one of the worst governed 
states in Europe. In one sense, his plan to turn Rome into a "showcase 
of good government" was doomed from the outset; he was able to correct 
some abuses and improve ce·rtain conditions, but he was never totally 
free to make sweeping reforms. His unalterable view of State as secon-
dary to Church would not allow him, as Prince/Pope, to act with the same 
freedom which any other sovereign could exercise. At every turn, his 
inability to wear two crowns simultaneously seemed to hamper even the 
best motivated efforts. 
Added to the major difficulty of setting harmonious policy for 
both church and state, we must consider the aspirations of many other 
proponents of change. Far from suffering from a dearth of followers, 
Pius had far too many adherents, most of whom offered confusing and con-
tradictory proposals. Some wanted to create a constitutional monarchy 
with liberal institutions. Others saw Rome as. the moral nucleus of a 
strong federation of Italian states. Still others hoped for a revival 
of the Italian national spirit which would bring on a fusion of states 
and the renewal of social harmony. His own ideas were certainly condi-
tioned by the many petitions, pleas and suggestions he received from his 
3 Frank J. Coppa, "Pessimism and Traditionalism in the Personality 
and Policies of Pio Nono, 11 of Italian History (1979) II, 210-5 .' 
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subjects and advisers - but he spoke only rarely of the limits beyond 
which he would not pass. As one reform edict followed another, Pius 
felt the growing panic of a man being forced to walk the plank: sooner 
of later, he would have to stop moving or face disaster. But what if 
everyone else wanted him to continue? When and how would the parting of 
the ways occur? He never decided on an answer to that question. 
One principal difficulty in his policy was that his proposed 
reforms would only touch certain·segments of the population. During his 
first year as Pope, he agreed to an independent judiciary, equality 
before the law, and taxation of moral entities, such as seminaries. 
These measures were generally applauded, and indeed, long overdue. Yet 
many of the popular journals complained that such modest decrees did not 
go far enough to correct the principal cause of the state's trouble, the 
hopeless plight of the smaller farmers and other working classes. 4 Up to 
this time, revolutionary influence in Rome (carbonaro or Mazzinian) had 
largely been confined to artisans, small merchants, some nobles and pro-
fessionals, and a few priests. Despite the amnesty and the early 
reforms, the loyalty of the poorest classes remained uncertain, condi-
tioned as it was by the needs of the poor and by their rising hopes and 
expectations of the new regime. 5 
In Naples, by way of contrast, much of the revolutionary discon-
tent was found among the middle level of the commercial class. Bour-
geois critics of the government wanted structural and constitutional 
4 Franco Catalano, "La Repubblica Romana del 1849," Scritti storici e 
giuridici in memoria di~· Visconti (Milano: Cisalpino, 1955), p. 212. 
5 Hearder, "Republic," p. 173. 
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reforms to allow them into the political arena. But in the Papal 
States, with its unique clerical monopoly and huge, tax-exempt estates 
in the hands of religious entities, the suffering was most acute among 
sharecroppers, day laborers and unemployed craftsmen. The popular slo-
gan among Roman revolutionaries was "work and bread, 11 signalling the 
need for social reform. Since economic and financial disorder was ramp-
ant, much of the underground rhetoric spoke of gaining control of the 
financial administration, solving unemployment, abolishing the grist 
tax, and raising taxes on the estates of the wealthiest landowners, jew-
elry, lavish carriages, and similar luxuries. It remained unsaid, but 
vivid in the minds of all, that prelates and cardinals would be among 
the first to be inconvenienced by such laws, and therefore would be 
reliably opposed to them. 6 
For conveniece, we can trace the political activity of Pius IX 
through four distinct phases. Each of these phases is marked by a dif-
ferent relationship between the Pope (especially as he saw himself) and 
the liberal or radical popular movements outside his immediate circle. 
1. From his election in 1846 until the authorization of the Civic 
Guard (July, 184 7) - Pius enacted many fundamental reforms 
with the full support of political liberals, and against fran-
tic opposition from the most retrograde conservatives. 
2. From July of 1847 until the publication of the new Constitu-
tion (March, 1848) - he continued reforms at a slower rate, 
under the influence of clubs and popular movements; he 
remained in control, but became increasingly conscious of his 
6 Catalano, p. 211. 
own popularity, with a consequent loss of good judgement. 
3. From March to September, 1848, when he appointed Pellegrino 
Rossi to the Ministry - the popular press and clubs actually 
directed policy, and the Pope followed with a growing sense of 
alarm and apprehension. (The Allocut ion of April 29 was one 
of these 11second thoughts 11 but not necessarily a burned 
bridge.) 
4. From Rossi's Ministry until the Pope's own death in 1878 - he 
resisted all further political innovation and fought unsuc-
cessfully, to retain control of his state. This period has 
been likened to a "30-year Greek Tragedy" in which Pius was 
forced to go on living among hostile fates, where al1 remain-
ing choices were bad. 
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The elements of this division ignore the mythical 11 liberal phase" and 
more accurately show the known traits of Pius' personality at work. 7 
From his 1850 restoration onward, Pius put away his attempts at 
being a reforming prince. He reverted to governing the Church as his 
principal occupation, and the Papal States as a necessary evil, if only 
because he needed somewhere to stand. His pessimism and religiosity 
reasserted themselves, and he began to read most contemporary movements 
as potential assaults on a strong and united papacy. The remainder of 
his pontificate is marked by strenuous efforts to preserve what he con-
sidered to be the necessary tools to govern the Church freely and 
firmly. From the end of the middle ages until his own time, Pius saw 
attacks on the power of the papacy as the work of the devil, to be 
7 Hearder, "Republic," 170f. 
82 
opposed at all costs. A contemporary author in 1862 wrote of a consis-
tent trend in the work of Arnaldo di Brescia, Cola di Rienzo, Martin 
Luther and John Calvin to destroy Papal influence; these earlier attacks 
were now supported by Cavour, Ricasoli, Garibaldi and Mazzini. 8 
Reforms 
The initial work done by Pius and his collaborators provides an inter-
esting vignette of one man's attempt to modernize his state in a very 
short time. But since it is only marginally significant to the present 
study, this period will be dealt with quickly. The main point of inter-
est here is the part which several of the former exiles and prisoners 
played in the new government, a hallmark of the new policy of reconcili-
ation. 
The Press Law of March 15, 1847 allowed relatively free publica-
tion of political journals. These journals were not subject to actual 
censorship, merely the supervision of a review board; the board con-
sisted of 5 nominated members, 4 of them laymen. By early 1848, there 
were over 100 political publications appearing regularly in all parts of 
the Papal States. This feature is all the more remarkable for the fact 
that not a single free paper existed in Milan or Vienna at that time. 9 
Almost immediately, these publications began to bring political 
discussion and debate into broad daylight. Most authors agree that the 
newspapers themselves, along with the political clubs, were largely 
responsible for the lively ferment which became the matrix for the 
8 Pier Giorgio Camaiani, "Il diavolo, Roma e la rivoluzione, 11 Rivista 
di Storia ~ Letteratura Religiosa (1972) VIII, 489 & 496. 
9 Hearder, "Republic," p. 174. 
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events of 1848. Chief among these active journals was Pietro Sterbini's 
Contemporaneo, which proved to be one of the most widely read papers in 
Rome. One strong moderate, Luigi Carlo Farini, considered Sterbini (a 
returned exile, like himself) to be both an opportunist and a demagogue, 
a man who would say or write absolutely anything to enhance his own 
political standing. He calls Sterbini a man whose flights of fancy 
overshadowed his intellect, !!an imaginative but inaccurate" writer, and 
a person ignorant of everything· except the history of Rome and the 
French Revolution. In a more favorable light, Farini cites several 
other publications: the Felsino of Bologna, competently published by 
Marco Minghetti and Antonio Montinari, the Roman Bilancia, work of Pro-
fessor Orioli (also a returned exile) and Advocate Cattabene, and Berti-
Pichat 's excellent Bolognese journal Ital , which he described as 
bitter against the "Gregorians 11 but not necessarily hostile to the pres-
ent government. 10 
Farini further pointed out that the liberalized Press Law served 
to solidify and highlight the two tendencies within the liberal camp. 
The Moderates (whom he clearly favored) worked for concord between gov-
ernment and people, non-violent evolution toward a representative sys-
tem, and a League of Italian States to oppose Austrian policy in Italy. 
On the other hand, the Radicals would settle for nothing less, said Far-
ini, than a unitary republic based on popular passion and war against 
the Austrians and other crowned heads. This highly vocal minority did 
favor moderate reforms, but only as stepping stones to their final goal, 
1 ° Farini, I, 213f. 
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not as ends in themselves. 11 In Farini's view, four principal villains 
emerged from this radical camp: editor Sterbini himself, lawyer Giuseppe 
Galletti of Bologna, the popular leader Angelo Brunetti, called "Cicer-
uacchio" by the Romans, and Carlo Bonaparte, Prince of Canino. Sterbini 
and Galletti are the most visible of the amnesty recipients who sup-
ported the overthrow of Pius IX in 1848. 
Following closely after the Press Law, Cardinal Gizzi also enacted 
two structural reforms for the Papal government during mid-1847. The 
first, on April 14, instituted the Council of State, an advisory body 
designed to assist the government in the moderization program. Legates 
and Delegates were asked to nominate three worthy individuals from their 
respective provinces; one of these would be chosen by the Pope to serve 
a 2-year term. The other directive, dated June 14, set up a Council of 
Ministers or cabinet. Without stopping the process of government, this 
edict re-named and re-defined the off ices of the principal administra-
tors. The most important office (that of President) absorbed all of 
Gizzi's duties as Cardinal Secretary of State, including the Interior 
Ministry, and both Ecclesiastical and Secular Foreign Affairs. Other 
ministries included Industry and Commerce, Public Works, War, Finance, 
and Police. All members of this first cabinet.were cardinals or prel-
ates, but there was a clear implication that the reorganization had 
opened the door for laymen in at least some of these offices. 12 
11 Farini, I, 216. 
12 Farini, I, 218-2. 
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The institution of a Civic Guard had long been a pet project of 
liberal reformers, dating at least from the French Revolution. In the 
Papal States, where a history of foreign troops and centurian atrocities 
had embittered relations between subjects and government, the idea of a 
domestic force of citizens keeping order in their own towns seemed espe-
cially attractive. As it was originally conceived under Pius IX, the 
Civica was seen more as a hedge against food riots and crimes against 
property by the starving poor during the bad harvests of 1846-7. Only 
later was it seen as a vehicle of military training and organization for 
a future nationalistic crusade against Austria. For the moment, it was 
requested and granted as a domestic police force to support the existing 
carabinieri and soldiers in maintaining order. 13 Unfortunately, while 
the project was well funded by the municipalities, it was not always 
well organized. Local leaders usually took charge of their respective 
units and recruited heavily among their closest friends, clients and 
associates. There was little attempt to screen membership or exclude 
people with questionable backgrounds. Conservatives feared the Civic 
Guard as the latest step in arming the common mob against the police, 
the Swiss and the Volunteers. Just as the amnesty had allowed radical 
leaders to resume their activities, and the Press Law had given them 
permission to propagandize, so the Civic Guard permitted the arming of 
those who would carry out the next revolution. The old "Gregorian" fac-
tion saw the Pope's program as a slow-acting dose of political sui-
cide. 14 
13 Giovanni Natali, "Bologna e le Legazioni durante la Rivoluzione 
del 1848" La Mercanzia, (1959) XIV, 49. 
86 
As events turned out, the paramilitary ranks and structure, the 
handsome uniforms, and the stirring display of band concerts, honor 
guards and parades all served to convince large numbers of civic guards 
that they were almost the equals of real soldiers. The events of early 
1848 would teach them hard lessons: that good weapons did not automati-
cally bring training in their use, that enthusiasm was no substitute for 
discipline, that there are few shortcuts to military professionalism. 
The tragedy of the Civic troops was that their many examples of individ-
ual heroism could not save the units themselves from disintegrating 
under the pounding they took from the well trained Austrian conscripts. 
On March 14, 1848, Pius promulgated a new constitution, the Sta-
' which he hoped would become the keystone of his new reformed 
state. As he saw it, this was the final instalment in the concessions 
he was prepared to make to admit laymen to the structure of civil gov-
ernment. Although he was aware of the uniqueness of the Papal States, 
he made strenuous efforts to conform to the appearances of other consti-
tutional monarchies. The Council of State would continue to function as 
an advisory board on executive matters. There would also be a bicameral 
legislature for all non-ecclesiastical affairs. The Pope would select 
members of the High Council from lists of nominees, while voters would 
elect members of the Council of Deputies according to a_ restricted fran-
chise. Professors, doctors, lawyers, pastors, ecclesiastical leaders, 
magistrates, mayors, councillors, and other such "notables, 11 had the 
right to vote automatically. Any other prospective voters had to show 
evidence that they had either paid 12 scudi in taxes, or possessed 300 
14 Hearder, "Republic," pp. 175f. 
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scudi in capital. This limited franchise was fairly typical of most 
contemporary states, based as it was on the twin assumptions that public 
policy at its best when decided by the well educated or those already 
engaged in administration, and that tax revenue would be spent most pru-
dently by those who paid most of it. 15 
Yet even under the accepted restrictions of the day, the Statuto 
was hardly a revolutionary concession. Pius was never prepared to place 
any part of the government of the Church in the hands of laymen. It was 
taken for granted that clerics would continue to participate in all 
civic functions, .both voting and being eligible for any office. But the 
opposite was not allowed. Non-clerics would only be free to set policy 
for clearly secular issues, something which was admittedly hard to 
define in a society where church and state blended so closely on most 
issues: foreign policy, education, taxation of property related to 
religious institutions, and such like. There was a tacit understanding 
that the title of "Secretary of State" was reserved for the cardinal who 
controlled the foreign affairs of the 
president of the Cabinet. The Interior Ministry was reserved for the 
highest ranking layman, who was effective "prime minister" in secular 
affairs. But it was also understood that most of the ministers and 
functionaries would henceforth be laymen, unless their offices dealt 
heavily with religious matters. As a final safeguard on the freedom of 
the Church, all legislation and policy would be submitted to secret 
review by the College of Cardinals. Although not an official element of 
the new government, the Cardinals effectively became a parliamentary 
15 Farini, II, SOf. 
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"third house" with power to veto the work of the other two chambers. 16 
But even with its obvious limitations, the Papal Statuto signifi-
cantly opened government decisions to lay influence for the first time 
since Consalvi's reforms. Coming as it did on March 15, it was the 
fourth Italian charter granted in a two-month period. Ferdinand II of 
the Two Sicilies had conceeded his on January 23, principally as a 
response to the revolt in Sicily. Charles Albert announced the funda-
mental principles of a Statute for Piedmont-Sardinia on February 9, 
later finalized in the document of March 5. Grand Duke Leopold II of 
Tuscany followed.suit on February 17. Thus, even before the outbreak of 
war, the liberals of 1848 successfully achieved adoption of relatively 
free constitutions for the larger Italian states, with the signal excep-
tion of Lombardy- Venetia. 17 
Almost unseen amid the hectic activity of March, 1848, the last of 
the 1846 amnistiati were quietly released from prison. These were 25 
prisoners held in Civita Castellana for crimes of armed violence which 
were technically not covered by the original terms of the amnesty. 
Their cases had been appealed and reviewed by the Consulta. Pius 
decided to pardon them as a gesture of good will, and they were turned 
loose at last. 18 Five of these prisoners were accused of a murder during 
the revolt of 1845 in Rimini. All twenty of the others were among the 
more violent members of the Muratori and Imola groups of 1843. Despite 
the seriousness of their charges, most of these men lived up to the con-
16 Hearder, History, LX, 176. 
17 Berkeley, III. 65-73. 
18 Farini, II, 16f. 
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ditions of the amnesty following their release, and never turned up in 
court again. As will be seen, however, four of the same names, Angelo 
Gori, Domenico Conti, Antonio Nanni and Paolo Scorzoni, are accused of 
later crimes in 1848-9. Gori's identity in the subsequent case is some-
what doubtful, but the others are confirmed matches. 
War and the 
Many of the Pope's reforms would doubtless have been tested and criti-
cized by his own citizens, even if the outside world had stayed peace-
ful, and the Papal States had remained calm. But the eruption of a lib-
eral revolution in Vienna (March 17), followed by the nationalistic 
upris in Milan and Venice (March 18- 22) guaranteed that turmoil and 
national passions would further confuse an already uncertain process. 
Public sentiment nearly everywhere in Italy longed for the day when the 
Austrians would depart (or be expelled) from northern Italy. The Pope's 
own words had often supported and encouraged this growing consciousness 
of Italian nationality. Since he was probably the most popular and 
admired individual in Italy, there is no realistic way that Pius would 
NOT be involved in any Italo-Austrian conflict. Especially after the 
Piedmonteie king, Charles Albert, declared war on Austria (March 24), 
the conflict became more than just an isolated rebellion. Charles 
Albert called for all patriotic Italians to join him in a crusade to 
push the Germans back across the Alps. There seemed to be a general 
expectation that the Pope would strongly endorse, if not actually lead, 
this popular effort. 
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Because the war between the Austrian army and the Italian rebels 
was taking place just across the Po river from the Romagna, there was 
legitimate concern that the fighting might spill over the frontier. In 
particular, the city of Ferrara and the small forts in the Cornacchio 
region, where the Austrians claimed the right to maintain garrisons, 
appeared to be dangerous flash points. The Ministry decided in mid-
March to send troops to the northern frontier. They ordered most of the 
regular army into a state of readiness, and called for volunteers to 
support them. The Papal army of 1848 was relatively small, and better 
schooled in mai~taining internal order than in fighting against other 
soldiers. Even so, the troops themselves were considered to be of good 
quality, and able to defend their State. A Piedmontese general, Giov-
anni Durando, was given command of the division containing most of the 
regular units, including 2 excellent Swiss regiments, as well as 4 regi-
ments of native infantry, 2 of cavalry, and smaller formations of 
artillery, engineers and staff officers. Durando's column, about 7000 
strong, was ordered to prepare for departure by the last week of 
March. 19 
A second division, comprising most of the Civic Guards and volun-
teer troops, was placed under the command of General Ferrari, a well 
respected Neapolitan officer in French service. The Civic Guard, as we 
have already seen, existed by now as an auxiliary force. It had the 
appearance of a military formation, but actual training was very weak, 
and the quality of its weapons and equipment uneven. Nevertheless, the 
Civica was mobilized to support the regulars by fleshing out the numbers 
19 Farini, II, Bf. 
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of the army, if not its quality. The core of Ferrari's force comprised 
four civic regiments, proudly called 11Roman Legions," each consisting of 
one or two battalions. A number of ad hoc units also enlisted in the 
enthusiasm of the hour, comprising 3 volunteer regiments (also with 2 
battalions each), and the Roman University battalion, in hopes of bol-
stering the army still further. Although, Ferrari's division numbered 
almost 10, 000 troops, it never had all of its basic equipment, and 
remained weak in cavalry, artillery and trained officers of every vari-
ety. 20 
Still other volunteer units from the Romagna (not to be confused 
with those under Ferrari's command) were raised and led by local nota-
bles independently of any real control by the War Ministry. Four of 
these independent battalions were named for river valleys: ~Ito Reno, 
Basso Reno, =-=-=-=~· and Senio. The Alto Reno battalion, soon to become 
the most aggressive of these units, was commanded by Count Livio Zambec-
cari, a returned exile. 21 These so called "free corps," together with a 
handful of civic units, had already marched to the Po long before the 
regular force had left Rome. 
As early as March 20, the Duke of Modena's police had attacked 
Modenese citizens who were demanding reforms.. S.ince this fighting 
angered many citizens in nearby Bologna, Cardinal Amat, the Legate, 
moved immeditely to contain the troubles, and prevent involvement by 
Papal citizens in the politics of another state. He tried to seal the 
frontier with a force of Swiss, Volunteers and Civic Guards, but Major 
20 Berkeley, III, 243. 
21 Natali, 11Rivoluzione," p. 50. 
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zambeccari led his irregulars all the way to Modena to support the reb-
els. He returned after the Duke was deposed but insisted on keeping his 
force together for action elsewhere. 22 Several other local forces moved 
against Austrian contingents within the Papal states. Volunteer units 
from Ravenna and the lower Romagna under Major Montanari forced Austrian 
troops to yield the Cornacchio forts. About a thousand others, including 
Zambeccari's men, surrounded the citadel of Ferrara, but were unable to 
capture it without heavy guns. It became increasingly obvious that only 
Durando's regulars could provide the crucial edge to dislodge Austrian 
troops from places which they were determined to hold. 23 
Meanwhile, the government in Rome eagerly hoped to conclude nego-
tiations for the League of Italian States. The cabinet saw such an 
alliance as a neat way to avoid the knotty problem of declaring war 
against Austria, and might even allow Durando's troops to fight, simply 
as members of the League, and not as soldiers of Pius IX. Furthermore, 
it might provide a stronger moral basis for Charles Albert's efforts to 
forge 11 Italy, 11 rather than an expanded Piedmont. On April 10, Monsignor 
Corboli-Bussi was sent to the king as special legate, with orders to 
expedite co-operation and eliminate all obstacles to the finalization of 
the League. It is genuinely unfortunate that these efforts did not bear 
fruit. Although the whole issue is idle speculation today, it remains 
possible that much bloodshed might have been avoided if Vienna had seen 
a relatively unified front among the Italian states. Given a willing-
ness to compromise in Vienna, there might have been a negotiated settle-
22 Farini, II, 36f. 
23 Farini, II, 59f. 
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ment for some sort of Italian federation. But while the goals of a cus-
toms union and a political federation seemed wonderful before the fight-
ing began, the need to expel Austria militarily replaced all other 
issues in Charles Albert's mind. The League was never concluded, and 
Corboli-Bussi returned home. For the Piedmontese, this narrowing of 
focus meant that they would be all but alone in their struggle. For the 
Roman cabinet, it meant a far more serious need to clarify the status of 
their troops, now that they were on the verge of active fighting. 24 
Since there still appeared to be some chance of an alliance, War 
Minister Aldobrandini ordered General Durando to "enter into communica-
tion with his majesty (Charles Albert) and act in concert with him." On 
April 18, he authorized Durando to cross the Po. Even this dramatic 
step remained short of war, however. The north bank of the river was 
the "Polesine di Rovigo, 11 formerly Papal territory which was assigned to 
Austria after 1815, but which Rome still claimed. 2 s The government 
appointed Count Carlo Pepoli as a special commissioner for the army, and 
traveled along with Durando's headquarters as both adviser and watchdog. 
When Pepoli was elected to the assembly as deputy for Bologna, he was 
replaced on June 1 by Filippo Canuti. Both Pepoli and Canuti were for-
mer exiles, passionately devoted to the moderate liberal cause. Canuti, 
a close associate of Farini, spent much of his time trying to restrain 
Durando from rash action and preserve the army's original mission as 
peacekeeper and guardian of the frontiers. Although he remained a loyal 
partisan of the Pope, he never succeeded in his task of preventing the 
24 Berkeley, III, 160. 
2 s Farini, II, 61-3 & 84. 
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disaster which would soon follow. 26 
But before Durando's army had arrived, Zambeccari once again 
decided to commit his volunteers to action. His Alto Reno battalion 
crossed the frontier and marched toward the Austrian fortress of Leg-
nano. By April 8th, they had marched 20 kilometers into Austrian terri-
tory and occupied Ostiglia, on the north bank of the Po. The following 
week, two other units crossed the frontier to join them: the Bersaglieri 
del Po, commanded by Count Raffaele Pasi, another returned exile, and 
the Lower Romagna Volunteers. 27 
On April 20, Charles Albert ordered Durando to follow the volun-
teer columns, and occupy Ostiglia and Governolo, but these orders were 
soon changed. An Austrian relief column under Marshal Nugent had begun 
moving to Radetzky's aid, and Durando's men were the only trained forma-
tion able to intercept these reinforcements. The Papal contingent 
marched to Treviso instead, and prepared to block all crossings of the 
Piave river. 28 Ferrari's Volunteer column, marching several days behind, 
received orders to conform to Durando's movements and support him with 
all possible speed. 
At just this crucial moment, Pius and his Cabinet had a falling 
out. After a meeting on April 25, Cardinal Antonelli, the Secretary of 
State, sent the Pope a memo on behalf of the rest of the Cabinet 
requesting a public clarification of policy concerning the war. The 
26 Michele Rosi (ed.), Dizionario del Risorgimento nazionale, 
(Milano: Casa editrice Dettor Francesco Vallardi, 1930-7) II, 524ff. 
27 Farini, II, 82. 
28 Farini, II, 84f. 
95 
memo listed three possible courses of action: a formal declaration of 
war against Austria) the outright withdrawl of the troops) or a state-
ment that the government did not want war, but could not stop its own 
citizens if they wanted to fight. 29 The Cabinet recommended the third 
alternative: allowing the troops to continue fighting without formal 
support, while declaring that a peaceful settlement would be the ideal 
solution. But instead of a simple clarification of policy, the Pope 
reacted more strongly than the cabinet wished. Some German bishops were 
reported to be considering- schism if the Papacy continued to promote 
Italian nationalism at their expense. Pius himself had shown signs of 
exasperation with the many demamds which had pushed him far beyond his 
better judgement, and decided to make a sudden end to the whole process. 
After meeting with a Consistory of the Cardinals, he issued what has 
subsequently been called the Allocution of April 29. He strongly repu-
diated the war being waged in his name, and ordered that all military 
activity stop at once. 30 The shock waves were not slow in spreading. 
The Cabinet resigned immediately) since their recommendation had 
been so firmly rejected. The general public realized suddenly that 
their army was now in a "limbo" condition: denied belligerent status, 
but committed to action against a resolute enemy._ Rumors circulated in 
Rome that Austrian troops had lynched a prisoner in a civic guard uni-
form, saying that he had no rights as a soldier. Crowds gathered in a 
state of panic and near-revolt. Princes and dukes mingled with the mob, 
trying to calm their passions, as Orioli and Mamiani attempted to repair 
29 Ghisalberti, "fuga," p. 113. 
3 ° Farini, II, 100-12. 
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the political damage Pius had inflicted on himself. 31 
Despite previous indications that he would never go to war, even 
to support neo-guelph efforts, Pius had still shocked public opinion too 
badly to recover quickly. Whether he knew it or not at the time, Pius 
squarely faced the question of whether church or state considerations 
would take priority in his Risorgimento policy: he chose the church. 
Ultimately, this choice proved to be long-ranged and durable; it proba-
bly cost him the Papal States, but actually strengthened the moral and 
spiritual influence of the·Papacy in the long run. However, it did not 
solve his immediate crisis, or save him from the turmoil which followed 
it. He clarified the Church's position on national politics once and 
for all: no active war against Austria, no endorsement of popular revo-
lution, and no sacrifice of the Papal States, if it meant loss of the 
Pope's freedom to act. Just a few years later, one writer opined that 
the Roman Republic was only "baptized" on February 9, 1849 - it had been 
born the day of the Allocution. 32 
Politically, the Allocution appears to have taken power away from 
the moderates almost overnight, and set up the subsequent clash between 
radicals and reactionaries. Despite the substantial progress of several 
ministries, the moderate liberals seemed discredited in the eyes of the 
general public, since they had failed to make Pius do the single thing 
the nationalists really wanted in April of 1848: to drive the Austrians 
out of Italy. 33 After May 1, the political clubs took over effective 
31 Farini, II, 114f. 
32 Monaco, pp. 186-91. 
33 Catalano, p. 212. 
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leadership of the population; through the Civic Guard, they held the 
keys to the physical control of the capital. The next ministry, that of 
Terenzio Mamiani, turned out to be one of the most talented and noble-
minded in the history of the Papal States. But by this stage, practi-
cally no one was paying attention to the official cabinet, seen as an 
agent of betrayal. 34 
Despite the thundering shock to his political momentum and per-
sonal popularity, Pio Nono tried to carry on as usual. The Pope allowed 
Mamiani a great deal of latitude in setting policy, including measures 
to reduce cleric.al control over temporal affairs. Mamiani' s vigorous 
policy, in harmony with his own most deeply held principles, earned him 
strong opposition from many of the curial cardinals. A 1 though Pius 
stood by his minister, the timing of the conflict was quite unfortunate: 
it alienated the clerical right without slowing the subversive efforts 
of Sterbini and the political left. On May 30, Pius named his Council 
of State, hoping desparately that stability might follow. Among its 
distinguished members were Advocate Sturbinetti and Professor Francesco 
Orioli, a former exile. Only 4 or the 14 members were clarics. 
Elections for the Chamber of Deputies followed on May 18. Despite the 
turmoil, the elections went smoothly and most of the candidates returned 
by the voters were highly respected. The president of the new chamber 
was the elderly Cardinal Soglia, the virtuous follower of Pius VII in 
exile. 35 
34 Farini, II, 121. 
35 Farini, II, 163-7. 
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Reverses and Violence 
Meanwhile, Durando 1 s army had moved into a position to block the rein-
forcements intended for Radetzky. On the day of the Allocution, he had 
reached Treviso with his Swiss Brigade and the other regular troops; he 
immediately prepared to defend the Piave bridges against Marshal Nugent, 
who was approaching from the east with an Austrian column twice his 
size. Since Charles Albert's forces had already been halted before the 
heavily fortified Quadrilateral, the duel between Durando and Nugent 
took the spotlight as the crucial campaign to save or destroy the Aus-
trian empire. W~thout supplies and reinforcements, Radetzky would soon 
be forced to surrender, despite his strong position. But Durando's 
force was still relatively small; the volunteer corps had only arrived 
at Ferrara, and would not be able to support him for at least a week, no 
matter what. 36 Even if he were so inclined, Durando was in no condition 
to act boldly and decisively at just the time when he might have turned 
the tide in favor of the Italians. 
One other variable factor lay in the 40,000 troops promised by 
Ferdinand of Naples. An advance guard of 14,000 under General Pepe had 
already entered the Papal States and had reached Bologna; the rest were 
to follow shortly. The full Neapolitan contingent would assure Durando 
of almost 50,000 regulars, plus several thousand additional volunteers. 
Such a force would be nearly impossible for Nugent to pass. But the 
Neapolitans would never see combat. Shortly after the street fighting 
of May 15, King Ferdinand recalled all of his troops to keep order at 
home (and eventually to re-conquer Sicily). Most returned home immedi-
36 Berkeley, III, 242-5. 
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ately, although a few hundred volunteers were allowed to follow Pepe 
northward to continue the struggle. They made a noble contribution to 
the defense of Venice, but were of no use to Durando as a mobile 
force. 37 
By the time Papal troops actually met Nugent's force in battle, 
they were well aware of the Allocution. Although none of them broke off 
their campaign, most were understandably dispirited at the lack of sup-
port from their own revered sovereign. Especially among Ferrari's vol-
unteers (most of whom tended toward republicanism anyway), there was an 
underlying spirit of anger. More than a few grumbled that this was one 
more example of Italy's being betrayed by its own princes. 38 These same 
volunteers took the brunt of Nugent's attack during the battle of Cor-
nuda (May 8 & 9). This misfortune was due largely to the Austrians' 
skillful movement and good discipline, as well as a few bad judgements 
by Durando. Ferrari's men gave a good account of themselves during the 
battle, but took dozens of casualties waiting for support that never 
came. The "conspiracy" rumor took hold of them again, and discipline 
collapsed completely during their retreat. Although good numbers of 
these men would continue to fight, this single battle finished Ferrari's 
division as an organized force. 39 
One month later, Durando defended a strong position at Vicenza 
against a much more powerful Austrian force. He deployed most of his 
Swiss and other regulars, together with the best of his volunteers, led 
37 Berkeley, III, 240f and 285f. 
38 Farini, II, 154. 
39 Berkeley, III, 253-65. 
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by former exiles Pietramellara and Pasi, and other ardent patriots. 
Despite a spirited effort, Austrian numbers and training prevailed. On 
June 11, Durando was allowed to withdraw from Veneta with arms, baggage 
and honors of war, but on the condition that he and his men would not 
fight against Austria for the next 3 months. 40 The disaster at Treviso 
ensured that other rebel forces in Veneta would quickly be mopped up by 
Austrian columns: Padua, Treviso, Palmanova. By the end of June, Venice 
was isolated and would eventually succumb to a lengthy siege. Radetzky 
now faced no one in the field except Charles Albert's Piedmontese, who 
presently received the same quick hammer blows which had destroyed their 
allies. The unqualified Austrian victory at the battle of Custoza hurt 
the Piedmontese forces so badly that they were unable to continue the 
campaign. They fell back in disorder. By August 6, the Austrians had 
retaken Milan; on August 9, they signed the Armistice of Salasco, which 
required the Piedrnontese to withdraw all forces to the old frontier. 41 
For all practical purposes, these events finished the military threat to 
Radetzky in 1848. 
After Vicenza, Durando's army fell back on Bologna in fairly good 
order. That city had been in an agitated state ever since the recall of 
the Neapolitan force in mid-March. The arrival of the 4000 armed and 
frustrated veterans served only to further inflame passions here and 
elsewhere in the Rornagna. 42 Durando and Canuti decided to disband most 
of the restive volunteer units rather than risk further erosion of 
4
° Farini, II, 229-33. 
41 Farini, II, 235f & 288. 
42 Natali, "Rivoluzione, 11 p. 51. 
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morale. Unhappily, these discharged troops took their rage and frustra-
tion back to their native towns, plunging many of them into anarchy. 
Ravenna, Faenza, Pesaro and Fano experienced an extraordinary number of 
political assassinations, with few if any arrests. Imola, Senigallia 
and Ancona suffered similar convulsions, as angry civic guards took out 
their hostility on anyone perceived to be an enemy. Bologna remained 
relatively quiet at first, due in part to the presence of the army, but 
also to Cardinal Amat 1 s wise and honest government, and to the efforts 
of many leading citizens. ·Wherever political clubs existed, they served 
not only as sounding boards for the nationalist and revolutionary rhet-
oric of the day, but also became de facto provisional governments, espe-
cially where papal administrators were either intimidated or ignored. 43 
In Rome, Sterbini had gained virtual control of the semi-radical 
Circolo Popolare, the club which would do so much to topple Pius IX's 
regime; it opposed the more moderate (and more timid) Circolo Romano. 
Bologna's political world was dominated by two similar clubs: another 
Circolo Popolare, which represented the extremists and more violent 
party, and the moderate but relatively powerful Circolo Nazionale, with 
a broad and talented membership, many amnesty veterans among them. 44 
Ancona was polarized in a similar way, with the Circolo Anconitano rep-
resenting those who favored the Pope's liberal reforms, and the Circolo 
Popolare which attracted the anti-papal carbonari and Mazzinian demo-
crats. Many other cities had clubs with similar names and groupings, 
43 Farini, II, 290f. 
44 Natali, 11Rivoluzione, 11 p. 52. 
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which would eventually function very much like political parties. 45 
Some of the Austrian commanders, emboldened by their recent suc-
cess, moved to regain their former strongholds south of the Po. 
Lichtenstein's ~orps temporarily re-occupied Ferrara on July 13, where 
Count Francesco Lovatelli, a former exile, was pro-Legate. Lovatelli 
protested the occupation vigorously, and Pius added his own pressure 
through diplomatic channels to force the Austrians to withdraw. 46 
On August 4, Baron Welden announced his intention to move another 
column toward Bologna, encouraged and followed by the sanfedist leader 
Alpi. He took Genta easily, then continued toward Bologna, where the 
Papal army (still bound by its pledge not to fight until September 11) 
made preparations to withdraw, leaving the city defenseless. Spontane-
ous resentment provoked ordinary citizens to initiate a four-hour clash 
at the city's gates on August 8, forcing Welden's troops to fall back. 
Although Radetzky rebuked Welden for his rashness, he did nothing to 
restore. stability to the largest city of the Legations. Volunteers and 
civic guards from the district converged on Bologna to defend it against 
another Austrian foray. When nothing materialized, many of them joined 
local rowdies in settling old scores with policemen or court officials. 
A Commission of' Public Safety, formed by local property owners, took 
power from pro-Legate Cesare Bianchetti in a vain attempt to maintain 
order. By the beginning of September, the city had approached nearly 
total chaos, with countless violent crimes happening every day. 47 
45 Natalucci, Marche, p. 128. 
46 Farini, II, 294. 
47 Farini, II, 316-22. 
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In Bologna, as elsewhere in Italy, the issues of liberty and inde-
pendence mesmerized the attention of the educated professional classes. 
But other factors, such as regional contrasts, irreconcilable factional 
disputes, and the nagging social question, with its economic and moral 
implications, all combined to reveal that the proposed 11nation" was 
being built over a void. Much of the chaos which was about to wrack 
Bologna would come from lower class people who saw nothing for them-
selves in the unification programs of the elite. These weaknesses in 
the social fabric demonstrated the pernicious effects of a long material 
and moral poverty, which no short-term or rapid reforms could ever hope 
to cure. 48 Yet Bologna was also a natural communications center, impor-
tant for the spread of revolutionary information, among other things. 
News travelled from there to Faenza (mainly through the efforts of for-
mer exiles Pasi and Galdesi), and then to Lugo and elsewhere. The Cir-
cola Popolare of Lugo was an essential link in the planning and execu-
tion of coordinated political activity, such as organized voting or 
blocking the movements of Swiss troops. Obviously, any upheaval in 
Bologna would have a strong ripple effect throughout the entire Lega-
tions region. 49 
Meanwhile in Rome, the government became more and more embarrassed 
and unstable because of the reverses and violence of the summer months. 
Mamiani had already strained his relations with Pius over the lack of 
support for Charles Albert. With a growing sense of helplessness, Mam-
48 Natali, Mercanzia, XIV, 52. 
49 Giovanni Maioli, 11 11 Circolo Popolare di Lugo negli anni 1848 e 
1849," Studi Romagnoli, (1953) IV, 53-5. 
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iani decided to resign when his reform program faltered, especially 
since the August crime spree in Bologna would be sustained largely by 
the people he hoped to protect: unskilled and semi-skilled workers, with 
some help from nearby peasants. 50 By the time that disorder occurred, a 
new ministry had already been formed, led by Count Odoardo Fabbri, a 
sick, elderly figurehead who obliged the Pope by accepting the job no 
one else wanted. Among the other notables who resigned in disgust was a 
conservative deputy, Professor Francesco Orioli. Scholar, mandarin, and 
former exile, Orioli had, until now, enthusiastically served the Pope in 
his attempted reforms, intensely thankful for his pardon in 1846. He 
retired from public life altogether in late July, and was heard from no 
more. 51 
After their defeat of Welden's troops, most of the Bolognese laid 
down their arms, but many of the more violent popolani, supported by the 
volunteers from nearby towns, did not. Two recipients of the 1846 
amnesty, Livio Zambeccari and Angelo Masini, attempted to seize control 
of the commune on August 15, using their own free corps of volunteers. 
The result was not revolution, but anarchy. Many leading moderates, 
including former exile Oreste Biancoli, made strenuous efforts to sup-
port the beleaguered pro-Legate Bianchetti. But the rabble and the free 
corps continued to act with relative freedom: they robbed, broke crimi-
nals out of jail, plundered homes of wealthy citizens, levied taxes on 
those quarters of the city where they were strongest, and systematically 
5 ° Catalano, p. 212. 
51 Farini, II, 329. 
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killed a judge, police officers, magistrates and prison guards. 52 In 
these acts of violence, many property owners saw the awakening of the 
"monster" of popular insurrection and redoubled their cries for aid. 
Farini sent General Zucchi north with troops to support Cardinal Amat, 
and by early September, they had temporarily restored order. Zambeccari 
led his men away to help defend Venice, while the rest of the free corps 
were broken up and fused into the newly formed Unione regiment, which 
was soon incorporated into the regular army. 53 
Count Fabbri, for all his good will, was unequal to the task of 
government. He asked to resign because of the hopeless financial situ-
ation, and was replaced on September 16 with the vigorous Pellegrino 
Rossi, called "tlte most talented statesman in Italy" by no less a critic 
than Camillo Cavour. Rossi was an unlikely choice for minister to the 
Pope: a cynical free-thinker with a Protestant wife, a doctrinaire lib-
eral who had followed Murat, a brilliant jurist and economist. He had 
come to Rome as ambassador for France, then stayed after the fall of 
Louis Philippe as a legal adviser to Pius. Rossi was aware of the 
urgent need to overhaul finances and public order, and was strongly sup-
ported by moderate liberals who favored the rule of law, especially 
those in Bologna. His program was ambitious from the angle of domestic 
development (foreign loans, a reformed civil service, railroads, tele-
graph, and compensation for the war veterans), but offered little to 
those nationalists who still wanted to fight Austria. Rossi favored the 
revival of Gioberti's Customs League, and its possible transformation 
52 Farini, II, 330-3. 
53 Natali, 11Rivoluzione, 11 p. 52. 
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into a formal Confederation of States. It may stand as a tribute to 
Rossi's fairness that his program did not favor any one party; on the 
other hand, he had the misfortune of being suspected by all and strongly 
supported by relatively few. Farini lists those opposed to Rossi as 
"all who favored turbulence, corrupt magistrates, Sanfedists, greedy 
clerics, and whoever wanted to destroy or change the Constitution by 
violent means. 1154 
During this period of the September-October armistice, there was a 
renewed call to summon a Constituent Assembly for Italy. The proposal 
was made by the Montanelli ministry in Tuscany (which included Guer-
razzi) as an alternative to Gioberti's now moribund Congress for Federa-
tion. Among all the factions competing for the soul of Italian unifica-
tion, Mazzini's Young Italy was most passionately devoted to the 
Constituent proposal. Because of the process involved, Mazzini saw it 
as having a messianic and mystical function which matched his own views. 
From a more practical bias, he also knew that his oratory and charisma 
would play well in such a forum. 55 As proposed by the Tuscans, this Cos-
tituente would be a single chamber elected by universal suffrage 
throughout Italy, and would function as paramount sovereign for the 
Italian people, above all other princes and assemblies. Rossi and Far-
ini opposed this suggestion as dangerous and inflamatory. To them, 
Gioberti's neo-guelph proposals offered a brighter hope of consolidating 
the progress already made (moderate constitutions, economic co-opera-
tion, plans for military fusion, streamlined administration), without 
54 Farini, II, 363-85. 
55 Hearder, 11Republic, 11 p. 172. 
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the dangers of a relapse into political turmoil in the process. 56 
Rossi has drawn much criticism for trying a conservative solution 
to the Italian problem, and a moderate solution to the internal problem. 
He lost the support of the ultra-clerical faction because he planned to 
tax Church estates and promote lay administration. Much of the support 
which he and Pius might have had from the educated and propertied 
classes had eroded when they refused both the Constituent Assembly and 
war against Austria. The poorest of the peasants and workers had never 
seen their grievances addressed, and stayed enthusiastic only as long as 
Pius was the leading reformer and patriot on the peninsula. The Allocu-
tion had effectively cost him that position in the popular mind. The 
most rabid nationalists felt threatened by Rossi's sheer administrative 
competence which would not long permit them to preach war and revolution 
in every town square. The hostility to Rossi from both ends of the 
political spectrum, coupled with the relative indifference of many oth-
ers, turned out to be a deadly combination. His lack of popularity left 
open a window of opportunity for the more extreme faction of Sterbini, 
Galletti and Canino. 57 
Rossi knew that his enemies might try to disrupt the opening ses-
sion of parliament, when he intended to present his program to the leg-
islators. He ordered up extra carabinieri to guard against disorder, 
but Rome was hardly in a state of agitation. So the political shock was 
all the greater when Rossi was confronted by a sullen crowd of dis-
charged veterans, and swiftly struck down by an assassin's dagger. 
56 Farini, II, 385-7. 
57 Catalano, p. 213. 
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November 15 was a day when everyone lost nerve but the assassins. Their 
partisans paraded along the Corso with the tricolor, chanting slogans 
and brandishing daggers. No one objected. Rossi's ministry dissolved, 
and no one wanted to form a new one. 58 Pius, already shocked by his min-
ister's murder, now felt very much alone. All Cardinals had abandoned 
him except four, including Antonelli. The Roman nobility were careful 
to go about their affairs as though nothing were amiss. Most of those 
moderate liberals who had promoted his reform measures seemed to be 
occupied elsewhere. Only the foreign diplomats were in evidence, sup-
porting the Papa~y by their words, their presence, and a few personal 
weapons. Without advice or support, the Pope turned his thoughts to the 
basic survival of himself and his state, even if it meant asking for 
foreign assistance. The suggestion to flee the capital came from Anto-
nelli, and was supported by the legates from France, Spain, Portugal, 
Bavaria, and to a lesser degree, Count Liedekerke of the Netherlands. 
Both the French and Spanish ministers (d'Harcourt and Martinez de la 
Rosa) hoped to host the exile, if possible, but the Pope quietly 
declined. 59 
The following morning, there were rumors of a popular rally to 
demand Sterbini and other democrats in a popular ministry, with a com-
mitment to the Constituent Assembly. Pius' own preference to form a new 
cabinet would have Pasolini or Minghetti, but these were quite unaccep-
table to the people in the streets. He began to see Galletti as the 
best of a bad lot. Galletti had, after all, functioned reasonably well 
58 Farini, II, 404-14. 
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as police minister in the last 4 cabinets, and at least had a basic 
grasp of the political realities of the Roman government. Despite his 
continuing admiration for Mazzini (reasoned Pius) Galletti might prove 
to be loyal, if only out of gratitude for his 1846 pardon. By mid-day, 
the crowd outside the Quirinal palace grew more violent. Some of them 
fired into the palace, killing one bishop, and wheeled a cannon into the 
square, aimed at the central gate. The Swiss fired back and prepared to 
defend the palace at all costs. The only advice the Pope heard was to 
surrender. He protested formally to the diplomats that he was no longer 
able to act freely. Only then did Pius ask Galletti to from a govern-
ment. He also nominated Rosmini and Mamiani to significant ministries, 
but they declined. Sterbini accepted the portfolio of Commerce and Pub-
lic Works, and now became virtual ruler of Rome through Galletti and his 
control of the political clubs. The members of the Assembly were so 
cowed by those clubs and the mob violence that they almost ceased to 
function. Bolognese deputies Minghetti, Bevilacqua and Banzi resigned 
their seats in disgust, and others followed their example. Overcome 
with despair, Pius decided to flee his capital and trust foreign mon-
archs to rescue him from his own subjects. He slipped out of Rome the 
night of November 25, aided by the Bavarian, Spanish and French ambassa-
dors. Once across the Ngapolitan frontier, he took refuge at Gaeta 
under the protection of Ferdinand II, and called for help to restore his 
reign. 60 
6 ° Farini, II, 415-31. 
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After the Flight to Gaeta 
once it became clear that Pius had left the Papal States, the remainder 
of the Government was in somewhat of a quandry. On one hand, Galletti's 
November 16 cabinet felt compelled to carry on, if only because someone 
had to do so. On the other hand, the ministry and the councils only 
existed because the Constitution allowed them to share the Pope's execu-
tive and legislative authority. At least in theory, they had no other 
mandate to act. Until some other basis for their authority could be 
established, their legitimacy as a governing body was very much in 
doubt. And unle~s there was a reconciliation with the Pope, the ability 
of Galletti and company to continue in power demanded a high degree of 
popularity with the citizenry. This need to legitimatize themselves 
served to condition nearly every element of the policy which followed. 
Although heavily manipulated by Sterbini and the Circolo Popolare, 
the violent mob of November 16 really DID represent a genuine popular 
movement. As a result, their demands became a sort of initial, unwrit-
ten charter for Galletti' s cabinet: a democratic ministry, social 
reforms, creation of jobs, war on Austria, the Costituente, and Mamia-
ni 's national program of June 5. The first priority of what came to be 
called the "Roman Parliament," was to create jobs, beginning with the 
previously authorized rail line from Rome to Ceprano. War minister Cam-
pello decided to hire unemployed tailors to make uniforms for the next 
campaign. Sterbini found artistic jobs for craftsmen to work on mosaics 
in St. Mary Major, and restoration of paintings in other churches. He 
spent an existing Fine Arts fund, but saw that more money would be 
needed. So began a cycle of programs and spending which would mark the 
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entire history of the Provisional and Republican regimes. The need to 
create employment was essential, but the money to pay for the programs 
was hard to come by. This chronic lack of funds was never solved (and 
never seriously addressed) until Pius was restored to power. 61 
The Provisional Government also hastened to clear away many of the 
most annoying statutes and feudal remnants of the old regime: the fede-
commesso (a perpetual trust status which prohibited sale of certain sec-
tions of land), encumbered noble estates which favored eldest sons as 
heirs, feudal banalities and rural prohibitions on wood gathering, pas-
turing and the like, and above all, the hated grist tax. Although most 
working people applauded the abolition of this last tax, the municipali-
ties had to face the loss of a major source of their revenue. 62 
The legislative agenda of the Provisional Government included more 
social reform than any regime since the French Revolution. The circle 
most concerned with the radical re-organization of society was led by 
former .exile Sterbini and the Prince of Canino. Their closest collabo-
rators (all on record as favoring the working classes) included Carlo 
Armellini, Fasci, Campello the War Minister, Captain Torre, Martini, 
Sacripante, Giacomo Manzoni, Rusconi, and a few others. With the sig-
nificant exception of Sterbini himself, none of these radical partisans 
were veterans of the 1846 amnesty. These were the "new" revolutionar-
ies. Already under Pius IX, this faction had taken full advantage of 
the liberalized press and association laws, and the implementation of 
61 Domenico Demarco, Una Rivoluzione Sociale. La Repubblica Romana 
nel 1849. (Napoli: M. Fiorentino, 1948), pp.23-33. 
62 Demarco, Sociale, pp. 31-44. 
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the new constitution. They had gained worthwhile support for their 
programs by skillful use of the press and the political clubs, as well 
as the election of some of their number to public office. The Prince of 
Canino was one of a small group who saw the circoli popolari as the 
ideal means to promote Rome as the site for the Constituent Assembly, 
which would then come under the sway of Mazzini and his Italian National 
Society. Mazzini, for his part, was very receptive to that idea; he saw 
the social legislation of the Provisional Government as a healthy begin-
ning for his populist campaign to set up an Italian republic. Echoes of 
the same policy ~ame from clubs in Ancona and Forli' in appeals for a 
popularly elected assembly to establish a new political order. 63 
Meanwhile the Pope, from Gaeta, sought to undermine the Provi-
sional Government. He issued a brief on November 27 which stated that 
all actions taken since his departure were null and void. He then named 
a 7-member Governative Commission (December 3) to rule in his name until 
he returned to the Capital. Although Sturbinetti and the Assembly waved 
these acts aside as invalid ("issued on foreign soil and not signed by a 
responsible minister"), they also sent a deputation to Pius to work out 
a reconciliation. The envoys were turned back at the frontier. 64 
The other major issue was to decide what was to be done about 
Italian unification. There were still two possibilities alive. The 
Tuscan plan for a Constituent Assembly would decide the fate of Italy 
without compromising the sovereignty of the people, expressed through 
universal manhood suffrage. The alternate plan was Gioberti's Confeder-
63 Demarco, Sociale, pp. 45-58. 
64 Demarco, Sociale, p. 61. 
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ation of States, to be implemented by princes without any direct, popu-
lar initiative. The issue of the Costituente would not go away. Canino 
and his partisans were a clear minority in the Assembly, but the moder-
ates realized that their status was uncertain. They had, after all, 
been elected as deputies to support and advise the Pope, who now refused 
to acknowlege their validity as legislators. Resignations continued to 
weaken the cabinet, which finally fell on December 23. The new cabinet 
dissolved parliament, calling for new elections, and hence a new popular 
mandate. The election was ·set for January 21 and would choose 200 depu-
ties by direct and univetsal suffrage. Before this balloting took 
place, however, the cabinet received a strong petition from the "Commit-
tee of Italian Clubs," an umbrella organization of many of the more rad-
ical societies; it demanded that the 100 most popular candidates be 
declared the Roman delegation to a Constituent Assembly, "providing a 
nucleus for a unified Italy, based on universal suffrage and a sovereign 
mandate. 1165 The government agreed on January 17, and the elections took 
on that added significance. 
The Pope issued a condemnation of the election and banned any form 
of participation or support. But 200,000 to 250,000 votes were cast, 
perhaps one third of all those eligible, although .this data is difficult 
to determine. Demarco gives a breakdown of those elected according to 
profession and social class. He points out that there were only 27 
nobles among the 200, as opposed to 33 in the previous Assembly of 125, 
and almost all of the High Council. One of these noblemen was Canino, 
of course, who was far more radical than most commoners. The vast 
65 Demarco, Sociale, pp. 62-5. 
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majority of the others were upper bourgeoisie and professional men. 
Only 24 deputies were re-elected from previous councils, the rest were 
new. Of special interest to this study are the 24 deputies previously 
exiled or imprisoned under Gregory XVI. Most moderate leaders made it a 
point not to participate in the election, still holding out for a recon-
ciliation with Pius, but their boycott appears to have attracted little 
popular support. A few moderates did participate, however, despite'the 
Pope 1 s ban; Mamiani was one who refused to abandon the field to the 
extremists, and was elected easily. Mazzini, Garibaldi and several 
other foreigners were also elected, although Mazzini did not arrive in 
person until March. Because of duplications or renunciations on the 
part of those elected, there were several follow-up elections before all 
200 deputies were chosen. 66 
The new Constituent Assembly, its ranks still incomplete, formally 
met for the first time on February 5, 1849. Four days later, the issue 
of the Pope's temporal power was introduced. After a furious debate, 
142 members voted in favor of terminating the Papal State "in theory and 
in fact." Pius IX was deposed in favor of a Roman Republic, which would 
function as a pure democracy. Never one to shrink from a fight, Teren-
zio Mamiani led the debate against the resolution,, and voted "no" with 8 
others. There were also 12 abstentions, 1 conditional vote and 37 
absentees. Mamiani and several others resigned their seats before the 
end of the month. 67 
66 Demarco, Sociale, pp. 69-76. 
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To replace the Pope as executive, the Assembly decided on a Trium-
virate. Mattia Montecchi, a former prisoner, was one of the first tri-
umvirs, together with Armellini and Salicetti. The better known triad 
of Mazzini, Armellini and Saffi did not take power until March 23, after 
the battle of Novara. Sterbini kept his cabinet seat for Commerce and 
Public Works, and Galletti retained control of the Police. The new 
republican legislature would spend most of its efforts on just two 
items: defending itself, and responding to the petitions and needs of 
its citizens. Since defense would not become a critical issue until 
April, the earli~st legislation showed a determined effort to redesign 
the social and economic fabric of the state. First came efforts to 
rebuild faith in the pitiful economy. The Republic assumed the national 
debt, then declared Church property and deposits to be property of the 
state (February 21). Treasury bonds continued to lose value, however, 
necessitating forced loans at a later time. The Assembly abolished the 
bishops' authority over the universities and schools (February 25), then 
dissolved the Holy Off ice and the other ecclesiastical tribunals (Febru-
ary 29). Demarco considers these actions to be genuinely revolutionary, 
since the clergy lost control of most remaining phases of public life. 
He credits the Assembly with the willingness to keep trying economic 
remedies until something worked, but cautiously adds that the seizure of 
church property was certainly a convenient shortcut, but a one-time 
action, which could never be repeated. The price was the almost total 
hostility of the clergy. 68 
68 Demarco, Sociale, pp. 97-113. 
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Finances continued to be a headache for the Triumvirate. Despite 
the sale of religious assets, monetary instability continued because of 
inflation, deficit spending, and a general loss of faith in the new 
paper currency.· The "right to work" principle of the early days of the 
provisional government demanded that jobs be available to anyone in 
need. Despite the shortness of credit, 1200 workers and artists were 
put to work on the restoration of St. Paul's basilica. Housing for the 
poor was provided in the former Holy Office building, and in other 
houses and convents. The salt tax and monopoly of the Torlonia family 
was abolished, and unused church land was given to peasants. These 
measures were intensely popular when they were granted, but the long 
range result of many social experiments was not good. Local and provin-
cial administrations were in severe trouble because of increasing 
demands and empty coffers. By May, most commoners complained that the 
government had put them into the precarious dilema of abundant jobs 
(working for the state, if nothing else), but wages paid in nearly 
worthless money. The combination of severe inflation, bonds without 
backing, requisitions, and forced loans eventually eroded the support 
for the government among nearly all but the most ardent republicans. 
Even without war, the Triumvirate would have reached a financial crisis 
by summertime. 69 
By February 18, Pius IX admitted that there could be no reconcili-
ation; he asked Catholic Europe for help to restore him to power. Along 
with a Neapolitan force assembled by his host, Ferdinand, substantial 
numbers of troops from France, Spain and Austria would assemble to 
69 Demarco, Sociale, pp. 115-32, 142-74, & 213. 
117 
extinguish the upstart Republic. Because the so-called First War of 
Independence was over before Rome's troubles began, support for the 
Republic also came from northern diehards who wanted to prolong the 
struggle wherever possible. In addition to Garibaldi's own Red Shirts, 
substantial numbers of experienced fighters from the north joined the 
defenders, including Luciano Manara's battalion of Lombard Bersaglieri. 
One of the refugees from the abortive revolt in Genoa was Giuseppe Avez-
zana, who would serve the Republic as a War Minister. Most leaders had 
no illusions about Rome's ability to defy Europe indefinitely, but the 
coming struggle .began to take on the aura of an apocalyptic clash 
between the combined forces of Italian nationalism and the might of the 
old order on the peninsula. 70 
While the Republic was striving to build its popularity and moral 
authority among its own citizens, the military forces of Austria, Spain, 
France, and the Two Sicilies prepared to overthrow it. Mazzini's gov-
ernment was considerably hurt in the eyes of the international community 
by disorders within the Roman State. Widespread murder and factional 
fighting in the Legations and Marches, (especially in Ancona during 
March and April) betrayed his lack of control on provinces outside the 
walls of Rome. The chaos in Ancona culminated with the murder of an 
Irish Carmelite friar on April 19, with a subsequent British protest and 
the dispatch of a warship to Ancona harbor. This sensitive condition 
eased only when Felice Orsini imposed draconian police measures in late 
April, and regained control of Rome's largest port. Just as damaging to 
the prestige of the Republic were several local uprisings among rural 
70 Demarco, Sociale, pp. 140f. 
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communities in the provinces of Ascoli and Fermo. Badly needed Repub-
lican troops had to be detatched from combat duty to regain control of 
those sectors in April and May of the same year. 71 
After the battle of Novara, the Austrian army was free to begin a 
systematic occupation of the Legations and beyond. This process was 
slow but relentless, and involved relatively few major battles, since 
the bulk of the Republican troops had been concentrated in the capital. 
Although Spanish and Neapolitan preparations were proceeding, it was the 
French army under General Oudinot which was in a position to strike at 
the heart of the. upstart regime. Even when his force of 10,000 troops 
landed at Civitavecchia, there was a great deal of doubt as to whether 
the French had come as friends or adversaries. Prince-President Louis-
Napoleon Bonaparte had good reason to favor Mazzini's immediate expul-
sion, since he was eager to enhance his political standing among the 
French clericals, and also improve his image as an international arbiter 
and peacekeeper. But there was an equally strong democratic- republican 
faction in the French National Assembly which saw the Roman regime as a 
kindred state and a potential ally against despotism. The vagueness of 
Oudinot's orders reflected the ambivalence of his own government. He 
was given the impression that the Triumvirate was an unpopular usurpa-
tion which could be easily removed. Although he was told to treat the 
leaders with respect, he should not imply any recognition of their 
legitimacy as a government. 72 
71 See chapter IV below. 
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The only real hope for the Romans, under these circumstances, was 
French public opinion. If the views of Alexandre Ledru-Rollin, Ferdi-
nand deLesseps, and other French democrats prevailed, then Oudinot's 
army might actually shield the capital from the other three forces, and 
buy enough time for the Triumvirs to establish themselves in power. 
This hope ebbed away slowly, however, as Bonaparte held out for the use 
of force. The final chapter came on June 13, when the 11Red 11 faction in 
Paris, led by Ledru-Rollin, attempted an insurrection over earlier 
French actions against the Roman Republic. The army quickly suppressed 
the effort, and .the police arrested socialist and democratic leaders, 
some deputies among them. The last obstacle to a military solution had 
been remov<:::.d. 73 
At first, Oudinot was able to take advantage of the uncertainty of 
his mission. He pursuaded the troops guarding Civitavecchia (commanded 
by former exile Pietramellara) to permit his landing, then disarmed them 
to make sure that there would be no resistance to French control of the 
port. Loudly proclaiming that his forces were a threat to no one, he 
marched the 40 miles to Rome, only to discover that Garibaldi's legio-
naires and Manara's Lombards had arrived mere days ahead of him. In his 
eagerness to establish a French presence, Oudinot decided to seize con-
trol of the city on April 30 by a coup de The result was a costly 
assault against the Pertusa Gate which had long since been walled up, 
but not shown as such on the French maps. Although surprised at first, 
the Roman defenders rallied to defend the walls and the Vatican gardens. 
After 6 bloody hours, the French withdrew, leaving 500 casualties and 
73 Demarco, Sociale, p. 260. 
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365 prisoners in Roman hands. 74 This abortive assault cost the French 
whatever elements of surprise or good will which they might otherwise 
have enjoyed. It also encouraged the defenders to redouble their prepa-
rations for a siege, as it proved that even the French army could be 
defeated on a given day. 
Oudinot, for his part, asked for an armistice, and offered to 
exchange Pietramellara's men for those prisoners taken by the Romans. 
He also realized that his present force was unequal to a proper siege of 
the fortified capital and its now arroused defenders. So he struck an 
agreement to refrain from further attacks, and sat beck to await rein-
forcements and heavy artillery. Garibaldi and the other Roman generals 
took advantage of this temporary truce to deliver a smashing counterat-
tack against the Neapolitans. Ferdinand II's army had advanced into the 
Alban hills southeast of Rome while the French were landing at Civita-
vecchia. Garibaldi countered by advancing rapidly toward him with a 
striking force of Rome's best troops. Severly jolted at Palestrina (May 
9) and Velletri (May 19), the Neapolitans withdrew in great disorder 
toward their own frontier. They contributed little else of value to the 
French efforts during the rest of the campaign. 75 
On May 31, the day Garibaldi returned to.Rome, the French special 
envoy Ferdinand de Lesseps signed an agreement with the Triumvirs 
extending the peaceful truce, and agreeing to protect Rome against the 
Austrians and Neapolitans. But his home government never ratified the 
pact. Indeed, the use of force was all but certain, as Oudinot's army 
74 Trevelyan, pp. 105-11 & 128-34. 
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had now grown to over 20,000 men, including excellent artillery and 
engineering units, and still more on the way. Only a day after de Les-
seps' treaty, Oudinot informed Rome that the truce was at an end, though 
he carefully specified that he would not attack 'the place' until June 
4. He interpreted his own words to mean that he would not attack Rome's 
ifications before then. However, he shrewdly planned to seize key 
outposts in the Corsini and Pamphili villas; these commanded the essen-
tial approaches to the walls of the Gianicolo, the weakest defensive 
sector. Accordingly, strong French columns dashed into these villas in 
the early hours of June 3, routing the handful of defenders, and gaining 
positions which might otherwise have cost thousands of casualties to a 
storming party. A~though the outrage of the Roman defenders prompted 
them to fight like lions to regain this sector, mere zeal could not com-
pensate for the villas' stout walls and good cover, now in French hands. 
Although Garibaldi's men continued to hold the Vascello, a house well 
sited to defend the San Pancrazi6 gate, they never succeeded in improv-
ing their position. With uncharacteristic lack of skill, Garibaldi 
threw hundreds of his own men against the villa walls in such a piece-
meal fashion that he gained only heartbreaking casualties and stories of 
heroic death. Many of the most famous martyrs of 1849 - Angelo Masina, 
Goffredo Mameli, Gaetano Bonnet, Enrico Dandolo, Francesco Daverio -
were killed in just a few hours during this fruitless carnage. As the 
French methodically moved up their heavy guns to begin a month-long 
pounding of the ancient walls, the best among the officers of both sides 
must have seen that the question had already been decided. 76 
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Although a month of hard fighting still remained, there was little 
hope left for the Republic. Since Mazzini had made the struggle one of 
Nationalism versus Reaction anyhow, he was now careful to sell his 
state's life dearly. The future propaganda value of noble sacrifice and 
symbolic gestures seemed to be his only remaining advantage. Even after 
French troops had stormed through breaches in the fortifications, Maz-
zini was careful to publish a new constitution as his final gesture 
before handing over the government to others. Although it was never put 
into effect, it remains to·this day an interesting charter for a social 
republic, founded on national pride. Garibaldi was equally determined 
to continue the fight as long as he was able. He assembled the most 
ardent of his followers (including Ciceruacchio and his sons) and made a 
dramatic breakout through the French lines. His bold escape and march 
toward the north captured the imagination of many a patriot, although he 
never actually succeeded in reaching beleaguered Venice with aid. Oudi-
not' s soldiers streamed through the streets of the shattered capital, 
and captured the remaining strongpoints with relative ease. The French 
set up their military government, and hoisted the French and Papal flags 
over the Campidoglio and all public buildings. Thus the Roman Republic 
of 1849 passed from the political arena to the pages of epic literature. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE RESTORATION OF PIUS IX 
Following the final collapse of all resistance on the part of the Repub-
lican forces, the French army set up a military occupation government in 
conjunction with representatives of Pius IX. Although the Pope himself 
would not physically return until the middle of 1850, his ministers made 
strenuous efforts to erase all traces of the Republic and its regime, as 
though it were a bad dream which could safely be ignored once normal 
activity was resumed. With the Republic gone, General Oudinot now found 
himself at odds with the ~ape's most conservative advisers, a handful of 
zelanti who hoped to restore the 11Gregorian11 regime in its full vigor. 
After the death and destruction his siege had caused, Oudinot hoped for 
a generous, conciliatory agreement with the former republicans. But 
Pius and the court of Gaeta were not about to agree with him. 
As early as 1831, Monsignor Corboli-Bussi had described the polit-
ical condition of the Papal States in terms of a dying man who sought to 
prolong his life with doses of poison. Now in 1849, after two years of 
failed reforms and one year of revolt, Pius found himself in the same 
uncomfortable spot as had Bernetti in 1832. He was no longer inclined 
to tinker with the machinery of the state, since it had already come 
crashing down around his ears. Some curial cardinals seemed to favor 
blind reaction, preserving everything and changing nothing, and hope to 
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postpone the moment of final collapse. 1 Farini felt that the severity of 
the restoration was a turning point in relations between Pius IX and his 
subjects. The Allocution of April 29, 1848 had been traumatic to the 
hopes of most nationalists, but Farini was convinced that most Italians 
continued to give him the benefit of the doubt. His government was tol-
erated, if not loved. But the restoration, occurring as it did, assured 
nothing but contempt for papal rule on the part of both republicans and 
moderate constitutionalists alike. 2 
As the French troops entered the battered and defeated city on 
July 3, a few d:i.e-hard republicans made their final gestures of defi-
ance. A mob near Palazzo Chigi attempted to attack ex-deputy Diomede 
Pantaleoni and his friend Abate Perfetti, who had been strong backers of 
Mamiani and the moderates; Doctor Pantaleoni managed to defend himself 
with a sword, but Perfetti was wounded. Later the same afternoon, three 
priests were stabbed and killed in a demonstration in Piazza Colonna. 
Nevertheless, the French were able to re-establish order rather swiftly. 
The only real result of the final disorders may have been to harden the 
positions of the reactionaries when they restored civilian rule. 3 Oudi-
not quickly vested administrative power in a military government under 
General Rostolan, who closed the clubs and political associations. His 
other emergency measures included a curfew, disarmament and preventive 
censure, suspension of the press, and a ban on all posters and placards. 
1 Alberto M. Ghisalberti, Roma da Mazzini a Pio IX, (Milano: Datt. A. 
Giuffre' Editore, 1958), pp. v-vi. 
2 Farini, IV, 239. 
3 Spada, III, 672ff. 
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Prince Odescalchi formed a provisional commission to replace the 
republican communal administrators and assist Rostolan. Defeated repub-
lican troops were confined to barracks, but Oudinot promised that they 
would not otherwise be mistreated. Soldiers and civilians from outside 
the Roman State were encouraged to leave as soon as possible, although 
even Mazzini stayed until July 16 without any trouble from the French. 
When he did finally leave, it was simply because he decided it was time 
to go. 4 
The Triumvirs of the Republic and their closest collaborators left 
in small groups with British or American passports. These foreign docu-
ments were not closely inspected by the French officers at Civitavec-
chia; most of them were already inclined to let the refugees depart 
quietly aboard French steamers. 5 Sturbinetti, Galletti and Mariani were 
allowed to emigrate with French passports and encouragement, largely to 
avoid conflicts later. 6 By way of exception, officials at Civitavecchia 
arrested ex-deputy Enrico Cernuschi. Although he had also been the most 
ardent member of the barricades committee, Cernuschi was only charged 
with a part in the Piazza Colonna disorders of July 3, after the French 
military government had been proclaimed. 7 The new French envoy, Franc-
isque de Corcelle, was a liberal Catholic and close friend of Alexis de 
Tocqueville, who was beginning his short but eventful term as foreign 
4 Martina, I, 377. 
5 Giuseppe Leti, Roma e lo Stato Pontificio dal 1849 al 1870, (Ascoli 
Piceno: G.Cesari, 1911), I, 37. 
6 Ghisalberti, 
7 Spada, III, 673-5. 
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minister (June 2 - October 31, 1849). Corcelle saw the restoration as a 
golden opportunity to streamline and consolidate the Poper s liberal 
reforms of the 1846-8 period and to ensure the continuation of the "new" 
Papal State, something Pius himself no longer believed in. This align-
ment put him at odds with Esterhazy and the Austrian delegation, who 
favored the "Gregorian" policy of no change whatever. 8 As things turned 
out, Corcelle and his occupation forces continued to promote a mild and 
conciliatory regime to replace the defeated Republic. But Pius insisted 
on biding his time and waiting for greater assurances that Paris would 
restore total control of his state to him. He considered himself to be 
the principal injured party and saw no reason to allow others a hand in 
making his policy. Any trust the French may have had in his benevolence 
was ill placed. 9 
The Interim of Red Triumvirate 
General Oudinot, anxious to begin withdrawal of his troops, grew impa-
tient to return control of Rome to the Pope, and stated his wish to do 
so by the end of July. But Pius refused to be hurried, and sent cardi-
nals instead; he nominated the so-called "Red Triumvirate" to rule in 
Rome until he returned. The members were three "Gregorian" cardinals, 
all considered reactionaries of one degree or another: Cardinals 
Gabriele Della Genga Sermattei, (nephew of Pope Leo XII), Luigi Vanni-
celli Casoni, and Ludovico Altieri. The Austrians considered the first 
two to be safely conservative and pro-Austrian, but found Altieri to be 
8 Friedrich Engel-Janosi, Catholic Historical Review (1950) XXXVI, 
152. 
9 Farini, IV, 247f. 
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too "pro-French" and too open to the sort of experimentation that had 
marked the Pope's early years. 10 In point of fact, Altieri was from a 
distinguished Roman family with diplomatic experience in Vienna and a 
strong devotion to Metternich, as well as to Pius. Della Genga is also 
described as intelligent and proud, but strongly anti-liberal and 
touched with rumors of scandal while Archbishop of Ferrara. He had 
strongly opposed the election of Pius IX, the amnesty, and all of his 
reforms. In his first years, Pius considered Della Genga to be his only 
true enemy among the Cardinals. Vannicelli, on the other hand, had no 
evident ability pr education whatever; the only reason for his red hat 
was friendship with Gregory XVI. He had served as pro-Legate of 
Ravenna, Governor of Rome and Legate of Bologna, and had performed badly 
in all three positions. He was finally removed from administrative work 
by Pius IX and hidden in the presidency of the Lands Registry Office. 11 
It is very curious that Pius now appointed this conservative but "bal-
anced" trio (one friend, one enemy and one non-entity) to pave his 
return to Rome. Austrian Ambassador Esterhazy saw it as a more profound 
political conversion than he had dared to imagine. 12 Had the Pope of the 
amnesty and the Innovations disappeared forever in the smoke of the 
siege guns? If so, then Austrian policy in Italy could once again count 
on Rome to be an anchor of conservatism. 
10 Engel-Janosi, pp. 152f. 
11 Farini, IV, 260f. 
12 Engel-Janosi, p. 153. 
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The Triumvirate's principal task was to bridge the gap between the 
violent overthrow of the Republic and the peaceful celebration of the 
Pope's return as a healer and conciliator. Although the French military 
government continued to occupy military strongpoints, Oudinot was only 
too happy to relinquish control of all but security matters to civil-
ians. Officially known as the Governative Commission of State, the Tri-
umvirate had full powers to act in the Pope's name beginning from August 
1, 1849. Their first act, on August 2, was to annul everything which 
had occurred since November 16, 1848 - the day that Pius consented to 
the formation of. Galletti's cabinet. From that point onward, they went 
to work resetting the mechanism of government. 13 
They began by reversing a French directive concerning the defeated 
army. Oudinot had always considered the Roman regular troops (about 
8000 men) to be his greatest potential allies in restoring order. He 
had offered conciliatory guarantees to any military men who agreed to 
enter the Pope's service. 14 The cardinals, however, never trusted the 
army, and insisted that they were not bound by such promises made in the 
heat of battle. They discharged anyone who had enlisted since November 
16; they also voided any promotions which had taken place since then, 
and began a general investigation of the conduct of everyone else. 15 
13 Raffaele DeCesare, Roma e lo Stato del Papa. Dal ritorno di Pio IX 
al XX Settembre, 1850-187~(Milano: Longanesi, 1950), p. 17. 
14 Decesare, Roma, p. 37. 
15 Farini, IV, 272. 
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Many anti-republicans were released from the prisons. Among these 
were partisans of Gregory XVI's government, including Colonel Stanislao 
Freddi, one of the prime movers of the military commissions of 1843-4, 
Captain Allai, another of the military _z_e--'-'-'~~· and large numbers of 
ex-Papal Volunteers and centurioni imprisoned at Faenza. Most of these 
men had done nothing beyond favoring the Pope, so their release was 
probably justified. What was harder to excuse was the immediate incor-
poration of these bitter partisans into police service to track down and 
punish their foes - a factious and utterly senseless measure. 16 
The cardinals then appointed a "Council of Censure" to investigate 
and decide the fate of all government employees who were still at their 
posts. This measure was not so much aimed at appointees of the Republic 
(who were simply dismissed out of hand) as it was against those of the 
former Papal administration who had held onto their off ices even after 
the flight to Gaeta. This vindictive act stirred up much resentment and 
hostility toward the new regime on the part of those who might otherwise 
have been friendly. 17 
There were two particular target groups for this Council. The 
first was made up of state employees in general, such as school teach-
ers, provincial magistrates, postal employees, and even cleaning women. 
The other group consisted of members of the "Famiglia Palatina," the 
papal household, and other employees of the Apostolic Palaces: dra-
goons, coachmen, clerks, kitchen helpers and similar workers. Records 
indicate meticulous investigation of hundreds of names, but few, if any, 
16 Farini, IV, 253. 
17 Decesare, Roma, p. 17. 
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charges were ever brought against the vast majority of these perfectly 
harmless people. Quite the contrary, many of those investigated main-
tained an almost childlike fidelity to the Holy Father, sometimes at the 
expense of great personal suffering and abuse. Most suspects were never 
prosecuted or indicted for disloyalty of any sort. 18 These individuals, 
like many service and governmental workers elsewhere, were generally 
loyal to their employer, but relatively lethargic and inert when it came 
to confronting those who represented an opposing system, like the Repub-
lie. This "lack of fervor'~ was enough to incur the wrath of the Council 
of Censure. It is uncertain how many of the same people may have walked 
away in disgust after their grilling, but Doctor Pantaleoni, for one, 
wrote on August 7 that he felt compelled to leave the country which 
countenanced such disgusting treatment of its own citizens. 19 
The Cardinals also appointed a Council of Ministers to take over 
the regular adminstration. This cabinet contained only 5 members, 4 of 
them laymen; but the single cleric was Monsignor Savelli, who received 
the portfolio of the Interior, including control of the Police. This 
was the same Savelli who led rebels against the Republic in Ascoli, a 
sharp and talented Corsican with a reputation for being violent and 
avaricious. The Ministry of Grace and Justice went to Avvocato Gian 
Santo, a man of integrity but little imagination, while Camillo Jaco-
18 ASR, ASP, busta 303, fascicolo 106. This is a thick file of 
investigative reports on members of the Pontifical Household. It is 
only one section amid the many pounds of paper generated by denuncia-
tions. Literally hundreds of names of accused traitors were submitted 
to the police, who dutifully investigated each one. In most cases, the 
infractions discovered were very minor, and not worthy of prosecution. 
19 Ghisalberti Mazzini p. 79. 
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bini, an honest farmer, took over the combined Ministry of Commerce, 
Industry, Fine Arts and Public Works. Angelo Galli, the new Minister of 
Finance, was well known as a fiscal bungler. 20 The War Ministry was held 
by a nobleman known for his loyalty and little else. Despite the image 
f h ' 11 1 I b' t !! 't 1 ' o t is new aymen s ca ine , i was on y the tough-minded Monsignor 
Savelli who held the lion's share of administrative and punitive 
power. 21 
Finally, the Triumvirate set up a special Court of Inquiry to 
investigate all crimes against religion, against the majesty of the sov-
ereign, and against public and private safety. Over the next several 
years, this special court would zealously prosecute many real and imag-
ined threats to Papal rule. Most of the political cases which reached 
the Consulta between 1849 and 1854 began as investigations by the Court 
of Inquiry. Thus the Triumvirate set in motion the legal machinery 
which generated much of the data used in the present study. 22 
Alarmed by what he considered the harsh mis-government of the Tri-
umvirate, Oudinot petitioned the Pope to return quickly in person. Pius 
replied that he would, but did not do so. The French President Louis 
Napoleon Bonaparte was also incensed by the actions of the three cardi-
nals, whose policy was seen as overtly pro-Austrian. Bonaparte was anx-
ious to maintain public support at home for his policy of restoring the 
Pope to his throne, but knew likewise that he could not survive if it 
looked like he favored destruction of a sister republic, and the repres-
2 ° Farini, IV, 263. 
21 Decesare, Roma, p. 23. 
22 Farini, IV, 272. 
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sion of the wishes of a sovereign people. He told the Chamber of Depu-
ties that France had acted to preserve human rights, and should be 
respected for doing so. Upset that the cardinals never mentioned the 
sacrifices of the French soldiers, he now took steps to win a more gen-
erous policy from Gaeta. 23 
President Bonaparte concisely stated his own program in a letter 
(dated August 18, 1849) to Colonel Edgar Ney, a trusted aide and envoy. 
He intended the letter for General Rostolan, who was to replace Oudinot, 
and would be the cornerstone of French policy during the restoration 
process. The letter listed four elements designed to restore harmony 
and reconciliation as soon as possible: a general amnesty, a secular-
ized administration, a liberal ministry, and implementation of the Code 
Napoleon. Since the French had restored the Temporal Power, he did not 
feel this was too much to ask. 24 
Pius found Ney's policy too threatening to his own independence; 
he immediately acted to show that he was unwilling to return home as a 
mere pawn of the French army. On September 4, he left Gaeta with his 
Court-in-Exile, but not for Rome. In company with his host, King Ferdi-
nand II, he sailed further south to Portici, where he would remain for 
another seven months, stubbornly insisting that only full sovereignty 
and independence of the military forces could suffice. 25 This delay is 
significant because the practical steps to a genuine reconciliation were 
postponed yet again. The Triumvirate Cardinals freely continued their 
23 Farini, IV, 280f. 
24 DeCesare, Roma, p. 19. 
25 Farini, IV, 287f. 
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policy of repression and alienation. 
With an eye toward establishing a "presence" in Rome without actu-
ally being present, Pius issued a Motu Proprio on September 12, in which 
he set out broad guidelines for the governmental structure to follow. 
The first four of the six parts traced the outlines of the future Coun-
cil of State to advise him on major administrative and legislative 
issues, an Assembly for Finance, Provincial Diets and autonomous Munici-
pal Diets; members of these bodies were to be appointed from lists nom-
inated by the broadest suitable franchise, and all would support a con-
sultive administ~ation. The fifth element vaguely promised reforms of 
the administration and of the civil and criminal courts. The sixth and 
final paragraph granted the second (1849) amnesty to "victims of the 
seduction, hesitation or inactivity of others. 11 This policy statement 
had the desired effect on both Austrian and French representatives; both 
declared their satisfaction. 26 Even the most casual analysis of this 
Portici manifesto shows that the Pope's political principles had not 
advanced beyond the Memorandum of 1831. Bland and outdated by 1848 
standards, he still resurrected that document as the key to restoring 
the Temporal Regime, just as he had in 1846. By now Pius felt that his 
earlier reforms had failed, but his personality still forced him to con-
cede something else, without knowing how or what. 27 
Revolution notwithstanding, one thing which had not changed since 
1846 was the staunch opposition of most Cardinals to political change of 
any sort. After the Motu Proprio of Portici, both Antonelli and Pius 
26 Engel-Janosi, pp. 155f. 
27 Ghisalberti, Mazzini, p. 13. 
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were again subjected to severe criticism by many Curial prelates and 
officials for their "liberalism" in not restoring the ultra-stable sys-
tem of Gregory XVI. It is essential to remember that Antonelli was not 
considered to be a reactionary by his fellow cardinals, but a reckless 
innovator and opportunist. The Austrophile faction within the Sacred 
College increased its influence by insisting that the Pope's return not 
take place until the French occupation forces had been reduced below 
10,000 men. 28 Thus the formal return did not take place until April, 
1850. 
Before we abandon the subject of Austrian influence, it is impor-
tant to recall that Austrian forces still occupied the Legations, the 
Marches, and Umbria, and that Austrian military governors ruled those 
regions harshly, with or without the consent of the papal representa-
tives. Despite the theoretical alliance between France and Austria to 
restore the Papal regime, Austro-French relations remained tense. Franz 
Josef's new ministry in Vienna considered French intervention in Italy 
to be not only an encroachment on Austrian prerogatives, but a source of 
destabilization. The Second Republic in Paris, on the other hand, saw 
Austrian hegemony as a continuing source of trouble, which provoked 
rebellion instead of repressing it. President Bonaparte knew that he 
needed a speedy resolution of the Roman occupation, or he would fe.ce 
public opposition at home for overstepping his authority. Most French 
deputies were willing enough to support a short-term peacekeeping force, 
but they rebelled at promoting the severe pacification of another state. 
But the Austrians planned just such an operation, hoping to permanently 
28 Engel-Janosi, p. 157 
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cripple liberal movements in the Papal States. The lines of conflict 
between Vienna and Paris had been drawn. 29 
Unlike the French occupation zone, the Austrian sector was closely 
supervised by the military. Pro-legates and other local administrators 
had seen their power effectively reduced to a largely ceremonial level. 
For example, the Extraordinary Commissioner for the Legations was Mansi-
gnor Bedini, a close friend of the Pope and a native of Sinigallia. In 
theory, he was to be the supreme civilian authority in the region, yet 
he conformed so closely to ·the policy of General Gorzhowski, that he was 
widely considered to be a mere rubber stamp for the Austrians. Austrian 
officials cons.idered any anti-government activity to be treason, no mat-
ter how trivial, and therefore subject to a possible death sentence. By 
sharp contrast, there were examples in Lazio of well-disciplined Spanish 
or French troops protecting civilians from the local police whenever 
they felt that justice was not being served. Yet Austrian officials 
continued to comport themselves as conquerors, rather than peacekeepers. 
They acted as though the overly permissive papal governors had brought 
the revolt upon themselves, and should be treated with disdain. As if 
to complete the humiliation of the Pope, the Austrian government 
insisted on billing Rome for the occupation forces, while the soldiers 
of the other states served at the expense of their own governments. 30 
29 A. J.P. Taylor, Italian Problem European Diplomacy 
(1847-1849) (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1934), PP• 231-4. 
3 ° Farini, IV, 264-9 and 313. 
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The Second Amnesty 
The Triumvirate published the amnesty in Rome on September 18, 1849, the 
date associated with it ever since. It is significant that this second 
pardon was broad enough to encompass nearly all who had supported the 
Provisional and Republican governments. Although it obviously made good 
political sense, it also betrayed the hard fact that so many Roman citi-
zens needed a formal reconciliation with their sovereign. Too many of 
them had supported some or all of the events after November 15, 1848, 
and it was impossible to punish them all. Yet Antonelli and Pius could 
afford to be generous; they were firmly and safely in charge, with 
French bayonets to back them up. They actually had more control over 
the machinery of government during the occupation than at any time 
before it, or afterward. According to Farini, the time at Portici 
marked Antonelli's rise to the peak of his influence. His own fidelity 
to Pius throughout the exile was still appreciated, and the infighting 
between French and Austrian partisans had paralyzed many other potential 
advisers. Cardinals Della Porta and Piccolomini were dismissed as too 
reform-minded. Other wise and temporate men, Amat, Orioli, Giacchi, 
Bofondo, Marini and Soglia, remained in the Pope's good graces, but out-
side his inner circle of power. Curiously, Antonelli continued to be 
criticized as "too liberal" by many of his contemporaries among the car-
· dinals. 31 
The amnesty of 1849 specifically excluded several groups, particu-
larly those who were leaders in the Provisional government, the Constit-
uent Assembly, and the Republic; Mazzini and his fellow Triumvirs were 
31 Farini, IV, 316. 
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high on the list of offenders. It also banned members of any Assembly 
who accepted election and took part in the proceedings. Some of these 
claimed that they had worked with the Pope's interests in mind, but 
their arguments were ignored. Pius had already declared from Gaeta that 
it was a political crime to co-operate with the Provisional Government 
or, to support the Republic by accepting election to its highest legis-
lative body. Other suspects among the civil administrators included the 
presidi of the provinces, directors of the police, regional commissars, 
and presidents of the civil and criminal tribunals, if they were nomi-
nated by the Repµblican government. There were further exclusions for 
all those who had been leaders of military units, whether regular army, 
civic legions, or volunteer formations. After a few clarifications, the 
term "military leaders 11 came to signify those who held the rank of major 
or above. Several more inquiries followed to clarify and remove linger-
ing doubts. 32 Finally, the second amnesty excluded all individuals who 
had received the amnesty of 1846; and all those who had been accused of 
ordinary crimes. 
Farini protested the injustice of what he called this "punishment 
by class," which lumped together, without distinction, all participants 
in Provisional Government, Constituent Assembly and Republic. In so 
doing, the Pope glossed over the very real differences between those who 
actually planned the revolution (chiefly republicans), and those who 
32 ASR, ASP, busta 308, fascicolo 249. This file contains correspon-
dence relating to the implementation and clarification of the second 
amnesty, and the exceptions to it. Of special interest is an order from 
the Interior Ministry, dated September 24, 1849 (register# 3695), to 
arrest 17 individuals including Ludovico and Vincenzo Caldesi and Pietro 
Guerrini. It is signed "Benvenuti" (the po lice chief) . 
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tried to oppose the revolution from a position of strength (mainly 
constitutionalists). Farini insisted that most moderate deputies acted 
courageously in speaking out against what they saw as republican 
excesses, even when they knew they were a minority in the Assembly. 
Their only real "crime" had been the decision to participate in govern-
ment rather than abstain. By failing to set off the real revolutionar-
ies from all others, the reactionaries swept everyone outside their own 
clique into one grand massa damnata, and virtually assured their own 
isolation instead. Farini ·sees this tactical error as one of the criti-
cal shortcomings of the Restoration, one which called into question the 
entire future of Papal government. 33 
A second major criticism of the new amnesty was the vague and 
uncertain wording of most of the terms and guidelines. This vagueness 
may actually have been carefully calculated by the more reactionary car-
dinals to create a broad "gray area" which removed the clear protection 
of law from their political rivals. Obviously, the motivation of polit-
ical crimes and disloyal actions is open to broad interpretation. So 
instead of healing the wounds left by war and revolution, the amnesty 
became a vehicle for any rigorists bent on breaking the power of their 
political foes. As things turned out, the Cardinal Triumvirs and some 
of the judges who followed them interpreted events even before the 
flight to Gaeta as worthy of prosecution: abusing liberty of the (then 
free) press, the fighting beyond the Po, taking part in political meet-
ings while they were still legal, and so forth. In a few cases, Cardi-
nal Vannicelli even dipped into the previous pontificate for charges, 
33 Farini, IV, 296. 
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even though they had technically been forgiven in 1846 by Pius him-
self. 34 
Many high-profascicolo public figures, as we have seen, did not 
wait to be accused or indicted of real or imagined crimes, but chose 
voluntary exile rather than fight a hopeless battle. Among them were 
Farini himself, Mamiani, Federico Torre, Giuseppe Galletti, Carlo Rus-
coni and others too numerous to mention. 35 Poor Mamiani was very badly 
treated by the Papal government he had tried to defend. He had argued 
convincingly in the Constituent Assembly that the Pope should not be 
deprived of his .Temporal Power, then resigned from that body when it 
voted against his advice, earning himself much abuse from the most 
ardent republicans. 36 Now the Red Triumvirate pressured him to leave the 
state altogether. As a final insult, the Holy Office seized his per-
sonal papers for "evaluation" (including writings on philosophy, litera-
ture, politics and history) and never returned them. Pantaleoni had 
suffered a similar loss of personal papers upon departure. As things 
turned out, Mamiani was subsequently elected to several Italian Parlia-
ments (third through eighth) from many different districts, and func-
tioned honorably as a deputy. He also served as Minister of Public 
Instruction in Cavour's cabinet, and as President of the Council under 
Cavour. He was nominated to the Senate in 1864, and died on May 21, 
1885. 37 Had the Triumvirate followed a more conciliatory policy, these 
34 Farini, IV, 297-300. 
3 5 Leti, Roma, I, 188. 
3 6 Farini, IV, 273f. 
3 7 Leti, Roma, I' 180f. 
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and other talented men might have felt welcome enough to continue work-
ing for the government of Rome, and not its rival in Turin. 
Altogether, those who were proscribed, exiled, dismissed from 
office, and otherwise excluded from positions of influence were numbered 
in the "thousands," according to Farini. They included not only con-
vinced republicans, but constitutionalists, moderate reformers and peo-
ple unconnected with any group. The net result was great disenchantment 
with Pius IX and his government among the Roman nobility, lower clergy, 
and others who had been hi& early friends. 38 
The Political Trials of Restoration 
Over the next five years, the Consulta, sitting as the court of appeal 
in all political cases, reviewed a huge number of trials covering every-
thing from printing and spreading seditious literature, to murders and 
violent robbery with political or partisan motivation. These trials did 
not include the principal leaders of the Republic who, as we have seen, 
were allowed by French military forces to emigrate before being 
arrested. This example of "mercy by neglect" allowed many deputies, 
administrators and military officers to find their way out of the coun-
try without further harassment. But far from being a denial of justice, 
this "laxity" helped to stabilize the war-torn state and avoided the 
divisive agony of political trials against popular leaders. 
Among these refugees, as among those who decided to remain, there 
were recipients of the 1846 pardon who now found themselves under suspi-
cion. It is now possible to determine who and how many of this original 
38 Farini, IV, 317. 
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group were caught up in the later turmoil of 1848-9. Simply stated, 
those who had received the amnesty of 1846 remained out of the political 
arena to a very surprising degree. These men were politically sensi-
tized, and had already suffered exile or imprisonment for their princi-
ples at least once; their initial tendency was to return to the forum to 
promote those ideals one more time. But they did not. Those who could 
be considered otherwise by ~_!!Y stretch of the imagination number only 
160 of the 989 individuals in this study: about 16%, but no more. One 
possible reason is that many of the remaining 84% saw no future for 
themselves in acting against the Pope's government. The slow, deliber-
ate change of 1846-8 had given them enough hope to keep them content. 
Although it can not be proven by these statistics, it is possible that 
the alternative of following Sterbini (or Mazzini) appeared to uncer-
tain, or too dangerous. The previous reforms, though modest, looked 
good enough to them that radical change could bring it down like a house 
of cards. 
If, indeed, this was "silent support" for Pius IX and his moderate 
program of reform, the quiet 84% would be disappointed. By 1849, Pius 
and most of the cardinals had given up on reform - the only new opening 
was to the conservatives, as embodied by the Red Triumvitate. Taken in 
this light, the choices of the Restoration appear to have been even more 
crucial. Moderates who felt they had remained loyal to the Pope at 
great cost to themselves, and now had nothing to show for it, could look 
to Piedmont or elsewhere for their salvation. At least for them, the 
Restoration was more tragic than the rigors of the revolution itself. 
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Even allowing for those individuals who fit more than one cat-
egory, most fall into four broad groupings: 
1. Officials, deputies and administrators of the intervening 
regimes (Provisional Government, Constituent Assembly and 
Republic). 
2. Military officers and men (regular army, volunteers or civic 
guard) who fought for the above. 
3. Anyone who commited violent or other crimes which might carry 
some degree of polit~cal or partisan motivation. 
4. Purely political offenders with no other crimes to their 
charge; such acts as speaking, writing or disseminating liter-
ature which criticized the Church-State or promoted secret 
societies. 
LEGISLATORS AND ADMINISTRATORS 
Perhaps the most highly visible group of participants in the political 
process were elected members of the Constituent Assembly. No more than 
25 names from the 1846 amnesty list match the 200 representatives 
elected, but some are quite familiar. Galletti and Sterbini were 
elected easily. So were many leaders of the revolts of 1843-5: Bel-
trami, Pasi and Zambeccari, Vincenzo Caldesi and ·his cousin Ludovico, 
Mattia Montecchi, and the young zealot Felice Orsini. Some of these 
deputies, as we will see shortly, would also distinguish themselves as 
military leaders, and a few as local administrators. But most of the 
others turned out to be unremarkable - and ultimately harmless - both 
before and after their election. Geographically, 13 of the 25 were from 
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the Legations (including most of those just named), while only 7 repre-
sented Lazio and 5 from the Marches. These names were automatically 
excluded by the Pope when they were elected. 39 
The second amnesty also excluded all provincial governors (pre-
sidi) during the Pope's absence. The central police office sent a cir-
cular letter to all provincial administrators on August 25, 1849 
requesting names and biographical data on these presidi. The replies 
include several members of the 1846 amnesty group, including two who 
were also deputies. In the Legations region, Count Oreste Biancoli was 
listed as third ~nd final administrator of the province of Bologna, sue-
ceeding Carlo Berti-Pichat in April, 1849. Biancoli remained there 
until the Austrian capture of Bologna, when he resigned his powers to 
the municipal council. Also listed is Count Francesco Lovatelli, who 
was preside of Ferrara before November 16, and stayed at his post until 
resigning in protest at the proclamation of the Constituent Assembly. 40 
Lovatelli was, in fact, very devoted to Pius IX and his early reform 
program. He decided to remain in office after the flight of the Pope 
simply because he would be of no use as a mediator if he resigned. Dur-
ing the previous year he had almost single handedly saved Imola from 
anarchy during Durando's march northward. He had asked for extra troops 
39 ASR, RR, busta 1, fascicolo 2. This is an interesting collection 
of the-rists of deputies, both printed and hand written, following the 
elections of January 21, 1849. There are minor differences in these 
lists, which represent interim and final election results. 
40 ASR, ASP, busta 304, fascicolo 120. The key element here is a 
circular letter from police headquarters, dated August 25, 1849, asking 
for names and information on the presidi of all provinces during the 
provisional and republican periods. Several responses to the circular 
are also included. 
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and police to restore order (there had been 20 attempted murders in one 
month). When these never arrived, he simply used the force of his per-
sonality and his reputation as a leading local reformer to re-establish 
tranquility there in less than two weeks. 41 Like his friends Farini, 
Mamiani and Minghetti, Count Lovatelli had hoped for vindication by the 
Pope for his earlier services. Unlike them, he chose to remain in the 
Papal States after the restoration. Seven years later, he was assassi-
nated by militant republicans who considered him a traitor. His murder-
ers were never convicted; their trial was suspended in 1860, when Italy 
annexed the eastern provinces of the Papal States, and never resumed. 42 
In the Marches, two other recipients of the 1846 amnesty were pre-
sidi of important provinces. Giuseppe Camillo Mattioli was in charge at 
Ancona for the entire period, as was Francesco Bubani at Fermo. 
Although Mattioli was elected deputy, he never took his seat in Rome, 
but remained in Ancona. He was largely blamed for the violent disorders 
not only in the city of Ancona, but in Jesi, Corinaldo and the rest of 
the province as well. Bubani is described by the police report as very 
anticlerical, despite good skills as an administrator. He is accused of 
being the force behind attempts to seize church property in his prov-
ince, and especially as the one responsable for the arrest of Cardinal 
DeAngelis, Archbishop of Fermo. 43 
41 Anna Rustici, "Le drammatiche giornate imolesi della primavera del 
1848.," Studi Romagnoli, (1955) VI, 137-46. 
42 Alessandro Roveri, "Aspetto del Risorgimento ferrarese: il conte 
Francesco Lovatelli a Ferrara, nelle carte della Raccolta Piancastelli 
di Forli'," Ferrara Viva (1961) III, 76-81. 
43 ASR, ASP, busta 304, fascicolo 120. 
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In Lazio, Pietro Sterbini is listed as the second preside of Fro-
sinone, his home territory. Even though he was a deputy, he apparently 
had no difficulty administering the nearby province after the resigna-
tion of Francesco Mayr. Since Sterbini was already one of the chief 
promoters of the revolutionary movement, his seat in Frosinone was the 
very least of his problems. 44 
Another significant administrator was Dr. Tomasso Zauli-Sajani of 
Forli'. He had been president of the Circolo Popolare in his native 
city, and was appointed governor of Albano during the Republic. His 
police dossier d~scribes him as 11 an inflamatory presence" in Albano, 
responsable for encouraging other.like-minded republicans in their oppo-
sition to the Pope, and also accuses him of taking 116 scudi and a gold 
ring with him as he departed from the city. The police recommendation 
is that he be excluded from the amnesty because he went back on his ear-
lier word of honor. 45 
A lesser administrator worthy of note is a Roman, Luigi Uffre-
duzzi. During the Republic, he served as police commissioner for the 
Ripa & Trastevere district of the city. Not only did he allegedly sup-
port the Republic, but also possessed literature and organizational 
material pertaining to secret societies. He is also accused of occupa-
tion and requisition of church property, as well as possible implication 
in the San Calisto murders and the "Cardinals' Carriages" case (treated 
below). Uffreduzzi was arrested in January, 1850 and brought to trial 
44 ASR, ASP, busta 304, fascicolo 120. 
45 ASR, ASP, busta 308, fascicolo 250. Here are filed police reports 
and letters dealing with suspects from the Comarca district. Zauli-Sa-
jani is described in entry # 23 under the city of Albano. 
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on these charges. The proceedings had to be suspended, however, when he 
escaped from the Castel Sant' Angelo in December of the same year. 46 
MILITARY LEADERS 
According to the guidelines of the 1849 amnesty, "military leaders with 
the rank of major and above" were to be excluded from the pardon. This 
study has identified 14 names which fit this description and were also 
beneficiaries of the 1846 amnesty. 
There is· a certain degree of overlap, especially among aristo-
crats, when we consider the military leadership. Four of the deputies 
already listed were also officers above the rank of Major: Bartolucci, 
Pasi, Pescantini and Zambeccari. Each of the four was also a unit com-
mander who figured prominently in the struggles against French and Aus-
trian forces. The story of the siege of Rome would have been quite dif-
ferent without them. 
Cavaliere Luigi Bartolucci is probably the most significant offi-
cer in the sample under consideration. He helped to organize the First 
Volunteer Regiment during the earliest days of the spring campaign of 
1848, and served in that unit as Lieutenant Colonel. Later, he was pro-
moted to Colonel and transerred to the Second Volunteers as commander. 47 
46 ASR, TSC, busta 219, fascicolo 143. These documents are court 
transcripts outlining the charges and judgements against Uffreduzzi, 
even after his escape. 
47 ASR, MAV, Rubricella 1. The "Rubricella" is a hand written regis-
ter of the officers commissioned in all volunteer units for the cam-
paigns of 1848-49. 
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Because of his service in Napoleon's army, including the Russian 
campaign, he had more professional experience than the vast majority of 
his collegues. His Second Volunteers fought well in Veneto despite 
their lack of experience and training, but Bartolucci 1 s own skill and 
daring helped General Ferrari far more than his men's zeal. On April 
10, 1849, the day after the Republic was proclaimed, he was promoted to 
General. During the siege of Rome, he commanded the division defending 
all fortifications to the east of the Tiber. The only walls not under 
his control were those of the vulnerable Gianicolo & Trastevere sectors. 
That division was assigned to Ferrari, and later to Garibaldi. 48 
Upon the elevation of Bartolucci to staff duties, Count Raffaele 
Pasi took command of the Second Volunteer Regiment. Pasi was already a 
Colonel and had commanded the volunteers from Faenza the previous year. 
In the reorganization of units, the Second Volunteers was renamed the 
Sixth Regiment of the Line, and served honorably throughout the siege. 
Just before the entry of the French, Pasi fell back to the Castel Sant 1 -
Angelo with his regiment and disbanded it before returning to exile. 49 
The remaining two officer/deputies also commanded volunteer units 
raised for the campaign against Austria in the spring of 1848. Count 
Livio Zambeccari raised and commanded the battalion "Cacciatori del Alto 
Reno, 11 composed mainly of men from the province of Bologna. The Alto 
Reno battalion fought well in the campaigns north of the Po, then was 
incorporated into the newly formed Eighth Regiment of the Line for the 
48 Romolo Righetti, 11 Il generale Luigi Bartolucci, 11 Capitolium, 
(1949), XXIV, 347-54. 
49 Rosi, III, 800£. 
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defense of Rome. Lieutenant Colonel Federico Pescantini was the 
founding commander of the "Pio IX" battalion of Lugo. Though full of 
nationalistic zeal in the Veneta campaign, the "Pio IX" battalion was so 
badly mauled by the Austrian regulars that it could not be rebuilt. Its 
remnants were incorporated into the "Unione" regiment, a new composite 
unit which proved to be much more durable, and later provided the 
nucleus of the Ninth Regiment of the Line in a subsequent reorganiza-
tion. Both of these line regiments served nobly during the defense of 
Rome.so 
Two other .officers, though not deputies, were significant unit 
commanders in their own right. Marchese Pietro Pietramellara raised and 
led the "Bersaglieri del Reno," also known as the "Melara" battalion, 
after the popular shortening of his name. The Bersagleri had made a 
name for themselves by their spirited defense of Vicenza during Duran-
do' s campaign. With the proclamation of the Republic, Pietramellara's 
unit was charged with the defens~ of Civitavecchia. Although surprised 
and captured by the French, the unit was exchanged for French prisoners 
taken in the ill-fated assault of April 30, and was able to participate 
in the principal events of the siege, including the battles of Villa 
Pamphili, Villa Corsini and Parioli. Lieutentant Colonel "Melara" was 
seriously wounded on June 5, and died a month later in the hospital set 
up at the Quirinal Palace.s 1 
so ASR, MAV, Rubricella 1. 
s 1 Rosi, I, 809. and Trevelyan, p. 176. 
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Angelo Masini, although only a captain in rank, would certainly 
have qualified as a "unit commander" if he had survived. He led a small 
cavalry force called the 11Lancieri dell a Morte," which he raised and 
equipped at his own expense, originally to aid the besieged Venetians. 
During the battle for Rome, the Lancieri functioned as the effective 
cavalry arm of Garibaldi 1 s Italian Legion, despite the fact that he 
never had more than about 40 mounted men "who knew how to die 11 at any 
one time. Although misspelled 11Masina, 11 his name is well remembered, due 
principally to his heroic ·death on June 3, during an unsuccessful 
assault on the Villa Corsini. 5 2 
The officers' roster also lists Lieutenant Colonel Pietro Landi 
and Major Rubicondo Barbetti of the "Unione" regiment. Barbetti's 
younger brother Eusebio had been a cellmate of Felice Orsini before the 
amnesty but was already dead of a fever he had caught in prison; Rubi-
condo himself joined the student corps of the First Roman Legion (Civic 
Guards) before it was incorporated into the "Unione. 115 3 Another Civic 
officer, Major Antonio Celli, served with the Third Roman Legion. Major 
Gaetano Colombarini served in the Third Volunteer Regiment as both staff 
officer and company commander, including command of the bersaglieri com-
pany. The Third Volunteers were re-designated.Seventh Regiment of the 
Line during the reorganization before the fight for Rome. 54 
52 Trevelyan, pp. 78 & 185. 
53 Rosi, II, 175. 
54 ASR, MAV, Rubricella 1. 
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There remain three other officers not assigned to specific units: 
Colonel Domenico Belluzzi and Major Antonio Montanari of the Officers' 
Depot, and Colonel Ignazio Palazzi of the Mobilized Civic Guards. 55 
Colonel Belluzzi was one of the many who went to the aid of Venice in 
the spring of 1848. He proved so successful as a fortress commander, 
first at Vicenza, then at Malghera, that he was promoted to General and 
given command of the fourth brigade in the Venetian army. It appears 
that he never returned to the Papal States to participate in any of the 
fighting there. 56 Major Montanari was killed defending Ancona in 1849. 
Following the re.storation, Colonel Palazzi was mentioned in a police 
report dated July 23, 1849. The report is probably in error, at least 
insofar as it states that '\.wo ex-Republican Colonels were hiding near 
Frascati, Melara (=Pietramellara, who was dead by that date) and 
Palazzi." Palazzi is described only as having been previously condemned 
to life imprisonment for political crimes, then released by Pius IX in 
the 1846 amnesty. 57 
VIOLENT CRIMES - GENERAL 
Within this category, there are three very large "show trials" designed 
by the Court of Inquiry to prosecute their most implacable foes. They 
center upon major events of the rebellion itself, and not the more local 
and specific cases of crimes committed during the rebellion. These 
55 ASR, MAV, Rubricella 1. 
56 Rosi, II, 228f. 
57 ASR, ASP, Busta 302, fascicolo 50. This is another in. the very 
long series of police investigations, prompted by complaints, tips and 
denunciations, most of them anonomous. 
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three cases (the Rossi assassination, the San Calisto murders and the 
"Cardinals' Carriages" affair) were the best known political trials of 
the day. The prosecutors and the judges of the Consulta considered 
these cases to be the cornerstones of their campaign against the rebel 
leadership, since they were so closely connected with serious and via-
lent action against the Ecclesiastical State. Those rebels most deter-
mined to overthrow the Pope - so the argument went - had probably 
decided to commit themselves to action in one or more of these cases. 
So it is particularly interesting in the context of the present study, 
that amnesty recipients are NOT found among the defendants to any sig-
nificant degree. 
The most directly connected case is the assassination of Pelle-
grino Rossi on November 15, the event which actually started the revolt 
against Pius IX. There were 16 men finally put on trial for the murder, 
and one of them, Sante Costantini, was actually executed in 1854. None 
of these individuals were from the 1846 group. The actual assassin 
(Ciceruacchio's son Luigi by common consensus) had already been shot by 
the Austrians. Among the many others who had fled the country and were 
beyond the reach of the courts, the chief planner from behind the scenes 
was Pietro Sterbini. He was easily condemned .in. absentia, since few 
doubted that he had played a major role in Rossi's murder and most of 
the other events designed to turn Rome into a revolutionary center. But 
except for Sterbini, no other individual from the amnesty group was even 
accused. 58 
58 ASR, TSC, busta 405, fascicolo 132. This fascicolo is actually a 
hardcover book of 645 pages, containing transcript material from the 
Rossi murder trial. 
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A second famous murder trial prosecutes the so-called San Calisto 
murders. This case is the only one on record which dealt with a system-
atic attack on the clergy, despite the heavily anti-clerical spirit of 
the Republic. The defendants were members of the militarized but badly 
disciplined customs guards (finanzieri) under the command of Callimacho 
Zambianchi. Between April 29 and May 4, 1849, Zambianchi and members of 
his unit executed 8 unarmed priests or clerics, and had arrested 14 oth-
ers with the same thing in mind. At the time there were 289 members 
belonging to the corps, and all of them were interrogated. Only 5 names 
on the entire lipt could have matched members of the amnesty group, but 
even these were not consistent with known ages, hometowns, etc. Charges 
against these 5, as against most of the others, were dropped. No mem-
bers of the amnesty group were involved in this most famous of the 
atrocity trials. 59 
Finally, there is the so-called "Cardinals 1 Carriages" investiga-
tion. The original cause for this case was the requisition of several 
carriages, sometimes including the horses, to help prepare for the 
impending siege. Since some of the finest vehicles belonged to cardi-
nals still living in Rome, the scheme degenerated into an attempt to 
extort money for their safe return. In the final analysis, this case 
grew into a sort of "umbrella" process for prosecution of Republican 
officials for any damage to or destruction of private property, espe-
cially church property, during the interim period. There were 19 dis-
59 ASR, TSC, busta 404, fascicolo 130. Another very extensive col-
lectio~f transcript material, including printed and hand written 
notes, testimony and arguements. One set of corrected galley proofs is 
also provided. 
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tinct charges, in all, against various combinations of about 70 persons. 
Of these, only 6 names from the amnesty list are possible matches, and 
most of these were based on circumstantial evidence because of their 
official positions. These include Ludovico Caldesi and Enrico Serpieri 
among the 6 deputies named. The others were Luigi Uffreduzzi, police 
commissioner for Trastevere, Mattia Montecchi who was working at the War 
Ministry, Pio Pio, another civil servant, and Angelo Gori, who was a 
guard for the garage area under the Cancelleria palace. (Gori's name is 
not a secure match.) The trial became something of a local joke, 
because of its pettiness. As the testimony proceeded, it became 
increasingly evident that the revolutionary governments had actually 
done a fairly good job of safeguarding life and property. If anything, 
the end result of this and similar trials was to vindicate the Republic 
from charges of "anarchy" and wholesale destruction of property, at 
least insofar as was possible during a siege, when round shot and explo-
sive shells were flying through the air. 60 
VIOLENT CRIMES - SPECIFIC 
This section includes violent crimes against persons or property, fre-
quently with some added element of mob action or conspiracy. Among the 
most common crimes with political implications, are the numerous murders 
and attacks against government employees. The most interesting cases 
tend to "cluster" in just a few cities and provinces, possibly because 
they were planned and carried out by the same leaders or cadres. Bolo-
60 ASR, TSC, busta 404, fascicolo 131. Very detailed transcript 
material, none of it printed. Many of these pages are beautifully writ-
ten by hand as an obvious final copy. 
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gna, Lugo, Ancona and Pesaro are the cities most frequently mentioned. 
Most of these more violent crimes were committed by artisans and 
other lower class people. The tendency toward violence may reflect a 
lack of hope (or a lack of opportunity) to be heard in other ways. It 
may also simply be a much older way of expressing displeasure with the 
regime. Isolated acts of violence appear in the records, but they are 
probably not significant. Short of examining very personal motives, 
there is probably not much to learn from them. On the other hand, there 
is much of interest in the cases involving group activity, especially 
when the group is built aiound older associatiations, such as friend-
ships formed in exile or in prison. 
As second city in the Papal States, Bologna might look like an obvious 
trouble spot simply because of its size. But the Austrian incursion of 
August, 1848 also aggravated political passions in this sophisticated 
northern city. When the invading forces attempted to seize the city, 
they galvanized the patriotism of the Bolognese population into a spir-
ited defense and united the political factions for concerted action in a 
way that nothing else could. General Welden withdrew his troops after 
August 8, but many of the Bolognese decided to re-direct their rage 
toward their political rivals within the city. Anyone who might be con-
. d d II A . I! "G . II II t . u . t II h si ere too pro- ustrian, too regorian, or an i- ni y to w atever 
degree was suddenly in danger. On August 24, a large number of artisans 
and unskilled workers met at the Tamburrini tavern to decide on a course 
of action. They resolved to kill all employees of the police and the 
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courts, including spys, agents and prison guards, beginning with the 
most hated. Names were selected and plans finalized. Over the next two 
weeks, Bologna witnessed a series of vicious attacks on the most visible 
of the police agents, resulting in at least 20 murders and 16 other 
attempts. 61 Some of those most closely associated with this series of 
killings were recipients of the 1846 amnesty. 62 
Significant among these leaders were three working class brothers, 
Gaetano, Luigi, and Alfonso Costa. The first two of these had been 
accused of rebellion by the Military Commission of January 22, 1844, and 
received 15-year. sentences. As a result of the amnesty, both were 
released from Civitavecchia prison in 1846. All three brothers were 
among the ten men accused of killing police spy Luigi Giorgetti on Sep-
tember 1. Giorgetti, who was greatly hated by the Costas, knew of the 
August 24 meeting and planned to save himself by leaving town. Before 
he could do so, he was tracked down by the mob and shot three times, 
almost certainly by Gaetano. All three brothers were found guilty, with 
two others, and all were condemned to death. Alfonso's sentence was 
immediately commuted to life imprisonment, because he was still a minor. 
Luigi and one other also received a commutation on February 4, 1853, but 
6 1 These assassination squads, called "Balle" by many, continued 
their rampage until September 5, when a vice-brigadier of carabinieri 
was wounded. Police then arrested many of the leaders and sent them to 
Civita Castellana. Several of them joined Garibaldi when his column 
passed by there on his retreat from Rome, and continued their fight. 
ASR, TSC, busta 413, fascicolo 773. 
62 ASR, TSC, busta 413, fascicolo 724. This is the first of 5 con-
secutive cases concerning the events of August and September.in Bologna. 
Several names occur in more than one of these cases, as well as cases 
772 and 773, indicating multiple charges. 
156 
Gaetano and Pietro Bonetti were beheaded on July 27 of the same year. 63 
Gaetano Costa was also chief among 5 defendants in a separate 
trial for the murder of Pietro Brunori. Only two hours after the Gior-
getti murder on September 1, police inspector Brunori was surprised near 
his home by a group of seven armed men, and shot repeatedly despite the 
pleas of his 14-year old son. Gaetano was identified as leader of the 
group, and his conviction for this second murder undoubtedly helped to 
confirm his death sentence. Two of his companions were also executed 
for the same crime. 64 
On the following day, September 2, someone shot at police agent 
Pietro Zappoli, but failed to hit him. Zappoli identified his attacker 
as Luigi Sarti, a friend of the Costa brothers. 65 Sarti was a local 
workman who had returned from exile in Algiers as a result of the 
amnesty. He had been named as one of several present at the Giorgetti 
murder, but was not convicted. Sarti was· also suspected of still 
another attempted murder on August 9, along with Luigi and Alfonso 
Costa. This one involved an attack on police agent Francesco Piraz-
63 ASR, TSC, busta 413, fascicolo 724. -The fine line between cr1m1-
nal and political violence is hard to pin down, even among profession-
als. The Consulta chose to return many cases to the local courts, indi-
cating that the charge was not sufficiently political. The ordinary 
tribunals then proceded to try them as ordinary criminal cases. In 
practice, the difference between a political murder and a criminal one 
hinged on something said by the accused which gave away a political 
motive, or some degree of planning. Most of the time, conspiracy was 
interpreted as political. 
64 ASR, TSC, busta 413, fascicolo 725. 
65 
, TSC, busta 251, fascicolo 870. In this fascicolo and subse-
quent ones, a busta number in the 11 200 11 series indicates trial notes, 
usually hand written, while a 11 400 11 number means that some or all of the 
transcript is printed. Many cases have material in both categories. 
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zotti. Although another man was sentenced to 12 years in prison for 
this attempt, all other charges were dropped on March 20, 1852 for lack 
of evidence, and Sarti was released. 66 
Among the other attacks which took place on September 2 were the 
murders of Antonio and Giuseppe Ragazzini. Since one of these brothers 
was a policeman and the other a prison guard, they were well aware of 
the mortal danger to themselves, and attempted to hide at the home of a 
lawyer near the Porta Maggiore. ·A large throng located them there and 
proceeded to loot the house· while the brothers escaped to a nearby roof-
top. They were finally cornered and stabbed to death. Among the 30 
defendants eventually brought to trial for the killings were two local 
leaders who had requested the amnesty in 1846. Cesare Brini, a tailor, 
had been serving a 15-year sentence for mob action when he was released 
from Civitavecchia. Gaetano Vicinelli had been an exile in Paris, hav-
ing fled charges of previous violent attacks in 1843. He had returned 
home in 1847, apparently without authorization. 67 Brini was condemned to 
death as one of the five principal killers, and was guillotined on July 
25, 1853. Vicinelli was also condemned to death by unanimous vote the 
following year, not only for his support of the murders, but for his 
previous crimes and violation of the terms of the amnesty. His sentence 
was commuted to life in prison on September 12, 1854. 68 
6 6 
6 7 
6 8 
, TSC, busta 414, fascicolo 854. 
, TSC, busta 413, fascicolo 773. 
, TSC, busta 246, fascicolo 773. 
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Vicinelli is mentioned briefly in another case which is otherwise 
unrelated to events in Bologna, but which treats two other cases of 
unauthorized return, and offers a possible clue to linkage among indi-
viduals. The principals are Saverio Muratore and Gaetano Turri, leaders 
of the 1843 Savigno conspiracy and the resulting killings of Captain 
Castelvetri and several carabinieri. Both are accused of having 
returned without authorization, although Pius IX had been inclined to 
reopen their case in March of 1848. Records of their process had been 
sent to Rome with that end in view, but the files disappeared during the 
ensuing confusion and the case could not be brought to a conclusion 
either way. A decree dated April 30, 1851 (when conciliation was no 
longer in vogue) orders the two to return to perpetual exile from the 
state or face five years at hard labor. 69 
Another in the series of killings in Bologna took place on Sunday, 
September 3. The victim was a landowner, Antonio Baraldi, who had 
attempted to maintain order in his quarter of the city with a citizens' 
patrol. He was identified and followed by 3 men as he walked alone to 
Mass at the church of S. Donato. Although he tried to send for help, 
they tracked him into the rectory and killed him there before escaping 
up a narrow street. The assassins were identified as Domenico Sandoni, 
Domenico Conti, and Valentino Zani. Conti and Zani had been on trial 
together in 1843 for rebellion. Conti, who had a history of 17 arrests, 
had been condemned to death by the Military Commission, then had his 
sentence commuted to life imprisonment. Technically, the amnesty of 
1846 did not cover his charges, but after a series of special petitions, 
69 ASR, TSC, busta 225, fascicolo 229. 
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Conti was judged to be harmless and was one of those finally pardoned in 
March of 1848. Zani received 15 years at the same trial and was rou-
tinely released by Pius IX three years later. But there was little 
doubt as to who had actually killed Baraldi in 1848; accordingly, all 
three men were found guilty and condemned to death. Conti and Zani were 
executed on April 9, 1854; Sandoni died in prison. 70 
Several months later, on April 3, 1849, an unknown person 
attempted a similar killing. Police inspector Giuseppe Radicchi was on 
his way home when an assassin surprised him and stabbed him several 
times. Both Carlo Paccapeli and Francesco Versari were arrested as 
suspects, but the evidence was too circumstantial to convict either of 
them. The 1846 amnesty had released both men from Civitavecchia on the 
same day; both were also accused of subsequent crimes. A note on the 
transcript speaks of unfavorable public opinion following Paccapeli's 
release in 1850, since the general population felt that he was actually 
guilty of the crime. Internal exile was one option under considera-
tion. 71 
There were two additional cases in Bologna of mob related crimes 
against property. One was an attack on the offices of the local Crimi-
nal Court, following the withdraw! of the Austrians in August, 1848. 
The court offices, housed in an old convent, contained many objects and 
exhibits relating to pending cases, such as firearms, knives, clothing, 
money and other precious objects. The money alone was probably over 200 
scudi. These items were stolen when a crowd ransacked the entire build-
70 ASR, TSC, busta 416, fascicolo 890. 
71 ASR, TSC, busta 234, fascicolo 449. 
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ing. Although many of the perpetrators remained unknown, three men were 
eventually identified and brought to trial, including Luigi Rossi. 
Rossi had been condemned to 15 years for insurrection in 1843, but 
released from Civitavecchia in 1846. In August 1852, Rossi and his fel-
low defendants received another 20 years. 72 
A similar mob threatened the villa and family of Count Ottavio 
Malvezzi. Scion of one of Bologna's oldest and wealthiest families, 
Count Ottavio was known to be a devoted supporter of the government. On 
August 21, 1848, a large band of working class people marched about 8 
miles to the Malvezzi villa to requisition arms. The leaders demanded 
50,000 scudi from the Count, and threatened to hold his family hostage 
until it was paid. They eventually settled for only 3000 scudi in cash, 
and released their captives unharmed. 73 Among the 15 defendants in the 
resulting trial were Paolo Scorzoni (whose brother was the principal 
leader) and Gaetano Marchesi. Both of these men were also veterans of 
the 1843 rebellion and the subs~quent Military Commissions. Marchesi 
had been condemned to 20 years for his activity. Scorzoni had received 
a death sentence, later commuted to life in Civita Castellana. Although 
Marchesi was released immediately by the amnesty, Scorzoni had to wait 
for a pardon in 1848. The outcome of this trial is not indicated in the 
transcript, but several other charges were also pending against both 
men. It is of interest that one of the witnesses who identified Mar-
chesi at the scene was the heroic Captain 11Masina" (Angelo Masini) who 
72 ASR, TSC, busta 417, fascicolo 953. 
73 The spectacle of the Malvezzi and other distinguished families 
being threatened by armed crowds vividly illustrates how completely the 
traditional patterns of deference and authority had broken down. 
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would shortly die during the siege of Rome. 74 
Seen in combination, these cases include a dozen Bolognese indi-
viduals who received the amnesty; though the transcripts make no mention 
of it, they share an interesting background. At least ten of the twelve 
were heavily involved with the Muratori sedition of 1843. Vicinelli, 
Conti and Scorzoni were known to be members of the band which attacked 
the carabinieri at Savigno; Marchesi, Brini, Zani, Rossi and the Costa 
brothers were all named as members of the force which marched against 
Imola. Sarti was described as a messenger for the conspirators. The 
remaining two (Paccapelli and Versari) may also have been involved with 
the same group, but nothing of their background has come to light. 
Other members of the same group are identified elsewhere in this paper, 
though not accused of ordinary crimes. These facts suggest that the 
original command structure of the Muratori force had been maintained (or 
rebuilt) for the next upheaval, and not broken up and dispersed after 
1843, as the police had hoped. 
Lugo 
In the city of Lugo, we find a similar (if less dramatic) pattern. A 
series of· cases were combined into one trial process, since they 
involved the same 9 defendants, including Antonio Marani and Alessandro 
Barattoni. Marani was released from Ferrara prison by the amnesty, and 
Barattoni returned from his exile at Macon in France. The charges are 
serious ones - three murders and one attempt during the late winter of 
1849 - but the prosecution's evidence was probably quite weak, since the 
74 ASR, TSC, busta 417, fascicolo 982. 
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cases never moved ahead. The strongest case involved the murder of 
Sub-Chancellor Giuseppe Montanari on January 19, 1849. The victim was 
in the habit of taking an afternoon walk before returning to his office 
in the Rocca. He was attacked by armed men while he was walking alone, 
and collapsed at a Civic Guard post, where he died soon afterwards. 
Marani and his brother, with Barattoni, were the chief suspects. The 
same men were also charged with the murders of Giuseppe Tamburini and 
Desiderio Utili (both on January 29), and the wounding of District Gov-
ernor Filippo Masciali on February 29. The Consulta dropped the charges 
in the Montanari.case without any judgement (May 4, 1853), and the other 
charges never came to trial. 75 
The same Antonio Marani was accused of being one of two attackers, 
who caused injuries to Antonio Scalaberni in July of 1848. Since his 
fellow defendant has fled the country, this is not much of a trial. 
Marani received one year of detention on July 12, 1851, then was 
released immediately, since he had already been jailed for that long. 76 
Alessandro Barattoni was also accused taking part in a shotgun attack on 
Erminia Pascoli on February 9, 1849. Marani is mentioned in this case, 
but not charged. Pascoli, the victim, had done no more than refuse, a 
year before, to believe that the Austrian army had been beaten at Gaito. 
He escaped wounded, but identified his attackers. This case was also 
dismissed for insufficient evidence. 77 
75 ASR, TSC, busta 258, files 964-7. This is a combined process 
which began as 4 individual cases, but was later united when it became 
evident that the defendants had cooperated with one another. 
76 ASR, TSC, busta 409, fascicolo 523. 
77 ASR, TSC, busta 416, fascicolo 919. 
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Alessandro's brother, Alessio Barattoni was also accused of 
attempted murder. Along with Agostino Morandi, a fellow exile, he was 
indicted for shooting at Luigi Scalaberni as early as November 6, 
1846 ... mere weeks after his return from France. Scalaberni was only 
slightly wounded in his thumb, but both his mother and he were attacked 
again in September and October of 1848, allegedly by Barattoni as prin-
cipal party, Morandi as instigator, and various degrees of participation 
by four others. Since Barattoni had again fled the country by the time 
of the trial, it does not seem to have ever moved to completion. How-
ever, the one element common to the defendants was participation in the 
Bagnacavallo revolt of 1845. Morandi is listed as being active in 1831 
as well, and wanted for questioning in two other murders. 
described as espousing "anarchist principles." 78 
He is 
Returned exile Giovanni Caravita was accused of taking part in two 
murders and a wounding in two different incidents. Caravita had also 
been involved in the Bagnacavallo events of 1845, but only insofar as 
he, a horse dealer, provided horses and vehicles for the other partici-
pants. The earlier accusation involved the "Pio IX" battalion of Lugo, 
which Caravita had joined in July of 1848. The transcript describes the 
unit as "attracting all those dedicated to the poHtics of change." The 
battalion was in the process of marching toward Bologna on Sunday, 
August 6, when it passed through the town of S. Potito at the time of 
the last Mass. Caravita and several of his fellow volunteers spotted 
the Baroni brothers, with whom they had long-standing disputes. The 
armed men threw themselves into the crowd, and shot both Pietro Baroni, 
78 
, TSC, busta 407, fascicolo 256. 
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who recovered, and Lazzaro Delprado, who later died. Caravita received 
3 years of hard labor for his part in the shootings, but the murder 
charge did not hold up; there was probably a legitimate case for self 
defense. 79 The other murder charge involved the stabbing of Luigi Dra-
goni on April 22, 1849. Dragoni was a known political foe of Caravita 
and his friends. He was provoked into a fight at a wedding banquet and 
killed in the process. Caravita and one other defendant were probably 
the main instigators of the fight, but were released because of weak 
evidence. Another defendant was condemned for the actual killing, but 
died in prison in 1854, before he could be executed. 80 
Several other cases name participants in the 1831 revolution from 
Lugo. One of the more prominent individuals was Carlo Polzi, a former 
actuary of the Podesta' of Lugo. He was accused of rebellion and resis-
tance to the Austrians, as well as collection of funds for the Mazzini-
ans. The transcript says that he was wounded in 1831 fighting against 
papal troops, then emigrated to France (Lesneven in Brittany) where he 
remained until the amnesty. After he returned home, he became vice 
president of the Circolo Popolare of Lugo and authored an inflamatory 
poster of January 19, 1849. (A copy of the poster is included as evi-
dence in case 362) He was promoted to lieutenant in the local civic 
guard, then switched to the "Pio IX" battalion, finally_ to the 11Bersag-
lieri del Po." In his military capacity, he fought against the Austri-
ans beyond the Po, as well as defending Bologna and Ancona. In his own 
defense, Polzi said that he did only what hundreds of others did against 
75 ASR, TSC, busta 417, fascicolo 950. 
80 ASR, TSC, busta 408, fascicolo 460. 
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Austria. His claim on the second amnesty hinged on the legal technical-
ity that he did not actually need the first one. He insisted that he 
really did not fight in 1831, but simply got in the way and was wounded. 
Furthermore, he claimed that his departure for France was voluntary, not 
forced, and that he signed the declaration of loyalty (also voluntarily) 
almost a year after publication of the amnesty, June 8, 1847. 81 The 
court disagreed with this contention; Polzi was found guilty and sen-
tenced to die (April 27, 1852). The death sentence was commuted to life 
imprisonment, then to perpetual exile. 82 
Polzi's mopified sentence was used as a precedent in a similar 
case against Antonio Bedeschi and Facondo Gherardi. Both of these men 
are listed as being active against the government in 1831, then going to 
exile in France. Bedeschi returned briefly in 1845 to fight at Bagnaca-
vallo and le Balze. In the present case, both are accused of authoriz-
ing and manipulating bloody deeds from behind the scenes, while keeping 
their own hands clean. One specific crime is the murder of Giuseppe 
Nostini on February 9, 1849. Gherardi gets credit for trying to keep a 
low profascicolo at first and stay clear of politics. He was only drawn 
in after the flight of the Pope. Bedeschi, on the other hand, took up 
his old activities immediately. As an innkeeper, he made his establish-
ment a center for young hotheads, and quickly became what the transcript 
describes as a "local Ciceruacchio, 11 as did fellow exile Giovanni Mor-
8 1 Polzi is almost correct. His actual signed declaration, dated 
June 29, 1847, is filed at ASV, SdS, Rubrica 86 (1847), busta 21, p. 68. 
He had been cleared to return by the Secretary of State the previous 
September 19. ASV, SdS, Rubrica 86 (1846), busta 29, p. 30. 
82 
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andi. The charges of ordering murders seem to hold up in court, due in 
part to Bedeschi's outspoken support of the Republic and his own defense 
of Ancona as a lieutenant in the Civic Guard. Gherardi died in prison 
before the conclusion of the trial, but Bedeschi's sentence was commuted 
1 . 1 8 3 to perpetua ex1 e. 
A similar situation exists in the case of Giuseppe Budini, a 
native of Castel Bolognese. He was one of several suspects in a politi-
cal murder in 1831, but fled to France to avoid prosecution. He did not 
qualify for the 1846 amnesty because of the seriousness of this 
charge, 84 but found his way back anyhow in time to join the earliest 
volunteer units fighting the Austrians in Veneto. 85 He stood accused of 
violent crimes against Austrian troops during the wi thdrawl after 
Vicenza, and of being one of the most avid partisans of the Republic 
during the defense of Bologna and Castel San Pietro. He also used his 
cover as a horse trader to travel widely in an attempt to keep the Maz-
zinian network alive, even since the restoration. Budini received a 
sentence of 20 years in prison, but this was commuted to perpetual exile 
in Brazil. 8 6 
83 ASR, TSC, busta 402, fascicolo 49. 
84 It is mentioned in the transcript that fellow exile Sante Fanelli, 
a suspect in the same crime, had petitioned in 1846 for the case to be 
re-opened so that he could establish his innocence. This favor was 
granted, and all charges against him were dropped for lack of evidence. 
Fanelli remained on his good behavior during 1848-9, and never again 
appeared in court. 
85 Control of the frontiers in the Papal States was notoriously 
sloppy, as the thriving smugglers' trade demonstrates. Budini and at 
least eight other men found their way home despite being refused in 
1846. No distinction exists in this study between them and those who 
returned legally. 
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One minor case remains among those at Lugo. Gaetano Benini, a 
hemp worker and fishmonger, is accused in taking part in an attack on 
Luigi Bortolotti on June 13, 1848. Bortolotti was seriously wounded by 
a large group of men who stabbed him repeatedly. Benini and one other 
defendant are accused simply because they were known to be associates of 
others who had already been condemned for the crime. Benini was accused 
of another murder in 1832, and fled to Corfu rather than face the 
charges. Neither attack was ever proven successfully and both charges 
against him were soon dropped. 87 
Ancona 
The crimes of violence in Ancona present the most serious example of 
anarchy during the time of the Republic. Members of the so-called "Lega 
Infernale," also known as the "Lega Sanguinaria," instituted a genuine 
reign of terror lasting several months. Their extralegal activities 
brought the city government to its knees and left the local police help-
less to protect lives and property. For a time, it appeared that even 
the Triumvirs in Rome were unable to reassert their control of the city, 
until one crime too many brought the anarchy to the point of an interna-
tional incident. 
Even as early as 1847, a few working class toughs took advantage 
of the weak and tolerant government, conveniently dis tr.acted by its own 
reform projects. The police reported cases of renewed attacks or kill-
ings, as individuals tried to eliminate those whom they perceived as 
86 ASR, TSC, busta 410, fascicolo 553. 
87 
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oppressors. Some of these earlier victims included the Marchese 
Nembrini-Gonzaga, engineer Michele Baldeschi, judge Carlo Bonelli and 
carabiniere sub-lieutenant Sante Prioli. At this early stage, the 
attacks may well have been more criminal than political, although moti-
vation is always difficult to pin down. But after the Pope's flight to 
Gaeta, the Lega continued and intensified its activity, as the govern-
ment's control deteriorated outside of Rome itself. Judged by their 
activity, the overall aims of the Lega became more political, insofar as 
they selected victims for ·execution or removal from office entirely 
because of their support for the papal government, and not for reasons 
of corruption, inefficiency or similar motives. Unfortunately, it is 
hard to determine what positive objectives the Lega was promoting, since 
most of their activity was nihilistic and destructive. There were no 
obvious policies or candidates for office associated with them, and 
their principal targets were symbols of authority in general, even the 
existing Republican regime. Yet the Lega's crimes actually alienated 
popular support for their faction, and became a considerable embarass-
ment to the Republic. 88 The Triumvirs hoped to present the new Rome to 
the world as a humane, highly principled force opposed to Austrian des-
potism; the Lega's crimes reminded leaders of o.ther nations that Revolu-
tion could also have a more anarchistic and violent element. 
Part of the resilience of Lega partisans came from their tactic of 
paying lip service to liberty and the Republic, but acting on blatant 
criminal motives in practice. In addition to Ancona, the "Lega Infer-
nale" was also active in Senigallia, Pesaro and Corinaldo, which will be 
88 Natalucci, Marche, pp. 142f. 
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treated shortly. Despite obvious similarities to the Centurians and the 
"Colonna Mobile" of 1832, it should be noted that the Lega included some 
policemen and civil servants among its ranks. 89 
After the proclamation of the Republic, several of the deputies 
from the Marches demanded that Mazzini restore order, but he was slow to 
do so. The deputies wanted someone like an olympian hero: a good 
administrator who was also a political moderate; sufficiently attractive 
to appeal to all but the most extreme criminals, and impartial enough to 
reconcile warring factions. For reasons best known to himself, Mazzini 
seemed hesitant to entrust such power to anyone outside his own circle. 
His first two nominees for the task were political commissars whose 
principal qualification seemed to be loyalty to him. Both failed disas-
terously. Finally, on April 19, an Irish Carmelite friar referred to as 
"Luigi Okeller" (probably Aloisius O'Keller or O'Kelleher) was murdered 
in the streets of Ancona. The British government lodged a formal pro-
test in Rome and dispatched a warship to Ancona harbor to protect Brit-
ish citizens, if the Republic was unable to do so. With the credibility 
of his government at stake, Mazzini selected Felice Orsini, also a dep-
uty, to take control of the situation as a last resort. Orsini was not 
one of Mazzini's inner circle, but he was both inflexible and highly 
motivated. He immediately determined which policemen were most trust-
worthy, then found out who were the principal leaders of the Lega and 
where they lived. On April 27, Orsini took a small force of trusted men 
and staged a brilliant nighttime raid (2:30 A.M.) to arrest 20 of the 
89 Giuseppe Leti, La Rivoluzione ~ la Repubblica Romana 1848-1849 
(Milano: F.Vallardi, 1913), p. 219. 
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worst leaders, and still more the following day. Several days of 
vigorous police work followed, although he had already paralyzed the 
Lega from the first hour. His state of siege was called off after only 
three days.90 
Although the crime wave in Ancona stopped suddenly after Orsini 1 s 
decisive action, the prisoners were not actually brought to trial until 
after the restoration. The main process charged 40 individuals with 14 
separate counts of violence (including 5 murders and 9 other attacks) 
against persons. 91 Most of the accused were named in several of the 
charges. They were jailed first at Foligno, then moved to Spoleto for 
about 20 days. Special Commissioner Caldesi (himself a recipient of the 
amnesty) took them to Narni, where they were confined to a military 
prison for another 20 days, but then released by Garibaldi's men during 
their epic retreat from Rome. Although the police made earnest efforts 
to round up the prisoners, only 8 defendants of the 29 named on the main 
indictment were present when their trial opened. The 3 who shot 0 1 Kel-
leher were among them, and 2 of these were eventually sentenced to 
death. 11 other names were mentioned as possible conspirators, but none 
of these were in custody either. NONE of these 40 men were members of 
the 1846 amnesty group. There were over 60 returnees from the city of 
Ancona and its province, but none of them saw fit to join this more rad-
90 Natalucci, Marche, pp. 144f. 
91 The police archives ( ASR, ASP, busta 308, fascicolo 258) contains 
another more complete list of Anconans compromised by the events of 
1849. The original list of 35 individuals (later increased to 44) 
duplicates much of what already exists in Consulta fascicolo 22. One of 
the additional names, however, was Cesare Gemini, who will be discussed 
shortly. Gemini was only arrested in 1850 in Rome, not Ancona, which 
may account for his failure to appear in the earlier court records. 
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ical group. It is significant, however, that several others - Orsini, 
caldesi and Mattioli among the most important - were amnesty recipients, 
and defended Mazzini's republic against Lega members, most of whom had 
no previous political record. 92 This divergence of opinion supports the 
theory that much of the turmoil, in Ancona at least, had its root in a 
"new" faction of conspirators. The earlier rebels (as represented by 
the 1846 group) may have been largely satisfied by the degree of politi-
cal progress attained by 1849. Members of the Lega, obviously, were 
not. 
Although tbe arch-conservatives found few distinctions within the 
liberal camp, there were certainly sev.eral "levels of expectation" among 
those who hoped for change. The faction led by Farini and Mamiani sup-
ported the moderate reforms of 1846-8 and wanted them to continue. The 
group represented here by Orsini, Caldesi and Mattioli wanted more than 
Pius IX had provided, but were hardly anarchists. As functionaries of 
the Republic, they favored its iecular administration and social pro-
grams, but not murder in the streets. Members of the Lega, by contrast, 
were not satisfied even with Mazzini's regime. Information from this 
study does not tell us whether they had a more radical program of their 
own, or simply took advantage of the moment. Whatever their motives, 
they created great hardship for the Republic. 
Two related cases, labeled "Corinaldo/Ancona," name Mariano Bal-
lanti very prominently. Ballanti himself was not present for either 
trial, since he had fled to Piedmont with a false passport. Yet these 
legal processes present a spectacular list of charges against this one 
92 ASR, TSC, busta 202, fascicolo 22. 
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individual. He was accused of founding and leading a secret society 
called "Pasquale and Companions," dedicated to "debasing religion, pro-
moting disorder and killing honest people" in the words of the indict-
ment. He associated this society with another larger one, the "Carbo-
nari Cousins," to help achieve his ends by violent means, as the "Lega 
Infernale" had been doing in Ancona. He was also wanted for 5 murders 
(including those of an archpriest, an uncle of his, and one of his own 
assassins, killed with 22 stab wounds), and 10 violent attacks or 
attempted murders, some of· them against civic officials. He was also 
accused of defamation, bl~sphemy, forcing councilors to resign after 
they had beaten his party in open elections, theft of criminal records 
(against himself), and promoting riots. Finally, the fascicolo includes 
a small booklet of 52 other charges which are attributed to him or his 
group. He was wanted for questioning about all of them, and may have 
been the motivating force behind more than a few. No defense for Bal-
lanti was presented, since he was safely out of the country, but the 
trial of his companions proceded without him. 93 
Ballanti, a native of Corinaldo, had been a corporal of grenadiers 
with the Pesaro garrison in September, 1845. He left his post to join 
Renzi' s revolt at Rimini, then fled to Tuscany and France after it 
failed. He returned home after the amnesty. He joined the Civic Guard 
during the time of the Republic, and served as an artillery sergeant and 
instructor. The transcript describes him as 11 a truly perverse individ-
ual, an enemy of religion, and violent by nature." Even his compatriots 
thought that he was capable of anything. He loved the Republic because 
9 3 ASR, TSC, busta 223, fascicolo 203. 
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he saw it as an opportunity to promote civil war and place himself in 
positions of authority. He probably saw no future for himself in peace-
time occupations. Leaderless, 23 of his associates were put on trial 
for over 30 crimes. Most were condemned to prison terms, and 7 were 
given a death sentence for one of the murders - 4 of these were eventu-
ally shot. Ballanti himself never returned to the Papal States, 
although his arrest was ordered. Other records indicate that he died in 
1860 fighting with Garibaldi 1 s men in Sicily during the battle of 
Milazzo. 9 4 Ballanti 1 s spec·tacular record of criminal activity looks 
entirely personal and well isolated from his fellow amnestiati 
- no others from the 1846 list were noted among his followers. 
Another amnesty recipient, Caterbo Biagetti, was also involved 
with the events of Orsini's lightning strike against society members in 
Ancona. Biagetti was a non-commissioned officer in the Civic Guard, 
which Orsini mobilized to maintain order after he had arrested the most 
extreme of the anarchist leaders. Members of Biagetti's company sympa-
thized with the Lega, and resolved to seize the citadel where their 
leaders were being held. Biagetti himself, as one of the sergeants, was 
chosen to "relieve" the carabinieri on duty with 40 or SO of his own 
men. The alert policemen were not fooled, however, and most of the 
civic guards were arrested instead. Biagetti admitted belonging to the 
Circolo Popolare and the Civic Guard, but protested that he had done 
nothing wrong. He claimed to have been drunk during the incident, and 
pointed out that he was never actually condemned before the 1846 amnesty 
released him from jail. The court disagreed, adding that he had also 
94 
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abandoned a wife and 3 children in Urbino in order to live with a girl-
friend. Biagetti was one of several leaders condemned to 5 years of 
labor. The others received lighter sentences. 95 
One case which may be remotely related to the activities of the 
Lega includes Costantino Schiavoni, a basketmaker released from Civita 
Castellana in 1846. He was charged with wounding Giovanni Lanari in 
February, 1849. Schiavoni had been refused when he asked Lanari' s 
daughter to dance at a Liberty Tree celebration; Lanari, who had been a 
Centurian and was considered a spy by some, defended his daughter, and 
was later attack,ed on his way home. Schiavoni was not formally con-
victed of the deed, but remained a suspect. He and a fellow defendant 
were released on probation. 96 
Pesaro 
In the city of Pesaro, several related charges were brought against a 
relatively small number of men; surprisingly, quite a few of them were 
amnistiati. Pesaro had been a relatively calm and peaceful city until 
the reign of Pius IX. The sudden change may very well have resulted, 
not from spontaneous demonstrations in the streets, but from the efforts 
of a carefully organized network of activists, following the pattern of 
1831. 
Evidence in many of the cases indicates that the leaders of the 
entire movement were Achille Stefani and Ferdinando Ciacci, both 
released from prison by the amnesty of 1846. Even before the fateful 
95 ASR, TSC, busta 409, fascicolo 496. 
96 ASR, TSC, busta 407, fascicolo 287. 
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events of 1848, both men had enlisted in the local Civic Guard as 
officers, and turned Pesaro into a secure base for their own political 
advancement. One composite case against 26 defendants includes the mur-
ders of several of their factional rivals. In this case alone, 8 of the 
accused were former prisoners released by the amnesty. In addition to 
Stefani and Ciacci, three others had found municipal jobs as excise 
clerks or collectors: former soldier Ludovico Esposto (also spelled 
"degli Esposti"), Giuseppe Siepi, and Antonio Baroni, who died in prison 
before the end of the trial. The others were two artisans, Domenico 
Orazietti and Sisto Mosca (or "Mossa"), and Captain Lorenzo Bucci, of 
the Second Volunteer Regiment, who had been killed in the fighting near 
Rome during June, 1849. This case and those related to it, like the 
cases in Bologna, reveal a concerted effort to paralyze the police, 
prison and court systems. Pesaro may have had 9 or 10 murder victims, 
including the 5 considered in the large case. Although not included, 
mention is also made of a murder by ex-prisoner Camillo Gaj, who subse-
quently died in the Mondavio jail. 97 
Two of the victims mentioned in the same case were killed in late 
1847. One was Girolamo Terni, a workman who did menial jobs for the 
local police, and was considered a spy by some. The other was painter 
Curzio Andreozzi, who had spoken out against the formation of the Civic 
Guard. Both murders had been carried out by groups of armed men, led by 
Mosca and Esposto, respectively, according to witnesses. Esposto was 
also accused of being the principal killer of Giuliano Nicolai, Secre-
tary General of the Delegation of Pesaro, who was stabbed to death on 
97 ASR, TSC, busta 406, fascicolo 150. 
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February 4, 1848 as he returned from his customary after-dinner walk. 
Esposto may have met Ciacci during his prison term in San Leo, and is 
described as being totally dependent on him for direction and advice. 
Baroni and Siepi are described as being helpers in this crime, by 
assisting Esposto to get away. Ironically, another of the victims, 
Angelo Lombardi, was himself an exile who returned from Florence after 
the amnesty. He opened his own tavern on the Via Borgomazzo, where he 
openly criticized the local liberal leaders and the Civic Guards for 
putting their own interests ahead of the community at large. After the 
Veneta campaign pf 1848, he attracted many veterans of Vicenza and Tre-
visa as patrons; he jokingly referred to this informal group as his 
"Lega Lombarda." Although Lombardi considered himself intensely patri-
otic, he was very firm in backing the government of Pius IX, which he 
felt his oath of loyalty demanded. On one occasion, he rebuked some of 
his followers for attempting to steal cattl~ being shipped to besieged 
Venice. Resented as a turncoat by some, he was earmarked for death by 
Stefani and Ciacci, probably because the "Lega Lombarda" was not under 
their control. On December 14 or 15, unknown persons shot at Lombardi 
and missed. A week later, he was shot once in the throat and died. 
Although the actual killers were identified as men of Bucci's Volunteer 
company, Stefani and Ciacci were generally considered to be the ones who 
ordered the killing. 98 
The final murder charged in this series took place on January 6, 
1849. A shoemaker, Terenzio Seraghiti, was killed, and his assistant 
slightly wounded in what looks like a mistaken encounter with Orazietti 
98 A SR, TSC, busta 406, fascicolo 150. 
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and the same two men who probably shot Lombardi. The three were seeking 
(at 3 A.M.) to kill another man who had stated his desire to avenge Lom-
bardi, and fired at the wrong victims in the dark. The combined testi-
mony of both Nicola Conti, a returned exile, and one Isidoro Rossi, was 
a pivotal element in this case, since both men were witnesses to the 
planning of these attacks. Conti, especially, proved to be a valuable 
witness against his former companions, and may never have shared their 
convictions at all. No final verdict is found in these records. 99 
Ludovico Esposto had· already been implicated as the principal 
felon in the murders of Andreozzi and Secretary General Nicolai. In a 
separate case, he is likewise accused of killing the young Sub-Lieuten-
ant Vincenzo Arnaldi on March 12, less than a week after he stabbed 
Nicolai. Witnesses claimed that Esposto may have hated Arnaldi for 
blocking his application to the treasury police (the finanzieri) and 
because he considered Arnaldi too friendly toward the Jesuits. The 
Lieutenant was attacked by 3 men as he returned to his barracks and 
stabbed several times. He died the following morning after naming 
Esposto as his killer. The next day, the police jailed Esposto, only to 
see him broken out by a large crowd within hours. 100 The action of this 
crowd was not random or spontaneous at all. The quick, decisive vio-
lence betrays not only careful planning by Stefani and Ciacci but their 
perception that Esposto was a major asset to them, and worth fighting to 
liberate. 
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The throng which quickly assembled in the main piazza was openly 
led by Stefani and Ciacci. In addition to Domenico Orazietti, already 
mentioned, the group included Giulio Grilli, Luigi Santinelli, Graziano 
palombi, Raffaele Farina and Ferdinando Maccari, all former prisoners 
released in 1846. The crowd, described in the transcript as "anar-
chists," demonstrated loudly for Esposto' s release in front of the 
Legate's residence and the police offices, then marched to the jail, 
where they attempted to tear down the main gate. The warden saw no hope 
of any assistance from the police, so released the prisoner to prevent 
further violence, The triumphant rioters then escorted Esposto to the 
Cafe' d'Ausonia, their favorite meeting place. At the conclusion of 
this trial (March 2, 1853), Santinelli, Grilli and Maccari all received 
10-year sentences for their part in the jail break, and Santinelli got 
an additional 7 years for distruction of property. Palombi received 8 
years for the same charge. 101 
Several of the same people assembled later in the year for a simi-
lar attack on the off ices of the provincial police and the burning of 
the criminal archives. This event came as part of the popular demon-
stration on Sunday, November 19, when Pesaro native Terenzio Mamiani was 
asked to form a government. The "Unione" regiment of volunteers was 
passing through the city at that time, and joined the festivities. Ste-
fani and Ciacci, as civic officers, probably saw the joyful turmoil as 
a golden opportunity to cover the traces of their earlier activity. 
That evening, civic guards and a substantial throng assembled in front 
of the police offices, and demanded entry. The carabinieri on duty were 
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won over, but a small picket of grenadiers remained suspicious. These 
gave way only when a cannon was rolled up to the gate they were guard-
ing. The police headquarters was sacked and burned before the employees 
could do anything. All available records went into the bonfire, system-
atic destruction of furnishings and offices continued for 2 hours, and 
the fire in the building itself burned long into the night. In addition 
to Stefani and Ciacci, Raffaele Farina and Graziano Palombi are indicted 
as members of the crowd, and Nicola Conti is also mentioned here as a 
friendly witness to reduce his own prison time. 102 
Later the same evening, a group of young people, most of them 
drunk, reportedly broke into a house just inside the Fano gate in the 
name of the Civic Guard. As they searched for "spys," they terrorized 
the inhabitants, including 3 poor old men who usually slept in the base-
ment of the house. They left after a while to visit a tavern, then 
returned to confront Natale Guglielmi, one of the old men. In spite of 
his denials that he was a spy, they beat and stoned him to death, then 
sacked the house. Chief among the eight men accused of this crime was 
Luigi Santinelli, a veteran of the previous mob activities, and the one 
who reportedly leveled the accusation of spying. After reviewing this 
latter case, the Consulta decided that it should be handled as an ordi-
nary murder, and not a political crime. 
1851) to the local court. 103 
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Still another of the charges against Stefani and Ciacci (with 11 
others) is the violent expulsion of Major Lelia Lecce, commander of the 
Pesaro fortress. Lecce had the reputation of being a tough and uncom-
promising police official, but in February of 1849, he faced the dilemma 
of conflicting orders from the Government in Rome, and the Pope in 
Gaeta; Stefani and Ciacci decided to use the occassion to get rid of 
him entirely. He received a note on February 21, signed by Ciacci, 
telling him to resign and leave the city if he wanted to avoid trouble. 
When he refused to leave his office, he was forced physically into a 
carriage by a c~owd, and escorted to the Fano gate by a Civic Guard 
force under the command of Lieutenant Stefani. Lecce then continued to 
Rome when he saw that resistance was pointless. Also named in this case 
are Eugenio Marroni, himself a former prisoner, and returned exile 
Nicola Conti. Although both Marroni and Conti were present in the 
crowd, neither was charged, since both were freely co-operating with the 
prosecution. In this and other trials, large gaps exist in the informa-
tion, since both Ciacci and Stefani had fled the country, and therefore 
neither could be questioned. 104 
One final charge was leveled at Stefani and Ciacci in their capac-
ity as lieutenants of the Civic Guard. They commanded a Civic contin-
gent sent to suppress resistance in the countryside west of Pesaro. 
When the Republic decided to introduce conscription in March of 1849, 
many rural villages refused to comply. By order of Andrea Catabeni, the 
£reside, a punitive expedition sent against the villages of Ginestretto, 
Sant'Angelo in Lizzola, Montecciardo and Mombaroccio. Confident of 
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their overwhelming numbers and their artillery, the Civic Guards were 
accused of looting and destruction, and especially the burning of a 
local leader's house to conceal the theft of about 30 scudi, which 
reportedly ended up in Stefani's pocket. No verdict in this case is 
found in the records. 105 
There is certainly a pattern or linkage in the Pesaro cases, but 
it remains difficult to see what it is. Even the single common element 
- all 15 of the accused were prisoners, not exiles - is considerably 
weakened because they were· released from so many different jails. Six 
of the fifteen came out of San Leo, but each of the others was locked up 
in a different place. Granted, prisoners were periodically moved 
between jails, and both Esposto and Orazietti are described as being 
prison friends of Stefani and Ciacci. But the conection between these 
men remains a mystery. The police records give very little of value - 5 
of the 15 were known to be condemned for activities in Rimini (1845), 
but the others have no records provided at all. The single most inter-
esting feature is the frequency of multiple-case defendants. In addi-
tion to the planners, Stefani and Ciacci, 5 others figure in more than 
one case: Esposto, the assassin, Mosca, Santinelli, Maccari, and Siepi. 
(The first 3 of these were known to be veterans of Rimini.) So we are 
still left with an unsolved mystery about what brought these men 
together and kept them active. It may be no more than personal charisma 
of the leaders. Whatever their original connection, the group certainly 
stayed together once their activities began. The activities of this band 
definitely invite more attention from scholars. 
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Faenza 
Beyond any doubt whatever, bloody Faenza was the most highly polarized 
town in the Papal States before the amnesty. Since Faenza had contrib-
uted the largest number of exiles, it would also welcome home the larg-
est number of returnees. The amnesty, together with the disbanding of 
the Pontifical Volunteers and the subsequent authorization of the Civic 
Guard, assured that the local strife would continue, but under modified 
rules. Even geography had its part to play in the conflict, as the 
transcript of one of the trials points out. The old town of Faenza 
within the walls. had been strongly liberal and anti-Papal in outlook. 
It was an independent minded city-state with medieval roots and a long-
standing antipathy to directives from a distant capital. On the other 
hand, the sub-town (or borgo) of Urbecco just across the river Lamone 
was a more recent entity. The inhabitants keenly resented the shadow of 
the more prosperous and better educated municipality, and looked to the 
central government for protection against discrimination. Bargo resi-
dents, some of whom were of recent peasant stock, became rabidly pro-
government, and had traditionally supplied large numbers of Volunteers. 
One of the prosecuting lawyers felt it necessary to explain this polari-
zation for the benefit of judges or officials from other places; he lik-
ened it to the medieval wars to the death between rival cities. The 
Volunteers had doubtless misused their authority greatly, and the Faen-
tini nourished their smoldering resentment for the day when a new oppor-
tunity would come. Such a turn of events occurred with the reforms of 
Pius IX, although his objectives had nothing to do with such local 
affairs. The net result was to discredit members of one faction, who 
183 
had been armed and dangerous, then to first rehabilitate, and later arm, 
partisans of the other faction against their old rivals. As early as 
October 11, 1846, disorders were taking place between inhabitants of 
faenza and Urbecco, as both factions felt the winds of change. More 
clashes would not be slow to follow. 106 
Following the restoration of 1849, several of these partisan 
crimes were brought to trial. What is most shocking is not that the 
traditional strife continued (which it did, unabated), but that it had 
little relative connection ·with the revolution and the war raging every-
where else in the state. Could it be that the Italian convulsion of 
1848 looked so trivial to people in Faenza that it was no more than a 
new variation to a centuries-old feud? At least some of the evidence 
says so. 
The earliest of these crimes was a murder which took place on the 
afternoon of February 11, 1847, which was the last Saturday of Carnival 
for that year. The victim was Filippo Melandri, a papal sympathizer in 
his 60's (a "Papalone") from the Bargo who was making his way home. He 
was accosted by a group of 5 or 6 men, who stabbed and shot him several 
times without a word. Among those accused were 3 returned exiles: Giu-
seppe Bandini, Gaspare Mammini and Francesco Ballardini, all of Faenza. 
The Consulta was convinced that Bandini was genuinely one of the kill-
ers, but decided to send the case back to the provincial court in 
Ravenna (April 5, 1853) to be treated as an ordinary murder. Evidence 
was insufficient to establish a "political" motive for the crime. 107 
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Ballardini was not as fortunate in a related charge of murder in 
the nearby town of Fognano. The victim in this case was a local noble-
man, Andrea Albani, a former police chief who was very devoted to the 
papal government. He was variously called a "Papalone," a Gregorian, 
and a brigand by many of the defendants, and had nearly been killed in 
1842 by some of them. According to the testimony, Albani was killed on 
the morning of April 5, 1849 (which was Holy Thursday). Three men 
unknown to anyone in Fognano arrived by carriage along the road from 
Brisighella and Faenza; two of the strangers left the carriage, killed 
Albani, and quickly fled town in the direct ion they had come. Although 
there are many locals among the 21 defendants in this case, the accused 
absassins are all from Faenza and all unknown to the victim, lending 
weight to the argument for a conspiracy. Francesco Ballardini was even-
tually found guilty and condemned to death, his defense substantially 
hurt by his violation of the amnesty. Other defendants were cleared, 
but Ballardini was beheaded on December 19, 1854 as the principal assas-
sin.1os 
Two other multi-faceted cases describe the continuing strife in 
Faenza. One case recalls several incidents on July 14 and 15, 1847 in 
which former Volunteers were beaten up and their homes ransacked for 
weapons. Part of the same activity was a rather bizarre attack on a 
peasant selling manure just inside the walls of the city - he was beaten 
by 5 men who wanted his pitchfork. Among the defendants are 6 returned 
exiles: Sante Angeletti, Paolo Caroli, Andrea Pozzi, Raffaele Silves-
trini, Niccola Versari, and Cristofaro Rustichelli, all of Faenza. No 
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verdict was given in this case. 109 
Substantially more serious was the other case: 10 seperate counts 
of murder and other acts of violence, charged against 22 defendants. 
The obvious leader of the group was Count Raffaele Pasi, who has already 
been noted as leader of the revolt at le Balze in 1845, was soon elected 
Deputy for Faenza, and who would command the Second Volunteers during 
the siege of Rome. Pasi was a natural leader with great personal char-
isma, a logical choice to become commander of the local Civic Guard, 
with the rank of major. Among Pasi's followers in this case were fellow 
exiles who had a1so enlisted in the Civic Guard: Giuseppe Brisighelli, 
Pasquale Sangiorgi, Vincenzo Valli, Natale Mazzotti, and Niccola Ver-
sari, mentioned in the previous case. The most serious of the violent 
acts occurred on February 14, 1848 when Pasi led a large Civic Guard 
patrol into Urbecco without an obvious and valid objective. Most people 
in the Bargo barred their doors against this armed force. A number of 
stragglers were beaten up before they could get home, then several homes 
were broken into in an apparent search for ex-Volunteers. Three victims 
were found hiding with their families. After attempting to escape, they 
were surrounded and hacked to death with sabers. Hatred for the Papal 
government was seen as the principal motive in this case. Brisighelli, 
Valli and three others were found guilty as principals in these murders, 
and were condemned to death on September 20, 1853. The sentences were 
commuted to life under maximum security; Mazzotti also received a life 
sentance as an accomplice. Pasi had fled the country long before the 
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trial, b~t remained under order of arrest. 110 
Among the Faentini in these cases, a rather obvious pattern can be 
seen in Pasi's followers. Of the 14 defendants who received the 
amnesty, at least 11 were veterans of Pasi's expedition to le Balze in 
1845. All 14 were exiles in France, most of them in the towns of the 
"western crescent." (There had been 4 in Limoges, 3 in Saumur, 2 in 
Loches, 1 in Tours, 1 in Montpelier, plus 1 in Marseilles and 2 in 
Paris.) With the exception of Count Pasi himself, the rest were all 
innkeepers or artisans, acting as reliable clients and loyal followers. 
Evidence shows that Pasi was far more successful than most local leaders 
in keeping his own political network intact before, during and after 
exile. 
There remains one final case related to this group from Faenza. 
The nearby town of Brisighella experienced a mob action on February 14, 
1849 which resulted in the arson of all local records of the communal 
government, carabinieri and holy office. One of Pasi's followers, the 
Natale Mazzotti already mentioned, led a band of men from Faenza and 
Brisighella to attack the Chancery and Communal Residence. They sacked 
the buildings and burned all the records they discovered. Then Mazzotti 
used his position as a police agent in Faenza to demand that the local 
carabiniere commander to turn over the police records, then moved on to 
the holy office where he did the same thing. All of these papers ended 
up in the bonfire. The transcript of this trial contends that Mazzotti 
and his followers came to town for this specific purpose. Of the 30 
individuals indicted in this case, 18 eventually received prison terms, 
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including Mazzotti and 4 other principals, who got 15 years. This sen-
tence of June 24, 1854 followed the life sentence he had already 
received for his part in the murders of exactly one year before. 111 
NON-VIOLENT POLITICAL CHARGES 
We have already seen the results of a punitive expedition near Pesaro. 
Elsewhere in the Marches, there were several other expeditions sent to 
deal with villages hostile to the Republic, as well as church property 
and persons. Central to this effort in the province of Fermo was the 
preside Francesco Bubani. The most clear cut case against him was the 
violation of ecclesiastical immunity by arresting Cardinal DeAngelis. 
Although warned of danger by his friends, DeAngelis refused to leave 
Fermo, and continued to protest the illegitimacy of the Republic. 
Finally, the Interior Ministry ordered his arrest on March 9, 1849, and 
Bubani carried out the order with the forces at his disposal. He was 
one of 7 defendants found guilty, and received an 8-year sentence, later 
commuted to 5 years. 112 A similar but less serious charge was also lev-
eled at Bubani in his official capacity. A long-standing feud between 
one Cassiano Bonanni and a sergeant in the Civic Guard came to a head in 
late December, 1848. Bonanni's house was raided and looted in the mid-
dle of the night, and he was arrested, presumably on Bubani's orders. 
. l l 3 These charges were apparently considered too weak, and were dropped. 
l l l ASR, TSC, busta 412, fascicolo 620. 
112 ASR, TSC, busta 403, fascicolo 92. 
l l 3 ASR, TSC, busta 258, fascicolo 976. 
188 
Bubani found himself in far more serious trouble over the seizure 
of church property. The case in point involved the convent of clois-
tered nuns of Santa Chiara near the country town of Petritoli. In Feb-
ruary, 1849, everyone expected a decree from the central government to 
seize church land and property. When Bubani received word of frenzied 
efforts to send valuables away from the convent, he decided to act on 
his own authority. He ordered a mixed force of carabinieri and civic 
guards to occupy the convent and arrest anyone there who might be hiding 
valuable goods. He also authorized payment of all expenses out of what 
was seized. The.resulting expedition did capture the house without dif-
ficulty on February 19, then proceeded to sell off the large quantities 
of the wheat, corn, oil, meat and soap which they had confiscated, as 
well as linens and vestments from the sacristy. When the Assembly in 
Rome finally did publish the secularization law on February 25, it 
allowed the religious orders to continue to administer their own goods, 
or to be compensated eventually for their loss. Thus Bubani's mistaken 
judgement to anticipate the decree put him not only in a position of 
violating ecclesiastical immunity, but the laws of the Republic, as 
well. Eventually 16 men were brought to trial on these charges, but 
Bubani was obviously the one who had made the fatal decision. The court 
sentenced him to an additional 20 years in prison, while releasing most 
of the others on probation. 114 No other amnesty recipients at all par-
ticipated in these events. 
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Finally, Bubani was brought to trial on the generic charge of 
rebellion and violation of the 1846 amnesty. He had certainly received 
the amnesty and signed the printed declaration. Bubani defended himself 
on two points: that he technically did not have to sign the declaration, 
since the earlier charges against him were unproven; and that he did not 
accept his post in Fermo until after Pius had fled to Gaeta, and effec-
tively left the state leaderless. The Consulta disagreed. By unanimous 
decision on August 17, 1853, the 6 judges condemned Francesco Bubani to 
death. The Pope commuted this sentence to life imprisonment a week 
later. 115 
The provinces of Fermo and Ascoli,had been a considerable thorn in 
the side of the Republic. Since both provinces were at the southern end 
of the Marches, they were less influenced by the busy commercial cities 
of the Legations. Even the larger towns maintained an essentially rural 
outlook, and local leadership tended to be strongly conservative. Many 
of those farming towns in the Appennine foothills opposed Republican 
policies of taxation and conscription, the secularization of religious 
property, and the continued occupation of Rome (as they saw it) at the 
Pope's expense. The aforementioned Cardinal DeAngelis and Monsignor 
Savelli, the future police chief, were two of the many clerics in the 
provinces who continued to promote hostility to the Republic, and 
encourage armed resistance to the local administration. Since Ascoli 
itself was near the Neapolitan frontier, the nearby peasants could 
receive direction and possibly weapons from Gaeta, and took courage from 
the government's inability to surround them with troops. When some of 
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these peasants attempted (on April 12) to re-establish papal government 
in the province of Ascoli, Ugo Calindri of Perugia, the preside, ordered 
a mixed force of Civic Guards and volunteer troops against them in the 
late spring of 1849. The force, commonly called the "Roselli battal-
ion," was commanded by Colonel Pietro Roselli, of the Second Volunteer 
Regiment. In addition to the second battalion of his own regiment, 
Roselli took command of the Civic Battalion of Ascoli, with token con-
tingents of carabinieri and finance troops. His first expedition, in 
April, was directed against the villages of Balza, Arquata and Spelonga 
in the Montegallp region. This operation resulted in charges against 
Roselli and several of his men, including theft, sacking and destruction 
of private homes and church property, arson, extortion, and so on. In 
spite of the large number of men involved, only one individual charged 
is a recipient of the 1846 amnesty, Count Giovanni Battista Ferri, of 
Porto San Giorgio. In his capacity as Major of a militia column 
attached to Roselli's force, Ferri is accused of helping to requisition 
religious houses and threaten their inhabitants, particularly in the 
case of one house in Arquata. Ferri was not present for this trial, 
since he had already fled the country. 116 
The same Ferri is also accused of participation in a more exten-
sive operation against several towns in the Aquasanta district, south-
west of Ascoli. He and the men under his command were charged with 
theft, arson, and other damage to property of several citizens in the 
towns of San Gregorio, Arquata, Luco, Santa Maria, Talvacchi, and Torre 
Santa Lucia. In all of these towns, the houses most frequently selected 
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for sacking were those of former Pontifical Volunteers or their sympa-
thizers. One charge filed against Ferri alone alleges that he extorted 
30 scudi from Francesco Tosi of Torre Santa Lucia. Here, as elsewhere, 
money was freely taken from perceived enemies to defray costs, since the 
province had no money to pay its troops. Ferri is described as being a 
political activist since 1831, as well as a high-ranking member of Young 
Italy and a friend of Mazzini from his days in England. He had already 
served as a volunteer officer in 1831, and found a temporary commission 
in the Piedmontese army during his exile. When Pius authorized forma-
tion of the Civic Guard, Ferri joined as a lieutenant and rose through 
the ranks as fighting against the Austrians and the French presented him 
opportunities. 117 As Mazzinian leader for the southern Marches, he sup-
ported the violent expulsion of the Jesuits from Fermo, according to the 
trial transcript. Still later, he is said to have commanded the column 
which seized Narni and released the 23 prisoners from Ancona, following 
the siege of Rome. 118 
The transcript collection which contains the evidence against 
Ferri is a large one: a four-inch stack of paper, with 56 charges 
against 94 individuals. Yet with the exception of Ferri, the only other 
amnistiato accused is Felice Orsini, once again acting as special envoy 
and trouble-shooter for the Republic. Since neither Ferri nor Orsini 
was present for the trial, no effective defense was presented on their 
behalf, but even half of the story makes interesting reading. In early 
117 The trial transcript describes Ferri as a "self-styled" major of 
militia. In fact his name is not given in the register of commissioned 
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May, Calindri' s effort against his local rebels was running out of 
steam. Orsini moved south with token reinforcements to revive the cam-
paign and maintain the Republic's hold on the entire province. Even 
after Roselli's troops (presumably with Count Ferri in company) were 
called back to support Rome's final defense, Orsini insisted that the 
local forces in Ascoli had to do their utmost to foil the local "bri-
gands," as the rebels were commonly known. Not only did Orsini order 
another sweep of towns to the north and north-east of Ascoli (Offida, 
Appignano, Force, Montalto and Castignano), but he was also accused of 
theft and extortion at the expense of clergy and local leaders in Ascoli 
itself. As late as June 10, when French guns were pounding the walls of 
the Gianicolo, Orsini's columas were wringing over 800 scudi from the 
people of the hill towns, as their contribution to the war effort. At 
this late stage, very little effort was made to enforce the Republic's 
conscription laws - raising money for the troops by any possible means 
took priority. Orsini apparently considered himself worthy of his pay. 
He completed the spoliation of the town palace of Commendatore Francesco 
DeAngelis of Ascoli (brother of the Cardinal) by confiscating clothing, 
furnishings and 2 carriages. When the Austrians made t_heir final 
approach, according to the accusations, Orsini fled toward the Tuscan 
frontier in one of these vehicles, wearing one of DeAngelis' suits, and 
carrying a valise of his filled with still more of his possessions. 119 
There are also several political cases in Ancona which imply guilt 
by association or leadership. One of these included Lorenzo Lesti and 
the aforementioned Cesare Gemini among its defendants. Both were 
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accused of being leaders of Mazzini's Young Italy, and of recidivism, 
due to their reception of the amnesty of 1846. Neither was accused of 
personal crimes, but rather complicity in all of the bloody deeds of 
their underlings. Lesti was known to be one of the three principal 
leaders of the Society in Ancona. He had carried on a brisk correspon-
dence with Mazzini, and was a friend of all other major republicans in 
the city. Lesti admitted belonging to Young Italy since 1832 or 1833, 
and his flight to Paris at that time. But he claimed that he quit in 
1836 because of a policy dispute with Mazzini, and that he had no part 
in any killings pr other crimes since then. He declared his admiration 
for Marat and Robespierre, but had no use for Gioberti or Mamiani, whom 
he considered to be halfhearted. The transcript does not give a clear 
idea of the trial's outcome. 120 We know from other sources, however, 
that Lesti was condemned to 20 years in Paliano prison (December 17, 
1851), and was not released until August of 1863. Seriously ill, but 
unbowed, he died after only 9 days of freedom. 121 
Similarly accused was Domenico Buglioni, formerly a captain and 
adjutant major of the Civic Guard, First Ancona Battalion. Buglioni 
freely admitted that he was released from prison in 1846 by the amnesty, 
and that he retained his friendship with Giuseppe Camillo Mattioli, pre-
side of Ancona. He was suspected of association with the Circolo Popo-
lare, and possible complicity in the activity of the assassins which 
Orsini was sent to eliminate. The prosecution asserted that, as adju-
tant major, Buglioni always knew what the Civic Guard was doing, and 
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must have known something of the murders. These charges were too weak, 
d . . d 122 and were soon ism1sse . 
Another friend and adviser of Mattioli, Antonio Giannelli, was 
likewise accused of promoting rebellion and being a leader in the Cir-
co lo Popolare. Giannelli was a customs clerk before his imprisonment 
(therefore a government employee), then continued in the same job after 
his release in 1846. As a civil servant, he seems to have been close 
enough to those protecting the "Lega Sanguinaria" to know their activi-
ties, and was of great help to Orsini in suppressing the group. 
Although he signed a proclamation calling for a general assembly in 
November, 1848, Giannelli had always disapproved of the Republic. The 
opinion was presented during his trial that he had actually gotten close 
to the assassins in order to save or warn their designated victims. He 
was presented as a moderate leader who actively blocked formation of 
carbonari lodges. In so doing, he incurred the enmity of Lesti and Gem-
ini, as well as others inclined to extreme tactics. This latter argu-
ment prevailed in the trial, and that he was released on probation. He 
probably was able to benefit from the second amnesty and retain his job, 
since his supposed rebellion against the state was never proved. 123 
After his acquittal, however, he did continue to maintain ties with Maz-
zini. The same Antonio Giannelli was arrested again in 1853, as a liai-
son with 40 Hungarian officers of the Archduke Friedrich Karl regiment 
of the Austrian army. A Mazzinian plot to have the regiment seize 
Ancona never took place before it was discovered by the Austrian mili-
122 ASR, TSC, busta 227, fascicolo 269. 
12 3 ASR, TSC, busta 253, fascicolo 911. 
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tary governor. Giannelli and 14 of the Hungarians received death sen-
tences, which would have been quickly carried out except for the inter-
vention of a young woman. Emma Gaggiotti, daughter of the military 
intendant, appealed for mercy directly to General Hoyos. All sentences 
were commuted to prison terms as a result. 124 
Reflections 
All of the cases described here were based on real or perceived crimes, 
but their relatively low collective number says a lot. Despite vigorous 
efforts by the prosecutors, the ex-Volunteers and the zelanti to iden-
tify and punish their enemies, most of those designated did not come 
from the ranks of the veterans. The majority of all political and mili-
tary leaders described here managed to find themselves on the wrong side 
of the fence again, but they acted like statesmen and soldiers, not 
major criminals. Most likely, they concluded that the age of Papal 
Princes had passed, and they hoped to participate in constructing the 
next age. Whatever other results flowed from their choices, their crime 
was essentially a difference of opinion. 
A few examples of terrible violence did take place, sometimes 
involving 'the returnees. In some instances, political motives were very 
evident (as in some of the murders in Bologna), in others, fighting 
hinged on the settling of old disputes (especially evident in Faenza). 
But even allowing for the most extreme examples, there was no pattern of 
general violence among exiles and prisoners, certainly no more than in 
the population at large. 
124 Natalucci, Marche, pp. 166-8. 
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All things considered, the amnesty, and the men who received it, 
should get a clean bill of political health. 
CHAPTER V 
REBELS OR LOYAL CITIZENS? 
Who Participated in the Revolution? 
The first of the three original objectives of this study was to discover 
who actually violated the terms of the amnesty of 1846. The assembled 
evidence indicates that over 80% of the amnesty recipients stayed clear 
of all political and revolutionary activity during the events of 
1848-49. Only 160 names from the complete list of 989 can be identified 
as politically active, or were even accused of being such; 90 of these 
were returned exiles and 70 were released prisoners. As quite a few of 
the cases from the last chapter demonstrate, many of those who fall 
within the maximum of 160 accused were either judged to be innocent, or 
found guilty of lesser charges. Especially allowing for cases of doubt-
ful indentity, mistaken matches, or those whose charges were dismissed 
entirely, the number of those who failed to honor their amnesty agree-
ment is extremely small. This basic conclusion is not based on partisan 
rhetoric or rationalization, but on data from the Consulta's own tran-
scripts. The highest court in the land was hardly permissive. 
So even the most pessimistic tally yields on1y 16.18% of the total 
who were prosecuted, even according to the rigorous standards of the Red 
Triumvirate. When 5 out of every 6 veteran political offenders sit 
through a revolution, thinking their own thoughts, but doing nothing 
illegal, one is justified in concluding that they have met all expecta-
tions. 
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Within this group of 160, the most irreconcilable tended to be 
members of an organization, which probably sustained a sort of activist 
momentum. Some were members of formal societies like Young Italy, which 
allowed no possibility of compromise with a clerical government, at 
least in theory. Others belonged to local or less formal groups, like 
the Lega Infernale in Ancona, or the followers of Stefani and Ciacci in 
Pesaro. It is noteworthy that especially in the cases where violent 
crimes are charged, there is almost always a group behind the violence. 
It is also curious that, at least in cases involving amnesty recipients, 
there is only on~ group per city: Faenza, Lugo, Pesaro, Ascoli, Fermo, 
Ancona, and even Bologna. There may have been other groups, but the 
amnestiati did not join them, for whatever reason. 
All things considered, most of the 1846 group maintained their 
political equilibrium to a surprising degree, and with it, their contin-
ued freedom. There is no obvious support for the allegation that the 
former exiles and prisoners betrayed their trust by turning on Pius or 
the government. Even among the 160 of the Short List, a legitimate 
doubt remains about "which Pius IX" they were loyal to. At least before 
the Allocution of April, a zealous nationalist who enlisted to fight the 
Austrians could legitimately proclaim his undying loyalty to the Pope. 
Whatever else one believes about the wisdom of the amnesty of 1846, the 
fantasy of mass defections or betrayal during the Revolution simply does 
not hold water, and - barring new evidence to the contrary - never will. 
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What Background Patterns Exist? 
Using the general rate of participation as a criterion (16.18%), sowe 
sections of the statistical tables appear disproportionately large. For 
example, out of the original 75 exiles in Paris, 14 appear on the Short 
List of 160. Since they represent 18.67% of the original group, we may 
conclude that the Parisian contingent had a slightly higher recidivist 
rate than the entire sample. Using this simple percentage method, let 
us compare the breakdown of the sub-group with the divisions of the 
original Long List. 1 
Division by Place of Origin 
grouping 
--x/ --p/ --o 
Lazio 6 8 
Umbria 0 0 
Marches 11 24 
Legations 73 38 
Ferrara 23 10 
Bologna 14 14 
Ravenna 27 3 
Forli' 9 11 
TOTALS (160 of 989) 90 70 
1 As already established in chapter II, 11x 11 on the statistical tables 
t d • II II ' d II II f th s ans for exiles, p for prisoners, an o or o ers. 
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Of the four major regions, only the Marches shows a higher percentage 
(19.4%) than the average. The Legations and Lazio are relatively nor-
mal, and Umbria, with no one at all from the original list active in 
1848, has 0.0%. Of the Legations, Ferrara shows a sharp rise in activ-
ity (25.2%), while Ravenna (19.6%) and Bologna (17.8%) are only moder-
ately ahead of the norm. Forli' actually registered a decline. At 
least where men from the original Long List were active, they seem to be 
most aggressive in those regions with well organized groups, as we have 
already established. The geographical pattern supports that theory. 
Statistics.for the individual cities show that individuals in most 
municipalities chose not to participate. Only 6 cities show strong 
increases. 2 Pesaro is the city with the greatest rate of participation 
(28.1%), nearly all of them from Stefani and Ciacci's band. Together 
with Ancona' s 18. 9% (most of these from the Lega), Pesaro' s total 
explains why the percentage for the Marches is so high. In the Lega-
tions, there are high participation rates for Lugo (27.9%), Bagnacavallo 
(27.7%), and Faenza (24.4%), as well as a slightly elevated rate for 
Bologna (18.5%). Each of these cities had either a well organized local 
group, or a long history of strife which may transcend 1848 entirely. 
Another look at the geographic patterns described in Chapter II is 
in order. Recall that the combination of the "Via Emilia" pattern with 
the "Faenza Circle" - 15 provinces in all - represented over 60% of the 
names on the Long List of 989, and 88.5% of the same men known to be 
from the Legations region. If we reconstruct the same patterns from the 
2 For the sake of clarity, cities with fewer than 10 individuals from 
the Long List are not considered, since the percentage changes would 
appear overly dramatic. 
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Short List of 160, the combined configuration is sharply down (48% and 
69% respectively), and so is the single "Via Emilia" pattern. However 
the 10 "Faenza Circle" provinces increase dramatically: a former share 
of 47% of the Legations' names has grown to 56%. The large remaining 
totals for Faenza, Bagnacavallo and Lugo account for the increase, made 
even more dramatic by their geographical proximity to one another. This 
is NOT part of the general trend, so there must be specific local rea-
sons for the variation. Better orgainzation or communication within 
groups, and stronger leadership are likely factors in the elevated sta-
tistics, but the actual reasons are not evident from this study. 
grouping 
Nobility 
Gentry 
Clergy 
Urban Commoners 
Bourgeois 
Petty Bourgeois 
Artisans 
Unskilled 
Peasantry 
Military 
Other 
-unspecified 
TOTALS (160 of 989) 
Division by Profession 
17 8 
19 9 
24 19 
5 4 
- -x/--p/- -o 
8 0 
8 9 
0 0 
65 40 
0 0 
2 2 
3 2 
4 17 
90 70 
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The numbers may tell their most interesting story here, insofar as 
members of the upper classes were far more attracted to continued polit-
ical activity than their lower class brothers. Could it be that ideol-
ogy was a stronger motive than were material conditions? In general 
terms, the gentry and the nobility showed the greatest tendency to con-
tinue their political activity after the 1846 amnesty, with 32.7% and 
26.7% respectively. Most of the urban commoners show a moderate rise in 
the participation rate, but in a clear descending order: bourgeoisie 
(27.8%), petit bourgeoisie (24.7%), artisans (20%) and unskilled 
(16.1%). The simplest explanation may also be the most accurate: the 
more prosperous and the better educated felt more secure and free to 
act, whereas the less fortunate classes considered themselves more at 
risk. Among those listed as students, a hefty 45.5% reappear on the 
Short List, although most of these would no longer be students by 1848; 
the lion's share of these young people came from, and returned to, the 
upper classes after their education was suspended or completed. The 
handful of clergy and peasants on the Long List do not appear at all in 
the later group, and the participation rate for the military is down. 
Among the individual professions, it seems significant that 48% of 
the lawyers went back to politics; considering. what lawyers do for a 
living, this should surprise no one. Commercial dealers also showed a 
high return rate of 28.6%. Among the petit bourgeois professions, the 
highest rates occur for clerks (34.8%), shopkeepers (36.4%), coffeehouse 
keepers (50%) and innkeepers (46.2%). One possible linkage is the need 
for those in the given professions to deal with large numbers of custom-
ers, and hence be exposed to much conversation and propaganda.· However 
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the same characteristic also applies to others whose rate is much lower. 
Finally, among the artisans, only bricklayers (44.4%) and blacksmiths 
(25%) show substantial participation during 1848. No reason for this 
combination is evident. 
Among the suggestions already offered, most are only possible 
theories; nothing in this study conclusively proves any of them. The 
one single pattern that appears to stand by itself is the clear tendency 
of the elite classes to be more active, and the working classes to 
remain less so. It is hardly a shocking revelation, but it is interest-
ing to see the statistics line up so evenly. 
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Division by Place of Exile 
grouping 
- -x/--p/--o 
France 73 
Italian States 7 
Elsewhere in Europe 9 
Asia 0 
The Americas 0 
-unspecified 1 
Division by Place of Imprisonment 
Lazio 22 
Umbria 1 
Marches 24 
Legations 11 
-unspecified 12 
TOTALS (160 of 983) 90 70 
Among the exiles who had been in France, the participation rate was 
higher than the general percentage (20.4%). What is more striking, how-
ever, is that except for Corfu, exiles from all other states were LESS 
likely to return to politics than their French counterparts. 3 The high-
est percentages are recorded for Bordeaux (50%) and Limoges (43.8%), 
with less dramatic increases for Algiers, Loches, Paris, Marseilles and 
Saumur. Of these 7 cities, 4 belong to the "Western Crescent" described 
3 Here, as previously, samples of fewer persons are ignored, in the 
name of statistical simplicity. 
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in chapter II. Those three patterns of refuge continue to tease the 
imagination: exiles from the Western Crescent showed a collective 
relapse rate of 19.2% (although very unevenly distributed). This is 
lower than the rate for the Marseilles cluster (22.6%) but higher than 
the Paris group (18.7%). Hard and fast reasons for it are not obvious. 
Whatever political factors had been operative in France, they clearly 
made more of an impression on the exiles living there than the same fac-
tors in other countries. 
It is unfortunate that the statistics on the prisons include 102 
men whose prison.was unknown. The rest of the numbers will be less pre-
cise. Prisons in only 2 of the 4 regions showed increased rates: the 
Legations (23.4%) and Lazio (17.6%). The reasons are not obvious, but 
those imprisoned at Ferrara had a 25.6% of participation, far ahead of 
all others. San Leo (20.9%), Civita Castellana (20.5%) and Civitavec-
chia (17.7%) show more modest increases. Other significant prisons such 
as Ancona and the Castel Sant 1 Angelo had significant drops in the rate 
of participation, compared to the entire list. It is not conclusively 
provable, but these figures certainly suggest that leadership among 
prisoners may have had much to do with fostering or preserving friend-
ships and networks in the jails. Clearly, the same factors were at work 
among the exiles, who were more free to move around. Once prisoners or 
exiles were allowed to resume their ordinary lives, these connections 
probably continued, especially among men from the same town. The exis-
tence of these connections seems to be self-evident; the story of who 
formed them and how they were later used remains to be told by future 
scholars. 
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Does Background Explain the Crimes? 
Based on interpretation of the preceeding tables, several relatively 
easy conclusions are now possible. Many of the best known members of 
this group were noble and high- minded patriots whose only crime was 
disagreement with the theory and practice of the Church-State. However 
a large percentage of the Short List group (especially among the lower 
classes) engaged in overtly criminal activity, whether politically moti-
vated or not. Unfortunately, the charges against these individuals dif-
fer widely, so it is difficult to detect patterns among such relatively 
small numbers. One possibility, of course, is that there simply are no 
consistent trends at all. But a few patterns probably do merit some 
attention. 
Legislators and Administrators 
This category and the following one become especially interesting 
because they are composed almost totally of the elite: nobles, gentry, 
and upper bourgeois professionals. 
There are 24 possible names on the list of deputies who are proba-
bly amnesty recipients, and another 5 who were significant administra-
tors duririg the Republic. Not surprisingly, every single one of these 
people belonged to one of the elite classes of society: nobility, landed 
gentry, or upper bourgeoisie. These names represent many of the best 
known of the original amnesty group. In addition, several of those who 
were most passionately dedicated to the Revolution as an are found 
here: Sterbini, Galletti, Orsini, Zambeccari and Caldesi. Although 
these individuals and others certainly differ widely in many of their 
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ideas, we must remember that collectively they represent the leadership 
which gave life to the Republic, and that they were also lumped together 
in the minds of many reactionaries. 
Several of these deputies and administrators were also accused of 
other offenses, but not all charges held up under scrutiny. Two were 
accused of conspiring to commit murder (Sterbini and Pasi), five others 
(including Orsini) of crimes against property, and still two others of 
promoting secret societies. These additional charges were not actively 
prosecuted, since most of these Deputies and Administrators had fled the 
state anyhow, knqwing that their chances of vindication were nil. 
Military Leaders 
Among military officers who were not also deputies or accused of crimes, 
only nine officers were excluded. Pietramellara (a noble) and Masini 
(landed gentry) were already dead in battle, and beyond the reach of 
earthly courts. Palazzi (a doctor) was never charged, probably because 
he also emigrated, and Domenico Belluzzi (a professional soldier) may 
have never returned home after his spectacular defense of Venice. 
Although each of these individuals found himself on the opposite side of 
the fence from the Papal regime, none of them seems to have committed 
even remotely criminal acts, or indeed anything unbecoming of a good 
soldier. All eight of those with known professions are either career 
soldiers or the same upper class types as their colleagues in the previ-
ous category. 
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Murder & other Violence 
By way of contrast, lower class people seem to be the exclusive defen-
dants in crimes of violence, whether against people or property. For 
example, there were 40 defendants charged with actual or attempted mur-
der, multiple in some cases. Among these accused, only 1 was known to 
be gentry, with no nobles or upper bourgeoisie at all. The rest 
included 9 petit bourgeois, 17 artisans and 5 unskilled. This very lop-
sided condition may be one result of the limited political options which 
working class people saw as open to them. The same imbalance is cer-
tainly visible in the severity of their sentences. Although 9 of the 
defendants were released after dismissal of the charges, several others 
were convicted with overwhelming evidence. Those who were convicted and 
actually executed (6) were all lower class people: 1 petit bourgeois, 4 
artisans, and 1 unskilled. The 7 who received life sentences were like-
wise from the same lower classes, as were the 4 others who died in 
prison. 
Under the category of violence against persons (shootings, beat-
ings, and lesser injuries), 13 are so charged. Although 3 are of 
unknown background, 3 others were petit bourgeois, and 7 were artisans. 
Charges were dismissed in 4 of the 13 cases. 
Damage to Property & Society 
There were 10 individuals - petit bourgeois, artisans and unskilled -
accused of various crimes against property, both state and private. One 
of these (Antonio Liverani) was shot by the Austrians while trying to 
escape, and 3 other cases were dismissed. 
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Under a more vague charge of other crimes against society or prop-
erty, there were 5 individuals: one each from the nobility (Count 
G.B.Ferri), bourgeoisie, petit bourgeoisie, artisans, and one unknown. 
Unfortunately, the outcome of these cases is not provided in the tran-
scripts. 
Finally, there were 8 men, all of them former prisoners, accused 
of planning or participating in prison breaks. At least one case was 
dismissed, the rest are unknown. 
Non-violent Political Charges 
Ironically, the only category of charges which cuts across the entire 
social spectrum appears to be t~e political offenses. 
One frequent accusation was "Offense to the Dignity of the Saver-
eign" (Lesa :t-1aesta'). In practice, this frequently meant violation of 
the amnesty terms, especially with reference to the signed declaration 
of loyalty. It is worth noting that this title seems to have been used 
exclusively against amnesty recipients. A very broad spectrum of 29 
persons were so charged, including all classes except unskilled. These 
cases were either dismissed altogether (11 of 29) or given severe sen-
tences - there was no middle ground. Among the known sentences, 5 were 
given life in prison, 7 perpetual exile and one death in absentia. 
A similar but less serious grouping of charges covers all forms of 
communication or association perceived as hostile to the government: 
talk, literature or membership in secret societies. There were 16 peo-
ple so charged; one of these is accused of membership in some unnamed 
society, and 6 others are specifically listed as being Mazzinians. The 
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accused also cut across the social spectrum: gentry, upper and lower 
bourgeoisie, artisans, students and one unskilled worker. Only 4 are 
known to have received prison terms, 3 of them artisans. Of more than 
passing interest is the fact that 10 of the 16 accused had their charges 
dismissed entirely. This high dismissal rate may indicate one of two 
conditions: the difficulty of making a clear case in such a nebulous 
field, or the possible use of this heading to cover trumped up charges 
with little substance. 
In general, it appears that the individual's background did condi-
tion the crimes he was accused of to a certain degree. Upper class pea-
ple were more like to find themselves in leadership roles in the govern-
ment or the military. So their "dis loyalty" would more likely occur 
because they backed the wrong government, and not because of a murder or 
a prison break. Lower class people, on the other hand, tended to steer 
their political zeal into violent crimes, if indeed they did anything at 
all. Only in the purely political field are the classes relatively 
equal in their participation, allowing for a slight "bulge" at the mid-
dle of the social spectrum. 
What Next? 
Despite the interesting patterns which emerge from this wealth of data, 
there are almost as many new questions raised as there are old ones 
answered. 
Beyond any doubt, there is solid evidence which suggests organiza-
tions or networks about which we know relatively little. At least some 
of the revolutionary process in 1848 was far from the traditional con-
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spiracies among alienated elites, or bread riots by starving workers. 
Spontaneous outbursts and generic unrest do not account for the methodi-
cal and coordinated attacks on government personnel in Lugo. More work 
is necessary on Count Pasi's group in Faenza and the Lega Infernale in 
Ancona. The Pesaro crowds of Stefani and Ciacci are begging for more 
study. Even the coordination of the small bands in Bologna could use 
more study. Compared to these clusters of activists, the debates and 
decrees of members of the government seem far more like a modest reform 
program than a true revolution. 
For furthe~ study, one good place to start would be the police 
intelligence files stored in the Sapienza Archives in Rome, as well as 
the local police records and day books in Bologna and other provincial 
archives. The Consulta records may offer a few additional details about 
the cases reviewed here, but not much more; this present study shows the 
lion's share of what is there. Transcripts from the local courts might 
help, but not the Consulta. 
In any case, the "voiceless thousand" have now been heard. It is 
no longer necessary to assume what the amnistiati thought or did after 
their repatriation; their actions, and in many cases their touching 
fidelity to a pledge of loyalty, have now been shown in full daylight. 
More needs to be said about them and their political world, but at least 
there has been a beginning. Hopefully this study will provide a stimu-
lus to further investigation of these forgotten men. Their desire to 
improve their state and their world, even at the price of their own suf-
fering, should find common ground among many of us who hope for the same 
good things. If their efforts serve to inspire and instruct the state 
builders of tomorrow, then they certainly have not suffered in vain. 
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Grottazzolina 1 
Monte Giorgio 1 
Porto S. Giorgio 1 1 
Ascoli (city) 2 2 l 
Folignano l 
Ripatransone l 
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REX3ION OF THE LEX.;ATIONS 
Legation Governo City or tCMil xt.. 
I 
p/ 0 x/ p 
Legations - unspecified 1 
Ferrara -same- (city) 6 4 2 
Montalbano 1 
Argenta (city) 4 2 
s. Biagio di Argenta 1 1 1 1 
Bagnacavallo (city) 37 10 11 2 
Traversara 1 
Cento (city) 2 
Conselice (city) 1 
Iavezzola 1 
Fusignano (city) 9 
Lugo (city) 30 13 10 2 
Cotignola 1 
Ma.ssa Ianbarda (city) 1 5 3 
Sant'Agata 1 1 
Bologna -same- (city) 44 91 12 13 
Amo la 1 
calderino 2 1 
Crespellano 1 
Tignano 1 
Budrio Minerbio Garuolaro 1 
castel s. Pietro (city) 3 
Medicina (city) 1 
Villa Fontana 1 1 
Porretta (city) 2 1 
S. Pietro in casale (city) 1 
Verga to (city) 2 
Bargo Panigale 1 
Monte Severo 1 
Rocca Pitigliano 1 
Savigno 1 1 
SUsano sotto Vergato 1 
Ravenna -same- (city) 19 13 1 3 
S. Alberto 1 
Brisighella (city) 1 
castel Bolognese (city) 6 2 
Faenza (city) 85 1 21 
Im:lla (city) 7 3 1 
Russi (city) 14 3 2 
BRE'AKlXMN BY PIACE OF ORIGIN 
REX3ION OF THE LEX3ATIONS (continued) 
Legation Govern.o City or town x/ p/ 
Forli' -same- (city) 36 3 
Terra del Sole 1 
Bertinoro Forlimpopoli 1 
Meldola 5 2 
Cesena (city) 19 7 
Civitella (city) 1 
Fitnnara 1 
Coriano ltlnte Scudolo 2 
Ri.mini (city) 73 38 
Spadarolo in ltlnte 1 
Verucchio 2 
s. Arcangelo (city) 1 2 
Saludecio Cattolica 1 
ltlntef iore di Ri.mini 1 1 
ltlntegridalf o 1 
ltlrciano 5 
s. Giovanni in Marignano 3 3 
Savignano (city) 
s. Mauro 
"Others" 
specific but unknown places: 
Barbaro lo 
Piernarco 
Vetturato 
places outside Papal States 
Piedmont -unspecified 
Panna 
Tuscany 
Castel ltlnf errato 
San Remo 
Torino 
Piacenza 
Firenze 
Pistoja 
'lWo Sicilies Napoli 
no place of origin specified 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3 
1 
1 2 
.l 
7 3 
7 19 
0 
3 
231 
x/ P 
5 1 
1 
1 
2 1 
1 5 
1 
2 
550 433 6 90 70 
APPENDIX B 
BREAKrX:MN BY PROFESSION 
Grouping Profession (with translation) 
NOBILITY 
- unspecified (nobile} 
marquis (marchese) 
count ( conte) 
knight ( cavaliere) 
UNTITLED GENTRY 
man of property (possidente) 
CLERGY 
priest & pastor (parroco) 
priest ( sacerdote) 
subdeacon ( suddeacono) 
religious (religioso) 
URBAN COMMONERS 
-see next 3 pages for expansion: 
PE'ASANTRY 
peasant (contadino) 
farm worker (bracciante) 
market gardener (ortolano) 
shepherd (pastorolo) 
MILITARY 
colonel (colonello) 
captain ( capitano) 
lieutenant (tenente) 
- unspecified officer (ufficiale) 
non-cans ( sergente, brigatiere, maresciallo) 
soldier (soldato, militare) 
OTHERS 
student ( studente) 
sailor (marinajo) 
football player (giocatore di palone) 
sports official (bigliardiere) 
smuggler (contrabandiere) 
NO PROFESSION SP:OCIFIED 
G;rand 'l'o:tals 
x/ p/ o 
2 1 
6 
17 1 
3 
36 16 
1 
2 3 
1 
1 
342 123 5 
5 2 
1 
1 
1 1 
5 
7 
7 1 
7 
4 2 
7 4 
7 4 
1 
1 
1 
1 
87 272 
550 433 
0 
6 
233 
x/ p 
1 
5 
2 
8 9 
65 40 
1 1 
1 
1 
3 2 
4 17 
90 70 
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Grouping Profession (with translation) x/ p/ 0 x/ p 
BOURGEX)IS 
Professionals 
doctor (medico) 15 4 1 1 1 
surgeon (chirurgo) 8 1 5 
veterinarian (veterinario) 2 
engineer ( inginiere) 1 1 1 
lawyer (avvocato, legale, dottore in leggi) 19 6 7 5 
notary (notajo) 2 1 1 
university teacher (professore) 3 1 
Ccmnercial 
manufacturer (fabbricante) 1 
shipping agent (spedizioniere) 1 
accountant (contabile, computista) 2 1 
bookseller (librajo) 1 1 
money changer (cambiavalute) 1 
dealer (trafficante, canmerciante, sensale) 11 3 3 1 
contractor (appaltatore, impressario) 2 
hotel keeper (albergatore) 1 
PE'TTY BOURGEOIS 
White collar 
pharmacist (farmacista) 5 
male nurse (infirmiere, flebotano) 1 
deputy (deputato) 1 
political leader (capo politico) 2 
clerk, inspector (impiegato) 11 9 3 3 5 
bailiff (cursore) 1 1 
legal clerk (attuario) 1 
calligrapher (calligrafo) 2 
tutor (istitutore) 2 1 
copyist (scritturale, copista, emanuense) 2 1 
Tradesmen 
shopkeeper (negoziante) 10 1 4 
printer (tipografo, stampatore) 3 1 1 
medal seller (medagliaio) 1 
restaurateur (trattore) 2 
coffeehouse keeper (caffetiere) 9 1 4 1 
innkeeper (locandiere, oste) 11 2 5 1 
wineseller (spacciatore di vino) 1 
fU.tistic 
painter (pittore) 7 2 1 1 
sculptor (scultore) 5 
writer (scrittore, uamo di lettere) 3 
musician (musicante, suonatore) 5 1 1 
singer (artista di canti) 1 
actor (artista dranma.tico) 1 
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Grouping Profession (with translation) x/ p/ 0 x/ p 
ARTISANS 
Textiles & Clothing 
weaver (tessitore, lanino) 1 5 1 
ribbon maker (fettuciario) 1 1 
tailor (sarto/sartore) 36 7 4 3 
dyer ( tintore) 1 
hatter (cappelajo) 7 2 
Building Trades 
bricklayer (muratore, cazionsuole) 12 6 5 3 
carpenter (falegname, legnajuolo) 17 5 1 1 
cabinetmaker (ebanista) 4 3 2 
plasterer (gessino) 1 1 1 
house painter (verniciatore) 1 1 
Food Service 
baker (fornajo) 7 1 1 
butcher (macellaro, pizzicagnolo, beccaio) 7 8 1 1 
miller (mugnajo) 1 1 
cook (cuoco) 3 
fishmonger (pescivendolo) 1 
leather 
shoemaker ( calzola jo) 30 9 1 5 
tanner (conciapelli, concitore) 3 1 
haltennaker (capestraro) 1 
saddler (sellajo) 2 1 
Other Artisans 
barber (barbiere) 6 2 2 
blacksmith/ironworker (fabbro, ferrajo) 10 2 2 1 
coppersmith (ramajo) 1 
mechanic (rreccanico) 2 1 
gunsmith (anna.jolo) 1 
glassblower (vetrajo) 1 
basketmaker (canestraro) 1 1 
wickel'.WOrker (impagliatore) 2 
upholsterer (tappezziere) 1 
canb maker (pettinajo) 2 
cigar maker (fabbricatore di zigari) 1 
rope maker ( cordajo) 1 
BRFAKDCMN BY PROFESSION 236 
Grouping Profession (with translation) x/ p/ 0 x/ p 
UNSKILLED 
Service 
domestic servant (servitore, damestico) 5 
waiter/valet {camariere) 1 2 1 1 
coachman {cocchiere) 3 1 1 
carter/cat.man {vetturale, birocciaio) 1 2 
postillion (postiglione) 1 
messenger (corriere) 1 
watchman { sorvegliante) 1 1 
lamplighter {lampionajo) 1 1 
Labor 
porter { facchino) 2 11 2 
second-hand dealer (rigattiere) 1 
hemp-dresser {canapino, gargiolaro) 11 8 1 
rice husker {pilaricco) 1 
whitewasher {imbiancatore) 1 1 1 
laundryman (lavandajo) 1 
APPENDIX C 
PI.ACES OF EXILE 238 
Country City or town x/ p/ 0 x/ p 
France -unspecified 4 1 
Algiers (N. Africa) 31 7 
Angers 1 1 
Aurel lac 2 
Avignon 1 
Bastia (Corsica) 17 2 
Batillon-sur-I.Dire 1 
Bordeaux 8 4 
Bourbon-Vendee 2 
cahors 3 
Cette 1 1 
Charenton 1 
Chateauroux 30 3 
Chaumont 2 
Clermont-Ferrand 1 
Epinal 1 
Lesneven 1 1 
Lille 1 
Limoges 16 7 
loch es 19 4 
Lyon 1 
Macon 5 2 
Marseilles 79 15 
Mende 1 
Montauban 2 
Mont-de-Marsan 1 
Montpellier 3 2 
Nancy 1 
Narbonne 1 1 
Neuf chateau 1 
Nimes 6 1 
Paris 73 14 
Perigueux 4 
Quinper 1 
Rennes 1 
Rodez 1 
Saint Quentin 1 
Saumur 22 4 
Toulon 2 1 
Toulouse 4 1 
Tours 4 1 
Versailles 1 
Portugal Lisbon 1 
Spain -unspecified 1 
Barcelona 2 
Burgos 1 
Madrid 1 
PIACES OF EXILE 239 
Country City or town x/ p/ 0 x/ p 
Great Britain -unspecified 1 
Derby 1 1 
Dublin 1 
Ion don 8 
Taunton 1 
Netherlands Amsterdam l 
Belgium Brussels 2 
Mons l l 
Prussia Aachen l 
Switzerland Geneva l 
Lucerne l 
Vaud 1 1 
Austrian Italy Fil.m'le 10 
Trieste l 
Venice l 
Verona 1 
Villafranca 1 l 
Piedmont cagliari l 
Genoa 4 1 
San Retro 1 
'furin 2 1 
Parma Piacenza l 
Tuscany -unspecified 2 
Florence 26 3 
Livorno 4 1 
Lucca 2 
Pavena 1 
Pistoja 2 
Viareggio 1 
San Marino -same- 11 
1.wo Sicilies Naples 3 
Malta Valetta 3 1 
Ionian Islands -unspecified 3 
Cef alonia 3 
Corfu 17 3 
Santa Maura 3 
PI.ACES OF EXILE 240 
Country City or tam x/ p/ 0 x/ p 
Greece Athens 12 1 
Nostizza 1 
Patras 1 1 
Ottanan Empire Aleppo 1 
Alexandria 2 
Constantinople 4 
Ioannina 1 
Smyrna 4 
Russia Odessa 1 
Ceylon Colanbo 1 
Brazil -unspecified 2 
Bahia (=Salvador) 5 
Rio de Janeiro 1 
Uruguay .Montevideo 1 
Venezuela Caracas 1 
United States New Orleans 1 
New York 2 
Unspecified places of exile 21 1 
Grand Totals 550 90 
241 
PLACE:S OF IMPRISCHmNT 
Region Prison or jail x/ p/ 0 x/ p 
Iazio castel Sant'Angelo (Rana) 21 3 
Civitavecchia 62 11 
Civita castellana 39 8 
Corne to 3 
Umbria Narni 8 l 
Spoleto 3 
Marches Ancona 65 5 
cagli 3 l 
Cingoli l l 
Fano 9 l 
Fbssombrone 1 
Gubbio 3 
Macerata 4 2 
f.t:>ndolfo 2 l 
Pergola 1 1 
Pesaro 10 1 
San Leo 43 9 
Senigallia 3 2 
Urbino 3 
Legations Ferrara 43 11 
Ravenna 1 
Rimini 3 
Police request - prison unspecified 80 10 
No prison given 22 2 
Grand Totals 433 70 
APPENDIX D 
~ b \< 
\J sl1eto 
• Velletri 
0 
24J 
APPENDIX E 

APPROVAL SHEET 
The dissertation submitted by Leopold G. Glueckert, O.Carm. has been 
read and approved by the following committee: 
Dr. Anthony Cardoza, Director 
Associate Professor, 
Department of History 
Loyola University of Chicago 
Dr. Walter D. Gray 
Associate Professor, 
Department of History 
Loyola University of Chicago 
Fr. Richard F. Costigan, S.J. 
Associate Professor, 
Department of Theology 
Loyola University of Chicago 
The final copies have been examined by the director of the dissertation 
and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any neces-
sary changes have been incorporated and that the dissertation is now 
given final approval by the Committee with reference to content and 
form. 
The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. 
Date { ( 
